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ABSTRACT
A RISK- AND FUZZY SET-BASED METHODOLOGY FOR 
ADVANCED CONCEPT TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATION 
MILITARY UTILITY ASSESSMENT DESIGN
Thomas James Meyers 
Old Dominion University, 2007 
Director: Dr. Charles B. Keating
The U.S. Department of Defense Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration 
(ACTD) and derivative, rapid acquisition programs offer timely solutions to critical 
military needs by assessing the utility of technologies mature enough to be fielded 
without application of traditional, defense system development processes. Military utility 
assessments (MUA) are ACTDs’ most critical features, but the lack of a standard for 
identifying assessment criteria tailored to specific demonstrations risks poorly informed 
acquisition decisions and the military operations those decisions are intended to support.
The purpose of this research was to develop and deploy a methodology for 
identifying measures of effectiveness integral to advanced concept technology 
demonstration military utility assessment design. Within a context determined by 
attributes of complex systems, the research observed twin premises that ACTD 
assessment designs should accommodate: all risks possible when incorporating 
demonstration prototypes within superior and complex, joint military operations 
metasystems; and the ambiguities and other of what have been termed “fuzzy” 
manifestations of the cognition and language with which end-user, military operators 
craft and express perspectives required to identify measures of effectiveness fundamental 
to MUA designs. The effort pursued three research questions:
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(1) How might joint military operations metasystem models guide the identification of 
ACTD measures of effectiveness?
(2) How might be developed and employed joint military metasystem models with which 
can be identified ACTD measures of effectiveness?
(3) How useful might ACTD managers and analysts find the MUA design methodology 
developed and deployed with this research?
The deployed methodology stimulated answers to these research questions by 
uniquely combining tailored versions of established risk assessment methods with a fuzzy 
method for resolving small group preferences. The risk assessment methods honored one 
research premise while enabling the identification and employment of a joint military 
operations metasystem model suited to MUA design needs of a simulated ACTD. The 
fuzzy preference method honored the second research premise as it, too, promoted 
metasystem model employment. The complete methodology was shown to hold favor 
with a large segment of a community expert in managing and assessing the utility of 
ACTDs emphasizing critical, joint military service needs.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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PREFACE
This dissertation advances a methodology developed with the hope that United 
States military service members will benefit from its application. The methodology’s 
tested application domain of advanced concept technology demonstrations (ACTD) was 
chosen to represent other domains to which it may also be applied for the benefit of joint 
forces and missions: domains such as ACTD-derivative, joint capabilities technology 
demonstrations; rapid prototyping efforts of the Department of Defense(DoD); formal, 
DoD acquisition-related operational testing, and other domains prominently characterized 
by a need to employ subject matter experts for the identification and emplacement of 
measures of effectiveness able to drive meaningful assessments of the utility of systems 
and processes proposed for military use.
The research with which was developed and demonstrated this risk- and fuzzy 
set-based methodology for ACTD military utility assessment (MUA) design exploited 
theoretical and methodological perspectives of a problem drawn from practice, and only 
with those perspectives could the methodology be claimed to support practitioners.
While some might argue the methodology’s principal components of risk assessment, 
fuzzy set theory, and complex systems as peripheral to the realm of everyday, military 
operations, the researcher believes those components to undeniably and significantly 
contribute to assessments of utility of prototypes and methods proposed for the military. 
Given the opportunity to do so through the use of this document’s practitioner guide and 
fundamental themes, the methodology derived from this research effort will well support 
current and future, U.S. military missions.
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This dissertation comprises five chapters and ten appendices constructed and 
linked to offer readers a hopefully understandable and appealing blend of theoretical, 
methodological, and practical concerns regarding ACTD and similar, MUA designs. 
Chapter sections are likewise intended to clearly and comprehensively support chapter 
themes.
The introductory chapter identifies a research purpose and questions prompted by 
a MUA design standards deficiency noted by the DoD and external agencies as having 
plagued the ACTD program since its 1994 inception. The first chapter also offers a 
characterization of the ACTD program in terms of history and intent, together with the 
intent and other attributes of demonstration MUAs. Corresponding emphasis upon the 
complex nature of military operations that ACTDs are expected to markedly enhance 
establishes a context observed as the MUA design methodology was developed, 
deployed, and evaluated for its own utility.
The second chapter review of pertinent literature extrapolated ACTD program and 
MUA intents in identifying nine elements of the literature bearing on the MUA design 
standards problem. Relatively obvious elements like risk assessment, fuzzy set theory, 
and fuzzy approaches to risk assessment are explained, as are those less obvious -  such as 
pairwise comparisons and small expert group characteristics -  once the latter are logically 
drawn from the former. The Literature Review chapter represents a thorough and 
detailed effort to support the MUA design methodology explained in the following 
chapter.
“Research Methodology” is the heart of the dissertation document. This third 
chapter encompasses a rationale for and description of the MUA design methodology and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
its employment. It notably offers a description of the action research format used with 
this particular research effort and intended to be used with all applications of the design 
methodology. It also identifies and elaborates upon the five-phase design that governed 
this work, and it cites the approach emplaced to ensure a research effort faithful to tenets 
of reliability and validity.
The Results chapter illustrates the design methodology’s deployment, beginning 
with deliberations of an action research group of one leader and three additional, military 
operations experts, and concluding with judgments of the proposed methodology’s utility 
rendered by a 20-member expert group of managers and analysts that represented a 
sizable portion of all individuals ever to have pursued or supervised MUA designs for 
U.S. multi-service demonstrations. Results chapter data evince the methodology utility 
next addressed in “Conclusions.”
The Conclusions chapter links methodology deployment results with the three 
research questions of the Introduction, argues for methodology status of the research’s 
risk- and fuzzy set-based approach to MUA design, and cites theoretical, methodological, 
and practical contributions made by the research. It also serves a call for research 
targeting further mitigation of ACTD and ACTD-like, assessment design problems.
This dissertation’s first nine appendices complement information resident in its 
five chapters, but the tenth crystallizes the principal intent of all work portrayed in the 
document. The “ACTD Assessment Guide for Practitioners” notes 25 steps that capture 
for demonstration managers and analysts the essence of the MUA design methodology 
proposed here. The Guide is not prescriptive, in keeping with the methodological level 
claimed for this research’s assessment design approach; but it must be used smartly and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
rigorously. Though other research products may be rightfully evaluated as important, the 
Guide is the only one that can genuinely, immediately, and significantly benefit U.S. 
military service members.
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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Department of Defense instituted its Advanced Concept Technology 
Demonstration (ACTD) program in 1994 to “help expedite the transition of maturing 
technologies from... developers to... [military] users” (Department of Defense [DoD], no 
date-a, Introduction to ACTDs: Introduction section, 1 3) challenged by rapidly changing 
and significant threats (DoD, no date-b; Payton 2002). Conducted largely free of 
longer-established but more prescriptive and time-consuming (U.S. General Accounting 
Office [GAO], 2002), defense acquisition procedures, these demonstrations offer 
opportunities to relatively quickly advance to military use critically needed (DoD, no 
date-a), technological systems proposed but not necessarily developed for the military. 
The ACTD program is noted to have met its intent in widely varying degrees (DoD,
1997, no date-a; “On the Fast Track,” 2005; Payton, 2002; South, 2003; U.S. 
Congressional Budget Office [CBO], 1998; GAO, 1999,2002), with numerous 
demonstrations criticized for frailties of methods used to assess the military utility of 
proffered systems (GAO, 2002).
“The heart of an ACTD is the assessment of military utility by the warfighter” 
(DoD, no date-a, ACTD Guidelines: Formulation, Selection, and Initiation -  Formulation 
and Submission section, If 11), yet poorly designed or executed military utility 
assessments (MUA) have plagued many (GAO, 2002) of the nearly 150 demonstrations 
conducted 1995-2006 (DoD, 2006). Responsible DoD officials have conceded the need
This dissertation is formatted in the style of the Publication Manual o f the American 
Psychological Association, 5th edition.
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for standards promoting thorough and consistent assessments (GAO, 2002), but none 
have been formally promulgated by the department (A. G. Arnold, personal 
communication, January 18, 2005; W. F. Smith, personal communication, January 18, 
2005). This lack of MUA design standards invites a plethora of risks to acquisition 
decisions (GAO, 2002) and the very military operations those decisions are intended to 
support (DoD, no date-a; GAO, 2002). The standards deficiency constitutes a serious 
problem that should be eliminated and, if smartly addressed, can be.
PROBLEM STATEMENT
Military utility assessments are the most critical features of advanced concept 
technology demonstrations, yet poorly designed or executed assessments have plagued 
numerous demonstrations and represent significant risks to system acquisition decisions 
and military operations the decisions are intended to support. The ACTD program 
suffers from a lack of standards promoting consistently thorough assessment designs 
tailored to individual demonstrations. Program officials concede the need for improved 
designs but have provided no mechanism with which ACTD managers and their staffs 
can rigorously identify the assessment criteria those designs should emplace.
THE ACTD PROGRAM
Findings and recommendations of the 1986 President’s Blue Ribbon Commission 
on Defense Management, commonly called the Packard Commission, catalyzed the 
ACTD program (South, 2003). Eight years later, the Commission’s call for a new, 
defense acquisition management concept (President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on 
Defense Management, 1986) became what then-U.S. Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin 
termed an ACTD program to “address operational utility and operational cost
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
effectiveness with minimal technical risk” (Aspin, 1994, as cited in South, 2003, p. 14). 
Those tenets of the program that spawned today’s ubiquitous, Predator and Global Hawk 
unmanned aerial vehicle (GAO, 1999; “On the Fast Track,” 2005) operations, for 
example, remain unchanged since 1994.
Advanced concept technology demonstrations are “extremely important 
precursor[s] to...[what might be] formal acquisition processes” (Bachkosky, 1997, p. 54) 
involving certain types of military systems. They offer military users “try-before-buy” 
(Payton, 2006, p. 11) opportunities to operate prototype systems, explore prototype 
capabilities derived from those systems, judge prototype system effectiveness and 
suitability, and so influence related acquisition decisions that may follow. “Specifically, 
ACTDs focus on the question, ‘Is there a near-term solution, based on mature technology, 
that provides a useful and cost-effective response to .. .[a particularly notable] military 
need?’” (Perdue, 1997, p. 18). The ACTD process is not intended as “a substitute for the 
formal acquisition system required to introduce.. .weapons systems such as ships, tanks,
.. .aircraft, ...or other[s]... [not involving].. .substantial modification of operational 
concepts or procedures” (Perry, 1995, as cited in South, 2003, p. 16). It is, instead, a 
mechanism for blending “technology, .. .advanced concepts, tactics, techniques, and 
procedures” (Payton, 2002, p. 72) to satisfy “critical military needs” (DoD, no date-a, 
Introduction to ACTDs: Focus of ACTDs -  User needs section).
Demonstrations allow military operators to gain understanding of demonstration 
prototype-derived capabilities postulated as significant. Users develop employment 
concepts, or concepts of operations (CONOPS) (Ghambir, 2001; Koumbis, 2006), for 
ACTD systems and, through trials of appropriate numbers, assess the military utility of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
capabilities those systems provide (DoD, no date-a, Introduction to ACTDs: Introduction 
section, If 4) in concert with developed CONOPS. These processes lead to one of three 
demonstration outcomes (DoD, no date-a, Introduction to ACTDs: Introduction section, 
15 ):
(1) Demonstration systems and associated capabilities may be found militarily effective, 
suitable, and required on a scale exceeding that of the demonstration. In such cases 
demonstration officials will recommend that additional and possibly refined systems 
be procured by formal acquisition means and that assessed prototypes remain in the 
military’s possession to provide interim capabilities;
(2) Demonstration systems and associated capabilities may be found militarily effective 
and suitable but required only to an extent already satisfied by residual prototypes. 
Demonstration officials will recommend against additional acquisitions in those 
cases; or
(3) Assessors may adjudge demonstration systems insufficiently useful and recommend 
against acquisition or residual system pursuits.
Outcomes realized largely depend on military utility assessments peculiarly designed and 
executed for every ACTD.
ACTD MILITARY UTILITY ASSESSMENTS
The “primary purpose of an ACTD is to allow the user to evaluate the military 
utility of a [technology prototype-fostered] capability being considered in response to a 
critical military need, and to do so prior to a decision by DoD to acquire that capability” 
(DoD, no date-a, ACTD Guidelines: Transition -  Test and Evaluation -  Assessment of 
Military Utility section). Given that critical military needs may include counters to new
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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threats, significant improvements in current mission performance, or wholly new 
approaches to warfare (DoD, no date-a, ACTD Guidelines: Management Plans -  
Objective section), military utility assessments aim to characterize demonstration systems 
in terms of two questions:
(1) What can it do? In other words, is it effective?
(2) Can it be operated and maintained by the user? In other words, is it suitable? 
(Perdue, 1997; DoD, no date-a, ACTD Guidelines: Transition -  Test and Evaluation -  
Assessment of Military Utility section). These questions must be answered using 
ACTDs’ three most essential, analytical components of critical operational issues, 
measures of effectiveness, and measures of performance (DoD, no date-a, ACTD 
Guidelines: Transition -  Test and Evaluation -  Assessment of Military Utility section):
(a) Critical operational issues (COI). Incontrovertible, user-identified requirements for 
mission success or, equivalently, “show stoppers” (Sproles, 2002, p. 257) that “if 
not.. .addressed... [to assessors’ satisfaction] will make... [ACTDs] unacceptable on 
functional grounds” (Sproles, 2001, p. 147);
(b) Measures of effectiveness (MOE). “High level indicators of operational 
effectiveness or suitability (DoD, no date-a, ACTD Guidelines: Management Plans -  
Concept and Technical Approach -  Measures of Effectiveness [MoE] and Measures 
of Performance [MoP] section); “the engines of (test and evaluation)” (Sproles,
2002, p. 257); and standards directly derived by users from COIs, independent of 
systems under evaluation and against which should be assessed the performance 
(Sproles, 2000, 2001, 2002) of ACTD prototypes; and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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(c) Measures of performance (MOP). “Technical characteristics that determine a
particular aspect of effectiveness or suitability (DoD, no date-a, ACTD Guidelines: 
Management Plans -  Concept and Technical Approach -  Measures of Effectiveness 
[MoE] and Measures of Performance [MoP] section), evaluations of “internal” 
(Sproles, 2001, p. 146) functions, and the system performance values that are judged 
against MOEs (Sproles, 2000, 2001,2002) in efforts to assess demonstration system 
effectiveness and suitability.
With COI identification a strict charge of military operators and MOPs mere evaluations 
of ACTD prototype attributes, it is left for utility assessments to apply MOEs providing 
“the maximum opportunity to demonstrate... [any prototype] utility... [and operational] 
synergy” (Arnold and Kujawa, 1999, p. 34) realized when employing demonstration 
systems within settings replicating military operations (GAO, 2002). Effectiveness 
measures normally represent formulations “heavily dependent on creative thought” 
(Sproles, 2002, p. 257) of subject matter experts, but a MOE development process that 
respects key features of complex military systems, or military systems of systems, might 
more reliably channel expert creativity toward attributes of consistency, thoroughness, 
and realism officially endorsed for utility assessments (GAO, 2002).
THE JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS METASYSTEM
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration program guidelines cite three 
classes of demonstrations. Class I ACTDs typically address information systems pursued 
to meet very specific needs that can be met with system quantities roughly those used for 
demonstrations. Class II ACTDs involve weapon or sensor systems, such as the Predator 
and Global Hawk, similar to many procured through formal means (DoD, no date-a,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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ACTD Guidelines: Transition -  Classes of ACTDs section) but novel in terms of 
capabilities provided. Class III ACTDs are termed “systems of systems” (DoD, no 
date-a, ACTD Guidelines: Transition -  Classes of ACTDs section, 3) demonstrations 
because they comprise combinations of: already-fielded, or legacy, systems; systems not 
yet fielded but being acquired; and systems drawn from the technology base, such as 
those that could be categorized as Class I or II if assessed alone. The system of systems 
nature of Class III ACTDs effectively mandates that their assessments accommodate 
system and process integration issues associated with the demonstrations’ own 
components, but this concern can be generalized to endorse MU As accommodating 
integration issues attendant to all ACTDs as they are evaluated in settings replicating the 
complex and hierarchically superior systems of systems, the metasystems (Keating et al., 
2003; Keating, Sousa-Poza, & Mun, 2004, Keating, Sousa-Poza, & Kovacic, 2005) of 
joint, or multi-U.S. military service, operations (DoD, no date-a, ACTD Guidelines: 
Formulation, Selection, and Initiation -  Objective section, f  2) with which demonstration 
prototypes or their derivatives can be ultimately incorporated (DoD, no date-a).
“There is no clear, common, definition of ‘systems of systems’” (DoD, 1999, 
p. 44). “The term.. .means different things to different people” (DoD, 1999, p. 43), but 
recent literature (Carlock & Fenton, 2001; Chen & Clothier, 2003; DoD, 1999; Eisner, 
Marciniak, & McMillan, 1991; Keating et al., 2003; Keating et al., 2004; Luman, 1998; 
Maier, 1999; Sage & Cuppan, 2001) evinces a confluence of complex system concepts 
relevant to ACTD assessment design and described with this study’s most important 
terms in Appendix A:
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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■ Integrating complex systems - “many of which... [may not be] well integrated 
themselves” (DoD, 1999, p. 43) - to effectively serve joint military operations is a 
daunting task (Sage & Cuppan, 2001) of equally challenging implications for the 
measurement of integration success;
■ Assessments of joint military operations metasystems must “accurately (reflect) 
joint operations” (DoD, 1999, p. 44), including CONOPS (Carlock & Fenton, 2001);
■ Joint military operations are executed by what may be considered sociotechnical, 
military metasystems of prominent social (such as individual and organizational 
attitudes or relationships among distinct commands) and technical (such as 
command structures, equipment, or knowledge required for military missions) 
components. Advanced concept technology demonstrations mark attempts to 
consequentially redesign military operations metasystems, with redesign the central 
theme of a sociotechnical systems theory espousing balances of social and technical 
components (Keating, Jacobs, Sousa-Poza, & Pyne, 2001);
■ Joint military operations metasystems are continuously evolving and heterogeneous 
sets of legacy and new systems, with every system defined by its own operational, 
economic, political, technical, or other attributes (Carlock & Fenton, 2001; Chen & 
Clothier, 2003; Keating et al., 2003; Maier, 1999; Sage & Cuppan, 2001) and 
interacting with others in complex and myriad ways (Keating et al., 2003);
■ Assessment designs must consider truly optimal, metasystem configurations as 
fallacies precluded by metasystems’ ever-evolving nature and environmental factors 
such as threat. Design processes should emphasize satisfactory configurations to be
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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identified by assessed systems’ intended users (Keating et al., 2003; Kwok, Ma, 
Vogel, & Zhou, no date);
■ Assessment designs must concede and accommodate high degrees of ambiguity and 
uncertainty regarding metasystems addressed (Keating et al., 2003);
■ Assessment designs should pursue what Keating, Sousa-Poza, and Kovacic (2005) 
have termed phased system changes that respect anticipated effects of ACTDs upon 
the military operations metasystems with which they could be incorporated.
The foregoing list and earlier text illuminate two ACTD MUA design principles
that most motivated this research:
■ To design military utility assessments able to adequately measure effectiveness and 
suitability of demonstration prototypes, the ACTD program tenet regarding minimal 
technical risk must be expanded to one emphasizing “all types of risk” (Tchankova, 
2002, p. 294) -  such as organizational or operational as well as technical -  possible 
when incorporating prototypes with joint military operations metasystems; and
■ As with all ACTD assessment activities, MUA design processes should respect 
end-user perspectives in identifying risks of incorporating ACTD prototypes with 
joint military operations metasystems. Assessment design schemes should therefore 
employ analytical methods suited to the ambiguities and other of what have been 
termed “fuzzy” (Zadeh, 1965, p. 338) manifestations of the cognition and language 
(Btiyiikozkan & Feyzioglu, 2003; Karwowski & Mital, 1986) with which end-users 
would craft and express their perspectives.
These two principles prompted a research effort that merged methods of risk assessment
and fuzzy set theory to yield a fuzzy approach to risk assessment and a methodology for
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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identifying the measures of effectiveness integral to advanced concept technology 
demonstration military utility assessment design.
RESEARCH PURPOSE AND QUESTIONS
The purpose of this research was to develop and deploy a methodology for 
identifying measures of effectiveness integral to advanced concept technology 
demonstration military utility assessment design. The purpose implied two objectives: 
developing a literature-based methodology with which can be identified measures of 
effectiveness integral to ACTD MUA design; and deploying that methodology to gauge 
its worth to ACTD MUA design. Those two objectives prompted three questions that 
steered the research effort:
(1) How might joint military operations metasystem models guide the identification of 
ACTD MUA measures of effectiveness?
(2) How might be developed and employed joint military operations metasystem models 
with which can be identified ACTD MUA measures of effectiveness?
(3) How useful might ACTD managers and analysts find the MUA design methodology 
developed and deployed with this research?
Once developed, the methodology was deployed to synthesize from joint military 
operations literature and expert group perspectives a joint military operations metasystem 
model suited to a simulated ACTD. Given that model and additional deliberations of the 
operations expert group, the methodology next identified a group preference of 
prioritized risks associated with fielding the simulated ACTD and from which could be 
derived measures of effectiveness needed to assess the demonstration’s military utility. 
The methodology and its deployment results were lastly reviewed by a distinct expert
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group of ACTD managers and analysts who evaluated the methodology’s potential 
contribution to ACTD MUA design. Figure 1 represents the framework of inquiry that 
guided this dissertation’s research.
Figure 1. Framework of Inquiry
Purpose o f the Research
Research Objectives
Research Questions
Develop a literature-based 
methodology with which can be 
identified measures o f effectiveness 
integral to ACTD MUA design.
Deploy the methodology and gauge its 
value for ACTD MUA design.
How might joint 
military operations 
metasystem models 
guide the identification 
o f ACTD MUA 
measures of 
effectiveness?
How might be 
developed and 
employed joint military 
operations metasystem 
models with which can 
be identified ACTD 
MUA measures o f  
effectiveness?
How useful might 
ACTD managers and 
analysts find the MUA 
design methodology 
developed and 
deployed with this 
research?
Develop and deploy a methodology for identifying measures of 
effectiveness integral to advanced concept technology 
demonstration (ACTD) military utility assessment (MUA) 
design.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
This research contributed to the theory, methodology, and practice associated with 
joint military operations metasystem transformations driven by new technology and 
process insertion. In doing that, it also suggested a set of theoretical, methodological, and 
practical considerations regarding assessments of similar transformations applied to other 
types of metasystems.
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The study explored boundaries among theories regarding research in the fields of 
complex systems, risk, and fuzzy sets. It revealed undeniable links among those domains 
and forced consideration of synergies to be gained by exploiting them. It recognized the 
utility of fuzzy set theory in describing epistemic risk so prominent in complex system 
settings, and its emphasis upon risk, in particular, identified considerations pertinent to 
the recognition of failure modes of complex systems.
The work demonstrated a valid, risk- and fuzzy set-based methodology for ACTD 
military assessment design, and in doing so provided a flexible yet common scheme for 
assessments quite unlike the ad hoc approaches previously used. The methodology itself 
promoted a merger of risk assessment and fuzzy set theory that reflected theoretical 
findings regarding the inextricability of fuzzy approaches to particular risk settings, and 
the methodology’s deployment under an action research format endorsed the efficacy of 
that qualitative scheme for assessment design efforts.
The research lastly and perhaps most significantly contributed to practice. The 
MUA design methodology produced offers ACTD program executives, managers, and 
analysts a standard they concede as lacking and necessary. A corollary product of the 
research, a practitioner’s guide, can rigorously enable the identification and emplacement 
of measures of effectiveness fundamental to ACTD MUA designs or designs needed for 
assessments of ACTD-like enterprises. Indeed, the methodology and its derivative 
techniques suggest means with which complex system transformations of many kinds -  
especially those planned by small numbers of subject matter experts constrained by 
limited, evaluation resources -  can be anticipated.
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LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
The research described here was delimited in several ways and for several 
reasons. Limitations of research processes and results were partly attributable to the 
delimitations imposed.
Delimitations constrained the research scope and primarily comprised restrictions 
upon methodology deployment. The methodology was applied to only a single, 
simulated, joint operations ACTD derived from a single, actual, joint operations ACTD. 
This restriction was emplaced because it honored the distinctiveness of individual 
demonstrations while still satisfying research questions. The methodology was applied 
by a small group of joint military operations experts of backgrounds less diverse than that 
normally espoused in the literature, a conscious research concession to the homogeneity 
of the U.S. military officer corps and the arguably often limited availability of more 
heterogeneous groups to ACTD managers and analysts. Lastly, the operations expert 
group pursued just one cycle of an action research process conventionally iterative but 
restricted in this research to suitably exercise the proposed methodology without unduly 
taxing valuable resources personified by volunteer members of the expert group.
Most research limitations of greatest significance directly reflected or derived 
from delimitations established. The methodology’s single application to a single 
(simulated) ACTD kept the research scope manageable but simultaneously opened to 
challenge the generalization of research findings. So, too, could be criticized the study’s 
use of a small and purposively selected group of military operations experts drawn, 
however carefully, from an expert pool many times larger. The single iteration of an 
action research-based MUA design scheme could prompt concerns regarding the
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completeness of the proposed methodology’s deployment results, though such concerns 
might be blunted by arguments emphasizing the proof-of-concept nature of the 
deployment over comprehensiveness of the results. Likewise, plausible criticisms of the 
study’s use of purposively selected, joint operations ACTD managers and analysts would 
have to overcome the reality that the expert sample used constituted a statistically 
significant portion -  perhaps as high as 50% -  of a very small population of joint 
operations ACTD experts largely known and available to the researcher.
A possible limitation independent of delimitations imposed could derive from 
researcher assumptions regarding factors most consequential to MUA design. Should the 
nine factors identified in the literature and employed for methodology development 
constitute other than a necessary and sufficient set, the design methodology itself could 
suffer challenge.
SUMMARY
The U.S. Department of Defense Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration 
program is intended to provide rapid and low-risk solutions to critical military operations 
problems, yet it offers no rigorous methodology for designing military utility assessments 
of demonstration systems. This research sought to correct that deficiency by developing 
and deploying a joint military operations metasystem-oriented methodology to identify 
measures of effectiveness required of ACTD MUA designs. The research was steered by 
three questions:
(1) How might joint military operations metasystem models guide the identification of 
ACTD MUA measures of effectiveness?;
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(2) How might be developed and employed joint military operations metasystem models 
with which can be identified ACTD MUA measures of effectiveness?; and
(3) How useful might ACTD managers and analysts find the MUA design methodology 
developed and deployed with this research?
Joint military operations metasystem characteristics pertinent to advanced concept 
technology demonstrations were identified and in turn promoted the identification of two 
principles of ACTD MUA design: that assessments address all types of risk -  such as 
organizational or operational as well as technical risk -  possible when incorporating 
demonstration prototypes with superior and complex, joint military operations systems; 
and that MUA design processes employ analytical schemes suited to fuzzy manifestations 
of human cognition and language that will be encountered during design phases. These 
two principles and the three research questions drove a thorough literature review.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
This dissertation research rested on two premises: that ACTD military utility 
assessments should account for principal risks associated with deploying demonstration 
systems and associated CONOPS within standing, military operations metasystems of 
relevance; and that the identification of principal risks to metasystem operations must 
accommodate the ambiguities and other “fuzzy” (Zadeh, 1965, p. 338) characteristics of 
human cognition and language (Buyukozkan & Feyzioglu, 2003; Karwowski & Mital, 
1986) inseparable from the subject matter expert (SME) judgments needed to identify and 
evaluate metasystem risks. A literature review determined that these premises could 
foster an original and significant contribution to the extant body of relevant research.
The literature is witness to an abundance of risk assessment study and practice. It 
attests to an equal abundance of study and practice regarding fuzzy set theory. The rich 
and ever-growing offerings of both fields of literature provided this study the thread to 
stitch together a logical methodology for ACTD MUA design. A smaller but equally 
instructive body of material addressing mergers of risk assessment and fuzzy set theory -  
fuzzy approaches to risk assessment -  further endorsed this work’s premises and served 
as a first step in channeling the research toward literature deficiencies as evident as the 
abundance of risk or fuzzy set treatments. Additional steps certified that this study would 
remove some of those deficiencies.
The literature suffers from inattention to the utility of risk assessment and fuzzy 
set theory, singly or together, within contexts true to joint military operations. Military 
operations evaluations seem seldom to have been made using methods, techniques, or 
tools of either field. Published literature regarding ACTD MUA design even more rarely
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addresses what this research presumed to be markedly supportive aspects of risk 
assessment, fuzzy set theory, and complex system-based approaches to design. That 
paucity of pertinent literature illuminated the need for a risk- and fuzzy set-based 
methodology for advanced concept technology demonstration military utility assessment 
design.
RELEVANCE OF RISK ASSESSMENT
“ACTDs are intended primarily to explore operational... [effectiveness and 
suitability] issues of mature technologies; high technical risk is normally not acceptable” 
(DoD, no date-a, ACTD Guidelines: Management Plans - Concept and Technical 
Approach - Technical Risk Assessment section). Demonstration planning must 
nevertheless account for technical risks together with others such as the acceptability of 
schemes -  the CONOPS -  envisioned for employment of demonstration prototypes. All 
“risks must be identified and accepted by the primary stakeholders in the ACTD prior to 
its initiation” (DoD, no date-a, ACTD Guidelines: Formulation, Selection and Initiation - 
Formulation and Submission section, 1[ 10). This emphasis upon risk permeates the 
ACTD program as it does all U.S. defense system acquisition processes (DoD, 2003a, 
2003b, 2003c). It supports a notion that military utility assessment designs could or even 
should be risk-based.
“Risk-based decisionmaking and risk-based approaches in decisionmaking are 
terms frequently used to indicate that some systematic process that deals with 
uncertainties is being used to formulate.. .options and assess their various impacts and 
ramifications” (Haimes, 2004, p. 3). While often applied for purposes of policy 
development, risk-based decision processes need not be so restricted. “Risk analysis is
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applied to determine the scope of operational testing and evaluation (Thompson & 
Montagne, 1998) required for military systems being procured with traditional 
acquisition mechanisms. The efficacy of a risk-based approach to ACTD MUA design 
becomes even more apparent with review of risk-related definitions and risk assessment 
conventions.
FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK ASSESSMENT
Risk is perhaps most often defined as a function of likelihood and consequence 
(Bedford & Cooke, 2001; DoD, 2003c; Haimes, 1998, 2004; Kaplan & Garrick, 1981; 
Kaplan, Haimes, & Garrick, 2001; Kosmowski, 2000; Kujawski, 2002; Thompson & 
Montagne, 1998). Within Department of Defense publications frequently used by ACTD 
managers, risk is defined as “a measure of the potential inability to achieve overall 
program objectives” (DoD, 2003c, p. 7), a definition those same managers could 
plausibly be expected to interpret as a demonstration’s potential inability to perform well 
against MUA measures of effectiveness. Two additional and important definitions 
presented within the context of the ACTD program include:
■ Risk events are events that, should they occur, might limit capabilities otherwise 
achievable with ACTD prototypes and which therefore warrant assessment in terms 
of the two major risk components of likelihood and consequence (DoD, 2003c); and
■ Risk assessment is the process of first identifying risk events (Tchankova, 2002; 
Williams, 1995) and then analyzing them for their criticality to military utility (DoD, 
2003c). The process is intended to answer three questions: (a) What can go wrong?;
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(b) What is the likelihood that it will?; and (c) What would be the consequences if it 
does? (Haimes, 1991, 2004; Kaplan & Garrick, 1981).
Like the development of a demonstration’s MOEs, the identification and analysis of risk 
events is a process the DoD intends be accomplished in concert with experts in military 
operations and related endeavors (DoD, 2003c).
RELEVANCE OF FUZZY SET THEORY
Zadeh’s (1965) seminal exposition has spawned more than four decades of 
additional research regarding fuzzy set theory and derivative theories and applications 
such as fuzzy numbers, linguistic variables, and evidence and possibility theory (Bae, 
Grandhi, & Canfield, 2004; Bender and Simonovic, 2000; Dubois, Prade, & Smets, 2001; 
Fedrizzi, 1987; Kangari & Riggs, 1989; Terano, Asai, & Sugeno, 1992; Zadeh, 1996). 
Fuzzy set theory has been applied to fields as diverse as business project selection and 
management, large-scale systems engineering and analysis, computer-aided design, 
meteorology, medical diagnoses, decision-making for security trading and many other 
purposes, human reliability, and robotic control of common systems as large as trains and 
aircraft and as small as toaster ovens and video camcorders (Bender and Simonovic,
2000; Dutta, 1993; Karwowski & Mital, 1986; Klir & Folger, 1988; Kuchta, 2001; 
Machacha & Bhattacharya, 2000; Mon, Cheng, & Lu, 1995; Perincherry, Kikuchi, & 
Hamamatsu, 1994; Terano et al., 1992; Wang & Chang, 1980). Research closely 
resembling that conducted with this effort has explored generalized risk engineering and 
assessment (Cai, 1996; Kangari & Riggs, 1989; Karwowski & Mital, 1986), software 
operational risk assessments (Xu, Khoshgoftaar, & Allen, 2003), and military exercise 
reconstruction (Parsons, 1989). With its now widely-acknowledged utility for resolving
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ambiguities and imprecision in human thought and language (Gue, 2002; Kangari & 
Riggs, 1989; Liao, Celmins, & Hammell, 2002; Lin & Chen, 2004), fuzzy set theory 
bears significantly on processes central to ACTD military utility assessment design.
Zadeh (1965) and countless following practitioners have purported fuzzy set 
theory’s usefulness in defining and manipulating typically human evaluations such as 
“approximately 5 kg,” “short experience,” and “hot” weather (Parsons, 1989; Tah,
Thorpe, & McCaffer, 1993; Weiss, 2001), evaluations imprecise not for the aleatory 
uncertainty precipitated by random variables of classic probability but for the epistemic 
uncertainty (Bae et al., 2004; Bedford & Cooke, 2001; Quelch & Cameron, 1994; 
Williams, 1995) derived from “the absence of sharply defined criteria of class 
membership” (Zadeh, 1965, p. 339). A logical extension of these claims would have the 
discipline support the understanding of “military utility” or other descriptors such as 
“unacceptable” consequence, “frequent” likelihood, and “high risk” that could be 
intuitively and easily used by experts (Huang, Chen, & Wang, 2001; Karwowski & Mital, 
1986) assessing ACTD risks. Since MUA designers can be expected to construct 
assessments that will draw upon deterministic (for example, certain prototype component 
costs or threat system parameters) as well as probabilistic (such as historical weather data 
pertinent to prototype missions) data, it is plausible to view fuzzy methods as necessary 
to a suite of methods that assessment designs should offer assessors to evaluate the mixes 
of deterministic, probabilistic, and fuzzy data (Cai, 1996; Zaras, 2003) those assessors 
will routinely encounter. That such mixes will routinely comprise sizable proportions of 
subject matter expertise and other fuzzy data (Quelch & Cameron, 1994) manifests in
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four traits of new commercial product development (Lin & Chen, 2004) readily 
translatable to terms appropriate for ACTD military utility assessments:
(1) much of the information available to MUA designers is uncertain or incomplete;
(2) the prototype threat and operational environments are marked by uncertainty and 
rapid changes in technologies and missions;
(3) criteria for military utility are not always quantifiable or comparable, and may 
directly conflict or interact;
(4) multiple groups of interested parties, each with a different perspective, should be 
accommodated in MUA design processes and therefore render them like so many of 
the multicriteria and multi-attribute decision processes to which fuzzy set theory has 
been applied for decades (Bender & Simonovic, 2000; Buyukozkan & Feyzioglu, 
2003; Enea & Piazza, 2004; Ghyym, 1999; Ibrahim, 1991: Li & Yen, 1995; Lin & 
Chen, 2004; Roubens & Vincke, 1987; Whalen, 1987; Zaras, 2003; Zimmerman, 
1996).
A description of fuzzy set theory fundamentals further buttresses the theory’s place in 
MUA design.
FUNDAMENTALS OF FUZZY SET THEORY
Traditional theory regarding what are termed “crisp” sets holds that members of 
some universal set strictly are or are not wholly contained within any subset of the 
universal set (Zimmerman, 1996). For example, each of the three elements of the crisp 
set A of counting numbers, {1, 2, 3}, a subset of the universal set U of counting numbers, 
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, ...}, are wholly contained within set A; the universal set’s remaining 
counting numbers of 4, 5, 6, ... are not elements of set A. Such a thoroughly
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unambiguous approach using distinct set boundaries cannot support mathematics 
appropriate for analyzing fuzzy concepts so prevalent in human cognition and language; 
but fuzzy set theory does seem able to do so (Li & Yen, 1995).
Fuzzy set theory allows set elements partial -  and hence, fuzzy -  membership in a 
set. Formally,
DEFINITION 1. A fuzzy setzi of elements, x, on a given universe U is a 
set of ordered pairs such that
A  = { (x, tw(x)) | x e U }, where 
(44 (x) 6 [0, 1]
is the membership function of x or grade of membership of x in the fuzzy 
set, A.
For example, a fuzzy set defining old-aged persons in discrete terms of decades of life 
between 10 and 80 could be represented as (Klir & Folger, 1988) 
old = { (10, 0.0), (20, 0.1), (30, 0.3), (40, 0.4), (50, 0.6), (60, 0.7), (70, 0.8), (80, 1)}, 





10 < x < 80
70
1, x>80.
Note that unlike the somewhat analogous, density functions of classic probability, the 
membership values of elements of fuzzy sets need not sum to unity, and this total 
relaxation of a tenet of probability theory promotes fuzzy set theory as the better vehicle 
for mathematically representing the vagaries of risk assessments in situations devoid of
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data sufficient for application of the former (Quelch & Cameron, 1994). Note, too, 
however, that identification of membership functions has been long held as problematic.
“The issue of membership function generation is vital to ... [every] fuzzy set 
theory.. .application [that] depends on the membership function used” (Liao et al., 2002, 
p. 242). Such functions can be estimated from data when it is available, but must often 
be assumed a priori by theorists and practitioners (Medaglia, Fang, Nuttle, & Wilson, 
2002). There is neither universal agreement on characteristics required of membership 
functions (Medaglia et al., 2002) nor even uniformity in interpreting the meaning of 
membership grades (Dubois & Prade, 1997). Much research has been and continues to 
be dedicated to resolving the membership function dilemma, but the dilemma apparently 
remains (Ayyub, 2001; Comelissen, van den Berg, Koops, & Kaymak, 2002; Liao et al., 
2002; McCauley-Bell & Badiru, 1996a; Mendoza & Prabhu, 2003; Norwich & Turksen, 
1984; Turksen, 1991).
Equally integral to fuzzy set theory but far less problematic than membership 
functions are the corollary concepts of a-cuts and cut-sets, A a, “especially useful 
for. ..arithmetic operations on fuzzy numbers” (Btiyukozkan & Feyzioglu, 2003, p. 43). 
The cut-set, A a, of a fuzzy set, A, may be formally expressed as (Biiyukdzkan & 
Feyzioglu, 2003)
DEFINITION 2. A a = { x  e U \ l̂ a (x ) > a }
for a e [0, 1] and pi(jc) e [0, 1], 
with an a-cut simply the minimum membership value on the interval [0, 1] that every 
member of the cut-set, A a, o f A  must hold.
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Definitions 1 and 2 are as fundamental to the MUA design principles of this 
research as they are to fuzzy set theory, itself. They make apparent a link between fuzzy 
operations and epistemic risk that in turn promotes fuzzy approaches to risk assessment. 
FUZZY APPROACHES TO RISK ASSESSMENT
The literature abounds with treatments of risk assessment and fuzzy set theory. A 
body of material far smaller than that dedicated to either field concerns mergers of the 
two: fuzzy approaches to risk assessment. Such approaches served both to presage and 
refine the scope of this work.
Carroll (1983) may have been among the first to endorse the use of fuzzy methods 
expressly for risk analyses, particularly for the analyses of complex problems strongly 
characterized by uncertainty. Karwowski and Mital (1986) shortly afterward echoed the 
aspect of uncertainty by noting “risk (as) a fuzzy concept in that there does not exist a 
unique risk that a hazardous event will occur in a given period of time” (p. 106). Others 
have also endorsed the suitability of fuzzy methods for many risk assessment constructs 
traditionally employed only with probability techniques the fuzzy set theorists considered 
insidiously too exact (Quelch & Cameron, 1994; de Ru & Eloff, 1996; Tah et al. 1993; 
Yager, 2002; Zimmerman, 1983).
Fuzzy approaches to classic risk assessment-related methods and techniques such 
as: critical path method (Kaufmann & Gupta, 1988); program evaluation and review 
(Mon et al., 1995); fault tree analysis (Terano et al., 1992); event tree analysis (Cho,
Choi, & Kim, 2002; Huang et al., 2001); failure mode, effects, and criticality analysis 
(Bowles & Pelaez, 1995); and quantitative risk analysis (Quelch & Cameron, 1994) have
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been explored during the past two decades. Fuzzy risk assessment methods have also 
been deployed that share no links with probabilistic convention.
Fuzzy set theory has been suggested as a means to address some of this nation’s 
most public topics related to risk. Five years after Pennsylvania’s Three Mile Island 
incident, Yeh (1984) proposed that fuzzy set theory -  precisely, fuzzy ranking schemes -  
be used to assess nuclear power plant fire risks. Cornelissen et al. (2002) demonstrated a 
fuzzy approach to assessing risks inherent in agricultural production systems upon which 
the United States so greatly depends. Karwowski and Mital (1986) identified numerous 
industrial safety engineering applications of fuzzy concepts, McCauley-Bell and Badiru 
(1996a, 1996b) applied the same to the slightly more refined topic of occupational 
injuries in workplaces, and Merilan (1996) portrayed fuzzy set theory as a potent, risk 
assessment tool for epidemiologists. Demonstrated, too, have been business applications 
of importance to the nation’s economic health.
Serguieva and Hunter (2004) suggested fuzzy set theory as a means to appraise 
business investment risks. That proposal complemented and was in large part made 
plausible by preceding research regarding the multi-industry applicability of fuzzy 
methods to countless problems rooted in epistemic uncertainties of information or 
information flow (Kaufmann & Gupta, 1988; Klir & Folger, 1988; Zimmerman, 1996), 
conceptual design evaluation (Smith & Verma, 2004; Verma, Smith, & Fabrycky, 1999), 
major system design firm performance prediction (Sun, 2000), major system design 
performance prediction (Buyukozkan and Feyzioglu, 2003; Chen, 2001; Ibrahim, 1991), 
project selection (Enea & Piazza, 2004), major system operations risks (Xu et al., 2003), 
supplier evaluations (Tsai, 1999), the risks of selling certain consumer goods (Lin &
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Chen, 2004; Liu, 1996), and general project risks of many sorts (Grabot, Blanc, & Binda, 
1996; Gue, 2002; Jones, 2001; Kangari & Riggs, 1989; Kuchta, 2001; Liberatore, 2002; 
Machacha & Bhattacharya, 2000; Tamimi, 1989; Wells, 1997; Zaras, 2003).
These cited and other mergers of risk assessment and fuzzy set theory channeled 
this research effort, with other elements of the literature providing further refinement.
The balance of relevant literature addressed ACTD MUA design methodologies, 
approaches to complex system analysis and transformation, risk-based and fuzzy 
approaches to military operations assessments, small expert group and group decision 
characteristics, and fuzzy risk prioritization schemes.
ADDITIONAL RELEVANT LITERATURE
The literature displays a paucity of research and convention directly applicable to 
development of an ACTD MUA design methodology. To construct a methodology of 
value, therefore, fundamentally-pertinent topics of risk assessment, fuzzy set theory, and 
fuzzy approaches to risk assessment must be largely supplemented by literature related 
only indirectly to critical aspects of ACTD assessment: literature, for example, that 
illuminates complex system analysis and transformation attributes bearing on assessment 
design; literature respecting military operations; and literature addressing key elements of 
small group decision processes integral to MUA design, such as group composition, 
group size, proclivity for agreement among group members, and means by which 
decisions of any level of accord may be rendered in the face of ambiguity or uncertainty 
typically associated with decision criteria.
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ACTD MUA Design Methodologies
Little official, government literature directly addresses the question of how to 
design an advanced concept technology demonstration military utility assessment, and 
directives that do exist focus on assessment conduct rather than design. Unofficial 
proposals for MUA design compensate somewhat for the paucity of Defense Department 
guidelines, but these unofficial suggestions collectively provide more for concept- than 
for methodology-level needs.
The Department of Defense unequivocally mandates that typically limited, ACTD 
resources be directed toward determining “how effectively (a) capability under evaluation 
performs (an) intended mission and how suitable [that capability] is.. .for use in military 
operations” (DoD, no date-a, ACTD Guidelines: Management Plans -  Concept and 
Technical Approach -  Measures of Effectiveness [MoE] and Measures of Performance 
[MoP] section). Department guidance additionally stipulates those determinations to be 
made with respect to measures of effectiveness identified during demonstration planning 
stages by intended users assisted by military utility assessment agents (DoD, no date-a, 
ACTD Guidelines: Management Plans -  Concept and Technical Approach -  Measures of 
Effectiveness [MoE] and Measures of Performance [MoP] section). These few official 
dictates are complemented by military- and nonmilitary-related literature sourced beyond 
the confines of the Department of Defense.
Arnold and Kujawa (1999) emphasize systems of systems aspects of ACTD MUA 
design in offering a methodology for identifying effectiveness measures derived by 
military users and assessment analysts from the highest-level definitions of success in 
missions that individual ACTDs aim to support. Arnold (no date) and others refine that
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approach by suggesting that joint ACTD MOEs be directly derived with subject matter 
expertise from critical operational issues (Arnold, 1998; Elliott, Madden, & Dean, 1997; 
Luman, 1998; Luman & Scotti, 1996; Singleton, Luman, & Rapport, 1998; Sproles 2000, 
2001, 2002; The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory [JHU/APL], 
2000; JHU/APL, 2004; U.S. Atlantic Command [USACOM], 1998) in turn drawn from 
the Universal Joint Task List (DoD, 2002) of mission tasks assigned U.S. joint military 
forces (Arnold, no date; Singleton et al., 1998). Additional military and nonmilitary 
works (Arnold, 1998; Bahill & Briggs, 2001; Carlock & Fenton, 2001; Enea & Piazza, 
2004; Ghyym, 1999; Haimes, 2004; JHU/APL, 2000, 2004; Lin & Chen, 2004; Longstaff 
& Haimes, 2002; Luman, 1998; Sproles, 2001; USACOM, 1998; Verma, Smith, & 
Fabrycky, 1999) indirectly reinforce the importance to MOE identification of CONOPS 
and system of system perspectives, particularly when attempts to upgrade complex 
sociotechnical metasystems entail the use and related risks of what are termed 
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies (Bahill & Briggs, 2001; Chung & Cooper, 
2003; Luman, 1998; JHU/APL, 2000) so prominent in the ACTD program. Significantly, 
none of these offerings specify or even imply other than Sproles’ (2002) earlier-cited, 
“creative thought” (p. 257) method for identifying effectiveness measures; but Thompson 
and Montagne (1998) do provide the specificity upon which this research quite strongly 
depends.
Thompson and Montagne (1998) perhaps alone have challenged a serious 
literature deficiency by illustrating a “risk assessment process.. .(to) plan operational 
tests” (p. 42) in accordance with DoD (2000) prescriptions for formalized, operational 
testing. Those authors’ method for designing operational tests and evaluations of military
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command and control systems might serve as an example for designing deliberately less 
formal (GAO, 2002), ACTD assessments. Their employment of user-developed, risk 
assessments as first steps toward MOE identification might be repeated by ACTD MUA 
managers and designers. Just as important to repeat might be three more aspects of the 
Thompson and Montagne formula:
(1) a “user community... intimately familiar with... [demonstration] system requirements 
and.. .therefore the best group to assess the mission impact of a failure to meet each 
requirement” (p. 44);
(2) a “level of (assessment).. .sufficient to provide high confidence among the entire 
(user) community that.. .(assessment) results properly (reflect).. .operational 
effectiveness and suitability” (p. 46) of the assessed capability, without wasting 
resources that might be otherwise wasted with differently-designed assessment 
plans; and
(3) a level of user involvement strongly supporting the identification of risks across all 
domains relevant to military operations metasystems of interest.
This third aspect also figures prominently in complex system analyses and transformation 
approaches quite pertinent to the development of a methodology for ACTD MUA design. 
Approaches to Complex System Analysis and Transformation 
The literature supports a presumption that joint military operations should be 
analyzed and transformed as complex metasystems with all metasystem characteristics 
typically attendant. While only a tiny fraction of relevant literature (Arnold and Kujawa, 
1999; Luman, 1998; Luman & Scotti, 1996) directly supports that notion’s application to 
ACTDs, a larger body of military- and nonmilitary-related work does indirectly secure
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the validity of holistic, complex system-based approaches to analysis and transformation 
that ACTDs can impose on sociotechnical, joint operations systems of systems.
Holistic, complex system analyses depend on holistic, complex system modeling 
that places a primacy on characteristics distinguishing complex systems from simple 
ones. These characteristics include sociotechnical constructs postulated by numerous 
researchers (Clegg, 2000; Einarsson & Rausand, 1998; Elzen, Enserink, & Smit, 1996; 
Gregoriades, Sutcliffe, & Shin, 2003; Haimes, 2004; Keating et al., 2001; Keating et al., 
2005; Kosmowski, 2000; Kosmowski & Kwiesielewicz, 2002; Longstaff & Haimes,
2002; Sage & Cuppan, 2001; Williams, 1999), a principle holding that different 
perspectives will generally foster different models of any complex system (Enea & 
Piazza, 2004; Haimes, 2004; Keating et al., 2003; Newbem & Nolte, 1999; Pennock & 
Haimes, 2002), and what many (Beckerman, 2000; Calvano & John, 2003; Chen and 
Clothier, 2003; Keating et al., 2004; Williams, 1999) have described as dynamic behavior 
and “system properties that ‘emerge’ from the synthesis of interactions between 
components, at each level of interconnection within” (Beckerman, 2000, p. 98) any 
complex system. The importance of such characteristics influences the transformation as 
well as the analysis of complex systems.
Complex system transformation -  an activity that perfectly describes the intent of 
any ACTD -  most often occurs in environments of attributes familiar to ACTD MUA 
managers and designers:
■ Multiple stakeholders related to all component systems.. .with varying interests;
■ High levels of technical complexity;
■ Large scale, broad scope and long term activity;
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■ Change and evolution management (required for many) activities;
■ Various constituent systems featuring independent lifecycles and lines of 
responsibility;
■ (Complex system assembly) often (made) at short notice to meet unprecedented 
operational needs; [and]
■ The requirement for (complex system) adaptability... [and] flexibility. (Chen & 
Clothier, 2003, pp. 173-174)
These environmental factors “both constrain and enable” (Keating et al., 2004, p. 4) the 
transformation of complex systems, so complex system transformation efforts should 
account for them (Beckerman, 2000; Keating et al., 2004; Keating et al., 2005) together 
with the closely-related characteristics of complex systems (Clegg, 2000; Elzen et al., 
1996; Gregoriades et al., 2003; Keating et al., 2004; Keating et al., 2005; Rouse, 2005). 
Plausible accounting tools seem to be risk-based and fuzzy approaches to military 
operations and relevant aspects of the environments in which those operations occur. 
Risk-based and Fuzzy Approaches to Military Operations Assessments 
The literature makes evident no risk assessment or fuzzy set theory-based MUA 
design schemes per se, although the operational test and evaluation design proposal of 
Thompson and Montagne (1998) quite nearly does offer the former. Military operations 
and operations support processes other than those of ACTDs have more often been the 
objects of risk-based approaches to assessment.
Risk-based approaches to military operations assessments have perhaps been most 
visibly pursued by Haimes (2004) and others (Haimes, Kaplan, & Lambert, 2002; 
Lambert, Haimes, Li, Schoof, & Tulsiani, 2001; Lamm & Haimes, 2002; Leung,
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Lambert, & Mosenthal, 2004; Longstaff & Haimes, 2002; Riese, 2001; Riese, Brown, & 
Haimes, 2006) who have advanced the concept of a hierarchical, holographic model, or 
HHM, aligned with holistic approaches to complex system analysis because of its holistic 
(Haimes, 1989,1991) representations of those same systems and associated risks. “The 
term, hierarchical refers to the desire to understand what can go wrong at many different 
levels of... [a] system hierarchy” (Haimes, 2004, p. 90), with that emphasis on hierarchy 
seemingly quite appropriate for addressing strongly hierarchical, military operations 
metasystems. The term, holographic “is suggested by holography... .The difference 
between holography and conventional photography, which captures only 
two-dimensional planar representations of scenes, is analogous to the 
differences.. .between conventional mathematical modeling techniques.. .and the HHM 
schema” (p. 89) that affords multiple views of a hierarchical system’s multiple 
components. The HHM methodology has been frequently applied to military operations 
and operations support systems in efforts to determine and assess associated risks.
Haimes (2004) has applied hierarchical holographic modeling to military 
operations like those for which ACTDs can be appropriately staged, with applications 
ranging from operations support processes such as military system procurement, through 
what are termed military operations other than war (MOOTW), to homeland defense 
operations. Lambert et al. (2001) have used HHM to model and assess risks associated 
with additional, military procurement systems; Haimes, Kaplan, and Lambert (2002) 
have used the methodology to model and assess risks of additional MOOTW; and Ozinci, 
Singleton, Stobbart, and Zulick (2002) and Leung, Lambert, and Mosenthal (2004) have 
applied it to yet more homeland defense issues for which each group determined a set of
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defense priorities for critical highway infrastructure nodes thought vulnerable to terrorist 
attacks. Lamm and Haimes (2002) and Longstaff and Haimes (2002) have also applied 
HHM to risk-related pursuits regarding the need for military information assurance so 
critical to contemporary, joint operations.
The literature reveals a number of fuzzy set theory-based approaches to military 
operations assessments far smaller than that evident for risk-based methods. Parsons’ 
(1989) suggestion of theory utility for military exercise reconstruction and analysis may 
be the best example and few, if any, others might be so directly linked.
Zimmerman (1983) was among the first to extol the virtues of fuzzy set theory 
vis-a-vis operations research and in so doing can be argued to have first promoted its 
applicability to the assessment of military operations. In recognizing the importance of 
multi-attribute system concept designs -  with their routinely imprecise requirements and 
priorities -  inextricably linked to the holistic system modeling already described, the 
work of Verma, Smith, and Fabrycky (1999) represents a large body of research 
(Bellman & Zadeh, 1970; Bollujo, 1996; Buyiikozkan & Feyzioglu, 2003; Enea &
Piazza, 2004; Fedrizzi, 1990; Gaines, 1987; Lin & Chen, 2004; Liu, 1996; Machacha & 
Bhattacharya, 2000; Perrincherry, Kikuchi, & Hamamatsu, 1994; Smith & Verma, 2004; 
Terano, 1992; Whalen, 1987; Zahariev, 1990) that indirectly supports fuzzy set theory’s 
place in military operations assessments.
Small Expert Group and Group Decision Characteristics 
The literature is replete with treatments of large and small expert group decision 
functions, especially risk assessment (Aven & Korte, 2002; Ayyub, 2001; Blin, 1974;
Blin 8c Whinston, 1973; Clemen & Winkler, 1999; Comelissen et al., 2002; Ghyym,
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1999; Haimes, 2004; Kunreuther & Slovic, 1996; Lin & Chen, 2004; Saaty, 1980, 1987; 
Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004; Wang, Sii, Yang, Pillay, Yu, Liu, et al., 
2004; Weiss, 2001). Given “the limited resources available” (DoD, no date-a, ACTD 
Guidelines: Management Plans -  Concept and Technical Approach -  Measures of 
Effectiveness [MoE] and Measures of Performance [MoP] section) to ACTD managers, 
one can argue the importance of small group risk assessments to ACTD MUA design as 
well as the literature-acknowledged pertinence to such assessments of group composition, 
group size, and degree of participant agreement regarding decisions often made under the 
very uncertainty driving the need for expert perspectives.
Ayyub (2001) advocates expert panels that possess “a balance and broad spectrum 
of viewpoints, expertise, technical points of view, and organizational representation”
(p. 242). Clemen and Winkler (1999), too, endorse “heterogeneity among experts (as) 
highly desirable” (p. 199), as do Comelissen et al. (2002), though the latter do not wholly 
dismiss a place for expert group homogeneity. Other researchers (Bezdek, Spillman, & 
Spillman, 1978; Enea & Piazza; Ghymm, 1999; Spillman, Bezdek, & Spillman, 1979) 
implicitly emphasize heterogeneity of expert groups with their explicit emphasis upon the 
multi-attribute or multicriteria decision processes of groups of experts characterized by 
differing viewpoints, expertise, organizational allegiances, and the like.
The proper size for particular, small expert groups assigned particular -  perhaps 
risk assessment -  functions “should be determined on a case-by-case basis.. . .(but also) 
be large enough to achieve a needed diversity of opinion, credibility, and result 
reliability” (Ayyub, 2001, p. 241). The sizing might also be bounded by parameters 
found in the literature.
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Chen’s (2001) approach to evaluating the rate of aggregative risk in software 
development employed two experts. Ghyym (1999) employed a three-expert risk 
assessment panel, while Chytka (2003) followed by citing an admonition “that combining 
the assessments of three experts yields the most advantage to (certain types of group 
decision processes).. .(with).. .little to no empirical evidence that adding additional 
experts improves...effectiveness” (p. 17). Clemen and Winkler (1999) exceeded the 
number three slightly by noting analyses suggesting “three to five experts” (p. 199) to be 
optimal in many cases. Small group risk expert assessment panels of sizes 4 (Lin &
Chen, 2004; Wang et al., 2004), 10 (Weiss, 2001), and 7 through 20 (Haimes, 2004) have 
also been demonstrated.
Past and current research emphasizes the need for means to measure the level of 
agreement among members of small groups of experts attempting to render consolidated, 
group decisions of all sorts, including decisions regarding risk. Many authors (Bezdek et 
al., 1978; Blin, 1974; Blin & Whinston, 1973; Clemen & Winkler, 1999; Fedrizzi, 1990; 
Saaty, 1980, 1987; Spillman, Spillman, & Bezdek, 1980; Weiss, 2001; Xu, 2004) indicate 
the desirability of measures of small group accord, particularly when group decisions are 
subject to ambiguity, uncertainty, or even ignorance of information. Means posited and 
practiced to measure degrees of agreement behind small group judgments rendered under 
uncertainty have proved valuable accompaniments to proposed or practiced means for 
first achieving the small group risk prioritizations such measures of accord might 
describe.
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Fuzzy Risk Prioritization Methods
Small group risk assessments demand prioritization schemes by which “individual 
preferences on a given set [can be reduced] to a single collective preference” (Fernandez
6  Olmedo, 2004, p. 430), and “the combining process (as part of the overall expert 
judgment process) should depend on the details of each individual situation” (Clemen & 
Winkler, 1999, p. 199). While many may rarely if ever have been applied to military 
operations or similar assessments, the literature does evince group prioritization schemes 
aligned with this study’s motivating precept that ACTD MUA measures of effectiveness 
be derived from holistic risk assessments accommodating “fuzzy” (Zadeh, 1965, p. 338) 
manifestations of assessors’ cognition and language (Buyukozkan & Feyzioglu, 2003; 
Karwowski & Mital, 1986). Most demonstrate characteristics that can be used to classify 
them as either ordinal scale-type, comparative techniques or cardinal scale-type, direct 
ranking techniques, and many of both classifications can be difficult to employ and 
produce inconsistent results (Kim & Park, 1990). Cardinal scale-based comparisons, in 
particular, are vulnerable to claims that they can force expert evaluators to exceed the
7 ± 2 absolute, unidimensional judgments long considered by many as a limit of human 
capacity (Ghyym, 1999: Karwowski & Mital, 1986; Miller, 1956; Mustafa & Al-Bahar, 
1991; Saaty, 1980; Wang et al., 2004).
“Blin and Whinston (1973) and Blin (1974) first considered the possibility of 
using fuzzy sets to model the process of group decision making. They constructed a 
fuzzy [binary preference] relation over the set of alternatives under consideration by a 
group” (Spillman et al., 1980, p. 292) that drew from Zadeh’s (1965, 1971) definition of 
such relations as fuzzy collections of ordered pairs associated by membership functions
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describing group confidence in collective, pairwise rankings. Fuzzy, pairwise ranking 
has since been often and favorably applied (Basile, 1987; Bezdek et al., 1978; 
Buyukozkan and Feyzioglu, 2003; Chen & Klein, 1997; Fernandez & Olmedo, 2004; 
Roubens & Vincke, 1987; Spillman et al., 1979; Xu & Da, 2003) within decision contexts 
demanding comparisons of moderately large numbers of alternatives or when decision 
criteria are imprecisely determined (Graham & Rhomberg, 1996; Zahariev, 1990). The 
worth of so “natural” (Harker, 1987b, p. 837) a comparison method and its parent class of 
ordinal scale-based techniques has been acknowledged by the U.S. Department of 
Defense (2003c) and additionally promoted with fuzzy treatments (Enea & Piazza, 2004; 
Fedrizzi, 1990; Lee & Ahn, 1991; McCauley-Bell & Badiru, 1996a, 1996b; Mustafa & 
Al-Bahar, 1991; Wang, Wang, & Hu, 2005) of Saaty’s (1980) widely-used, pairwise 
comparison-based analytic hierarchy process, or AHP, itself expressly endorsed (DoD, 
2003c) for use in military risk assessments.
Cardinal scale-type, direct fuzzy ranking methods -  including those utilized for 
risk assessments -  are commonly found in literature offering resolutions of expert group 
preferences “when the number of alternatives to be compared is relatively small and the 
criteria are well determined” (Zahariev, 1990, p. 186). Smith and Verma (2004), for 
example, use a fuzzy, “weighted wedge” (p. 342) approach to individually grade the 
compliance with rigorously-specified requirements of small numbers of competing, 
system engineering project conceptual designs. Bowles & Pelaez (1995) demonstrate 
fuzzy set theory’s utility for determining risk priority numbers used with the automotive 
industry’s risk assessment conventions that emphasize limited numbers of risk categories 
and well-defined criteria. Bender and Simonovic (2000) exercise what they term a fuzzy
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
38
compromise approach that uses “the concept of the displaced ideal.... to determine a 
direct ranking (strong ordering) of [small numbers of] alternatives” (p. 36) with respect to 
limited sets of criteria characterized as objectively as possible. A sizeable portion of 
cardinal scale-based, fuzzy multcriteria and multi-attribute approaches to risk assessment 
exhibits pairings of small numbers of decision alternatives with well determined, decision 
criteria (Ghyym, 1999; Ibrahim, 1991; Karwowski & Mital, 1986; Lin & Chen, 2004; 
Machacha & Bhattacharya, 2000).
SUMMARY
This dissertation effort rested on two premises: that ACTD military utility 
assessments should account for principal risks associated with deploying demonstration 
systems and associated operations concepts within joint military operations metasystems 
of which they could become a permanent part; and that the identification of those risks 
should accommodate ambiguities of cognition and language used by the experts assessing 
demonstrations’ military utility within relevant metasystems. A literature review that 
emphasized nine topics determined those premises to point toward an original and 
significant contribution to the extant body of related research:
■ Risk assessment ■ Risk-based approaches to military
■ Fuzzy set theory operations assessment
■ Fuzzy approaches to risk assessment ■ Fuzzy approaches to military operations
■ ACTD MUA design methodologies assessments
■ Approaches to complex system analysis ■ Small expert group and group decision
and transformation characteristics
■ Fuzzy risk prioritization methods
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Ample risk assessment- and fuzzy set theory-related literature made evident those 
topics’ relevance to ACTD MUA design methodology development. A smaller but still 
instructive body of work regarding fuzzy approaches to risk assessment demonstrated the 
value to be gained from an MUA design methodology that merged key elements of the 
fields of risk assessment and fuzzy set theory. Complementary components of the 
literature identified a niche into which a risk- and fuzzy set-based methodology for 
ACTD MUA design could fit.
The literature review confirmed the legitimacy of this dissertation’s problem 
statement. Few offerings directly address the question of how to design advanced concept 
technology demonstration military utility assessments and, therefore, any proposal for a 
design methodology must largely depend on a synthesis of study and practice bearing on 
the problem only indirectly. Holistic approaches to complex system analysis and 
transformation were viewed as indispensable elements of that synthesis, as were more 
particular pursuits that applied either risk- or fuzzy set theory-based approaches to 
military operations assessments. Equally pertinent and even more particular were 
concerns for expert group decision processes required of ACTD MUA planning. By 
noting reasonably direct correspondence between representative research efforts and the 
literature review’s nine topics of emphasis, Table 1 portrays the review’s findings of 
literature supporting this study’s two premises as well as deficiencies in research and 
practice the study is intended remove.
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The literature review confirmed the theoretical, methodological, and practical 
contributions to be made with an ACTD MUA design methodology respecting risks 
associated with demonstration deployments and ambiguities of cognition and language 
associated with expert perspectives of those risks. The development and deployment of 
such a design methodology would itself be subject to methodological strictures emplaced 
to buttress arguments for its worth. Its status as a legitimate methodology would also 
have to be argued.
A SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS ENGINEERING-BASED METHODOLOGY
Keating et al. (2003) endorse Checkland’s (1999, as cited, p. 41) suggestion “that 
methodology is a guide more specific than philosophy (theory), but more general than a 
tool, method, or technique.” Keating et al. (2004) continue that “a systems-based 
methodology must provide a framework that can be elaborated to effectively guide 
action” (p. 5), and they identify nine attributes of a system of systems-based methodology 
suited to the engineering that occurs when ACTDs test transformations of joint military 
operations metasystems. Table 2 lists the nine attributes, all of which this dissertation’s 
proposed methodology can be seen to hold.
This study’s ACTD MUA design methodology was developed to serve 
theoretical, methodological, and practical considerations regarding assessments of joint 
military operations metasystem transformations. It was also intended to be transportable 
to other types of assessments pursued within contexts set by similar metasystems -  like 
assessments now also required for ACTD-derivative, joint capability technology 
demonstrations (JCTD) -  or even distinct ones, provided that any assessment designs
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guided by the methodology are dependent on the judgments of subject matter expert 
groups of purpose and composition like those defining this dissertation’s application. 
Small expert group characteristics of purpose and composition are particularly significant 
requirements that link the methodology’s practical artifacts to its driving principles 
grounded in theory regarding risk assessment, fuzzy sets, and complex systems.
Table 2. Attributes of a System of Systems-based Methodology
Attribute Attribute Description
T r a n s p o r t a b i l i t y C a p a b l e  o f  a p p l i c a t i o n  a c r o s s  a  s p e c t r u m  o f  c o m p l e x  s y s t e m s  e n g i n e e r i n g  
p r o b l e m s  a n d  c o n t e x t s .
T h e o r e t i c a l  a n d  P h i l o s o p h i c a l  L i n k a g e  o f  t h e  m e t h o d o l o g y  t o  a  t h e o r e t i c a l  b o d y  o f  k n o w l e d g e  a s  w e l l  a s
G r o u n d i n g p h i l o s o p h i c a l  u n d e r p i n n i n g s  t h a t  f o r m  t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  m e t h o d o l o g y  a n d  
i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n .
G u i d e  t o  A c t i o n T h e  m e t h o d o l o g y  m u s t  p r o v i d e  s u f f i c i e n t  d e t a i l  t o  f r a m e  a p p r o p r i a t e  
a c t i o n s  a n d  g u i d e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  e f f o r t s  t o  i m p l e m e n t  t h e  m e t h o d o l o g y .
S i g n i f i c a n c e T h e  m e t h o d o l o g y  m u s t  e x h i b i t  t h e  “ h o l i s t i c ”  c a p a c i t y  t o  a d d r e s s  m u l t i p l e  
p r o b l e m  s y s t e m  d o m a i n s ,  m i n i m a l l y  i n c l u d i n g  c o n t e x t u a l ,  h u m a n ,  
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l ,  m a n a g e r i a l ,  p o l i c y ,  t e c h n i c a l ,  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  a s p e c t s  o f  a  
s y s t e m  o f  s y s t e m s  p r o b l e m .
C o n s i s t e n c y C a p a b l e  o f  p r o v i d i n g  r e p l i c a b i l i t y  o f  a p p r o a c h  a n d  r e s u l t s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
b a s e d  o n  d e p l o y m e n t  o f  t h e  m e t h o d o l o g y  i n  s i m i l a r  c o n t e x t s .
A d a p t a b i l i t y C a p a b l e  o f  f l e x i n g  a n d  m o d i f y i n g  t h e  a p p r o a c h  c o n f i g u r a t i o n ,  e x e c u t i o n ,  
o r  e x p e c t a t i o n s  b a s e d  o n  c h a n g i n g  c o n d i t i o n s  o r  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  -  
r e m a i n i n g  w i t h i n  t h e  f r a m e w o r k  o f  t h e  g u i d a n c e  p r o v i d e d  b y  t h e  
m e t h o d o l o g y ,  b u t  a d a p t i n g  a s  r e q u i r e d  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  s y s t e m i c  i n q u i r y .
N e u t r a l i t y T h e  m e t h o d o l o g y  a t t e m p t s  t o  m i n i m i z e  a n d  a c c o u n t  f o r  e x t e r n a l  
i n f l u e n c e s  i n  a p p l i c a t i o n  a n d  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  P r o v i d e s  s u f f i c i e n t  
t r a n s p a r e n c y  i n  a p p r o a c h ,  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  a n d  e x e c u t i o n  s u c h  t h a t  b i a s e s ,  
a s s u m p t i o n s ,  a n d  l i m i t a t i o n s  ( m a y  b e )  m a d e  e x p l i c i t  a n d  c h a l l e n g e d  
w i t h i n  t h e  m e t h o d o l o g y  a p p l i c a t i o n .
M u l t i p l e  U t i l i t y S u p p o r t s  a  v a r i e t y  o f  a p p l i c a t i o n s  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  c o m p l e x  s y s t e m s  o f  
s y s t e m s ,  i n c l u d i n g  n e w  s y s t e m  d e s i g n ,  e x i s t i n g  s y s t e m  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n ,  
a n d  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  e x i s t i n g  c o m p l e x  s y s t e m  o f  s y s t e m s  i n i t i a t i v e s .
R i g o r C a p a b l e  o f  w i t h s t a n d i n g  s c r u t i n y  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o :  ( 1 )  i d e n t i f i e d  l i n k a g e  
. . .  ( t o )  a  b o d y  o f  t h e o r y  a n d  k n o w l e d g e ;  ( 2 )  s u f f i c i e n t  d e p t h  t o  
d e m o n s t r a t e  s u f f i c i e n t  g r o u n d i n g  w i t h i n  t h e  s y s t e m s  e n g i n e e r i n g  
d i s c i p l i n e ;  a n d  ( 3 )  c a p a b l e  o f  p r o v i d i n g  t r a n s p a r e n t  r e s u l t s  t h a t  a r e  
r e p l i c a b l e  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  r e s u l t s  a c h i e v e d .
(Keating et al., 2004, p. 6 )
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The significance of holism that Keating et al. (2004) assign to system of 
systems-based methodologies was a key determinant of the methodology developed for 
this dissertation, and that holism markedly supported development of a process providing 
the guide to action, consistency, adaptability, neutrality, and multiple utility described in 
Table 2. Those five attributes, together with the methodology’s final attribute of rigor, 
will be evinced with coming, more detailed descriptions of this study’s approach to 
ACTD MUA design.
PROBLEM SELECTION CRITERIA
Fernandez and Olmedo (2004) echo Zadeh (1971), Blin and Whinston (1973), 
Blin (1974), and others in acknowledging the importance of agents with which can be 
determined group, or social, decisions. They also recognize the difficulty of group 
decision agent design and endorse the use of fuzzy set theory in the design of decision 
agents to be applied to problem settings of the following characteristics:
(1) Each (group member) considers the same set of alternatives or potential actions;
(2) The preference of each group member can accurately be represented by a ranking 
(with ties) of all alternatives from best to worst;
(3) All group members have the same importance for deriving final agreement; and
(4) The group members accept a final ranking derived from an aggregation of their 
opinions with fairness and equity. (Fernandez & Olmedo, 2004, p. 430)
These characteristics perfectly describe key elements of the ACTD MUA design 
methodology this research tested against a simulated, Class III demonstration derived 
from an actual case of ACTD program history. They are also perfectly aligned with
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Department of Defense intent that identification and analysis of risk events bearing on 
military system acquisitions be accomplished in concert with military operations experts 
and those of other pertinent fields (DoD, 2003c). The Department’s acquisition-related 
intent bears on its ACTD program and can met by that program with methods drawn 
from the fields of risk assessment and fuzzy set theory.
A RISK ASSESSMENT METHOD SUITED TO THE PROBLEM
“The key to successful risk analysis is the development of a model that clearly 
illustrates risk factors and their relationships without getting into unnecessary detail” 
(Ashley & Avots, 1984, p. 56). “The ‘right’ model seems to capture the essentials of the 
system. Too much detail obscures the essentials; too little misses them” (Anderson et al., 
1999, p. 59). Risk analyses should ideally avoid vulnerabilities such as: (a) dependence 
on models based on overly-simplistic assumptions, like those that assign independence or 
Normal variation to model entities or processes for which those characteristics cannot be 
verified (Beckerman, 2000; Tamimi, 1989); (b) analytical treatments conveying a sense 
of surety not justified by available data, as can occur when probabilistic methods are used 
to describe processes about which too little is known (Bier, Haimes, Lambert, Matalas, & 
Zimmerman, 1999); or (c) a level of reductionism greatly favoring identification of 
model components at the expense of studying interactions among them (Beckerman, 
2000). One aspect of user-intensive, risk analysis that should always be prominent is the 
use of models understandable to participating users (Gue, 2002) but not so simple that 
they surrender utility (Tamimi, 1989). Risk assessments promoting MUA design should 
avoid unnecessary vulnerabilities and depend on justifiable and holistic, operations 
metasystem models elicited from and validated by military literature and experts;
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assessment-peculiar elements of Haimes’ (2004) well-practiced, Risk Filtering, Ranking, 
and Management (RFRM) method meet both criteria.
The RFRM comprises eight phases of risk-related review, the first three of which 
were important to the research of this dissertation. Phase I activities can identify military 
operations metasystem risk scenarios associated with ACTD prototypes by using a 
hierarchical holographic model (HHM) “developed to describe...[the metasystem’s] ‘as 
planned’ or ‘success’ scenario[s]” (Haimes, 2004, p. 280). The filtering process of 
Phase II can reduce the number of Phase I-identified risks by emphasizing particular 
aspects of envisioned, ACTD prototype employment. Finally, the DoD-conventional 
(DoD, 2003c; Haimes, 2004), risk likelihood- and consequence-based filtering 
mechanism of Phase III can decrease what might be hundreds of Phase I-derived, ACTD 
risks (Haimes, 2004; Haimes et al., 2002) to a number of perhaps no more than 20 
(Lamm & Haimes, 2002) practically required for the individual risk prioritization scheme 
this research pursued as a pivotal step in ACTD MUA design.
“The basic building block of the RFRM is the HHM” (Leung, Lambert, & 
Mosenthal, 2004). A HHM is able to demonstrate relationships among what could be 
termed an ACTD’s overlapping functional, temporal, organizational, geographical, and 
like perspectives (or head topics) and subordinate domains (or subtopics) (Haimes, 1998, 
2004; Haimes et al., 2002). Figure 2 offers an illustrative version of a HHM suited to 
designing ACTD assessments, with major, joint military operations metasystem 
components -  Haimes’ perspectives -  of commands, critical operational issues, major 
missions, users, system functions, and threat decomposed into varying numbers of 
interdependent domains each simultaneously representing the success and, when normal
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operations are disrupted, the risk scenarios associated with ACTDs (Haimes, 2004; 
Kaplan et al., 2001). In practice, domains can be further subdivided into whatever 
number of subdomains needed to portray total risk to joint operations utility; the assumed 
interdependence of all domains and subdomains most enables identification of individual 
risks.
































Figure 3 portrays the manner in which submodels of the Figure 2 example HHM 
afford identification of “an inclusive set of answers to ‘what can go wrong?” (Haimes et 
al., 2002, p. 386). It shows that, from the perspective of any of the four major missions 
the illustrated ACTD prototype might be expected to perform, there might be as many as 
five threats against which it could be employed or which could otherwise jeopardize its 
employment. Analysts, military operators, and other subject matter experts can use such
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relationships to prompt consideration regarding “what can go wrong?” Many risks will 
be identified in this way, though numerous other associations will merely illuminate 
highly unlikely or even infeasible scenarios. The qualitative elimination of unlikely or 
infeasible scenarios defines Phase II of the RFRM. The method’s Phase III can further 
refine the set of consequential risks to joint operations utility with its use of another 
qualitative procedure well known to ACTD managers.
Figure 3 ACTD Major Mission Submodel
Major Missions
Threats
Threat 2 Threat 3 Threat 5Threat 1





Phase III of the RFRM features a matrix of independent dimensions of likelihood 
and consequence, graduated in accordance with long-standing, DoD evaluation measures 
generically depicted with Figure 4 (DoD, 2003c; Haimes, 2004; Jones, Lyford, Qazi, 
Solan, & Haimes, 2003). Should the balance of the number of risks identified through 
RFRM Phase II activities remain large, the matrix can be employed to determine whether 
those remaining risks should be classified as high, moderate, or low. These Phase III 
classifications allow experts to focus on lesser numbers of risks (perhaps only those 
classified as high) than will be identified through Phase II, numbers possibly more 
conducive to ensuing prioritizations with which can be developed ACTD MUA measures 
of effectiveness. With risk “a fuzzy concept... .(of) quantities.. .inherently imprecise”
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(Karwowski & Mital, 1986, p. 106), such risk prioritizations can employ a particular 
method of fuzzy set theory that respects the normal, experiential judgment processes 
(Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004) used by subject matter experts rather than 
forcing those experts -  as is the case with many risk prioritization methods -  to render 
judgments in starkly analytical terms neither necessarily applicable nor with which the 
experts may be facile or unbiased (Karwowski & Mital, 1986).
Figure 4. DoD-Conventional Matrix of Risk Likelihood and Consequence
LIKELIHOOD
CONSEQUENCE Remote Unlikely Likely HighlyLikely Frequent
Unacceptable M o d e r a t e H i g h H i g h H i g h H i g h
Minimally Acceptable L o w M o d e r a t e M o d e r a t e H i g h H i g h
Acceptable with 
Significant Utility Loss L o w L o w M o d e r a t e M o d e r a t e H i g h
Acceptable with Slight 
Utility Loss L o w L o w L o w M o d e r a t e M o d e r a t e
Little or None L o w L o w L o w L o w M o d e r a t e
A FUZZY SET THEORY METHOD SUITED TO THE PROBLEM
The several risk filtering and ranking phases of Haimes’ (2004) RFRM not 
already addressed in this chapter depend on often-challenged (and challenging) Bayesian 
techniques of evaluation (Aven & Kvaloy, 2002; Bier et al., 1999; Clemen & Winkler,
1999) as well as problematic weighting schemes (Bender & Simonovic, 2000; 
Btiyiikozkan & Feyzioglu, 2003; Chen, 2001; Forman, 1987; Lee and Ahn, 1991; Xu,
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2004) that can force subject matter experts to render judgments in starkly analytical terms 
neither necessarily applicable nor with which they may be facile or unbiased (Karwowski 
& Mital, 1986). Risk-related weighting schemes and resultant cardinal rankings 
additionally conflict with a strong DoD inclination toward ordinal evaluations of risk 
(DoD, 2003c), an organizational preference that must surely affect ACTD managers 
despite the availability of RFRM and many more risk ranking methods featuring 
criteria-weights, cardinal scales, distance and area metrics, or other arguably 
overly-analytical schemes, some even infused with fuzzy concepts (Bender & Simonovic, 
2000; Bortolan & Degani, 1985; Chen & Klein, 1997; Lee & Ahn, 1991; Tseng & Klein, 
1989). One sometimes weight-based scheme known to ACTD managers (DoD, 2003c) 
and often extended with fuzzy concepts is Saaty’s (1980) AHP, notable not for its use of 
absolute measures or fuzzy extensions but for its dependence upon simple, pairwise 
comparisons minimally stressing (Harker, 1987b; Lee & Ahn, 1991; Mustafa &
Al-Bahar, 1991; Vachnadze & Markozashvili, 1987) the number of 7 ± 2 absolute, 
unidimensional judgments popularly assigned as a limit of human capacity (Ghyym,
1999: Karwowski & Mital, 1986; Miller, 1956; Mustafa & Al-Bahar, 1991; Saaty, 1980; 
Wang et al., 2004). That these “pairwise comparisons are fundamental.. .[to] the AHP” 
(Saaty, 1987, p. 163) and that the AHP has found so many applications over the last 
quarter century (Harker, 1987a, 1987b; Lee & Ahn, 1991; Mustafa & Al-Bahar, 1991; 
Vachnadze & Markozashvili, 1987) is strong endorsement of the utility of a fuzzy 
set-based ranking method to which pairwise comparisons are equally central.
Less than a decade after Zadeh (1965) set forth his theory of fuzzy sets, Blin and 
Whinston (1973) and Blin (1974) proposed the notion of a fuzzy preference, a
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straightforward and fuzzy set-based method for relating small group preferences, and one 
that circumvents most problems of criteria weights, cardinal scales, membership 
functions, and like complications that could trouble ACTD managers or military 
operators. The essence of Blin and Whinston’s approach has been revisited (Klir and 
Folger, 1988), expanded (Spillman, Bezdek, & Spillman, 1979; Spillman, Spillman, & 
Bezdek, 1980), and otherwise modified (Basile, 1990; Chen and Klein, 1997), but its 
original form and purpose of easily identifying and characterizing in terms of agreement 
level the preferences of small groups seems well-suited to a MUA design process 
typically involving small groups of experts who could develop MOEs based on their 
independent and relative assessments of demonstration system risks.
Individual choices may be categorized as binary, {Yes, No}, or (0, 1} in type, but 
“a cursory examination of the history of decisions should suffice to convince us of the 
fuzziness of group preferences” (Blin, 1974, p. 28). Group preferences may be modeled 
as fuzzy binary relations (Blin, 1974), or sets, in accordance with Zadeh’s (1965, 1968, 
1971) theories of fuzzy sets and relations (Blin and Whinston, 1973). Blin and 
Whinston’s method for determining social, or group preferences, allows groups’ 
“individual (members) to possess different aims and values while still assuming that the 
overall [group] purpose is to reach a common, acceptable decision” (Klir & Folger, 1988, 
p. 258), a presumption that can be plausibly made for military settings of many kinds, 
including ACTD MUA design. Multiplicity of opinion can be accommodated by 
defining a group, or social, preference, S, as a fuzzy binary relation of membership 
function
(x„ Xj): U x U  e [0, 1]
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indicating the degree to which the group believes risk x, exceeds risk xy. Such an 
expression of group preference may be defined in many ways, with one of the most direct 
possibly free of significant, membership function-related controversy and thus appealing 
to ACTD participants:
N (x x  1
DEFINITION 3. (*„ xj) = P J ,
n
the simple fraction of the number, N(xh Xj), of «-total experts considering x, riskier than xy. 
With such a membership function in place, final and nonfuzzy, group prioritizations of 
any number of risks may be determined by recognizing S  as the union of crisp relations 
of its own cut-sets, S a, with a-cut values essentially representing strengths of group 
agreements on particular prioritizations, or orderings.
The sequential procedure for identifying final, collective, group preferences and 
associated values of agreement level involves:
■ identifying elements of the set, O, of all possible, crisp preference orderings;
■ selecting from all possible orderings, the subsets, Oa, of elements compatible with 
the paired elements of the cut-set of highest-valued a-cut; and
■ continuing the process through cut-sets of increasingly smaller a-cut values until 
only a single, crisp preference ordering remains (Klir & Folger, 1988).
An example drawn from Klir and Folger (1988) illustrates how Blin and Whinston’s
(1973) method could be used to determine the most acceptable, overall group rankings of 
ACTD prototype risks requiring the greatest, MUA design emphasis:
Suppose that n = 8 military experts, E„ /' = 1,2, . . . 8 , have together 
applied Phases I-III of the RFRM to identify an ACTD’s four most critical 
risks, a, b, c, and d. Suppose still that this group hopes to prioritize -  with
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some reasonable degree of agreement -  those four most critical risks in an 
effort to follow with a MUA construct of accordingly tailored MOEs. 
Now assume that the eight experts have independently ranked the four 
risks, in order from most to least risky, as:
Ei = (a, b, c, d)
E2 = E5 = (d, c, b, a)
E3 = E7 = (b, a, c, d)
E4 = Eg = (a, d, b, c)
E6 = {d, a, b, c).
Applying Definition 3 to the individual rankings of Ei through Eg yields 
what is termed a reciprocal (Spillman et al., 1979; Spillman et al, 1980), 
fuzzy, group preference relation, S, that may be expressed in matrix form 
as
a b c d
a 0 0 . 5 0 . 7 5 0 . 6 2 5
b 0 . 5 0 0 . 7 5 0 . 3 7 5
c 0 . 2 5 0 . 2 5 0 0 . 3 7 5
d 0 . 3 7 5 0 . 6 2 5 0 . 6 2 5 0
The significant cut-sets of this fuzzy relation are those associated with 
a-cuts that match matrix values. Thus 
S 1 = 0
S°-?s = { (a, c), (b, c ) }
S 0-625 = { (a, c), (b, c), (a, d), (d, b), (d, c) }
S 0-5 = { (a, c), (b, c), (a, d), (d, b), (d, c), (b, a), (a, b) }
S 0375 = { (a, c), (b, c), (a, d), (d, b), (d, c), (b, a), (a, b), (d, a),
. . .(b ,d ) ,(c ,d )}
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S 0J5 = { (a, c), (b, c), (a, d), (d, b), (d, c), (b, a), (a, b), (d, a),
...(b, d), (c, d), (c, a), (c, b) }.
To determine the unique, crisp ordering that will constitute the group
choice, the set of all (in this example, 4! = 24) possible risk orderings can
be reviewed in descending, a-cut value sequence to identify those
compatible with the pairings of corresponding cut-sets:
O1 = Trivial solution (all 24 possible orderings are compatible with
S 2 = 0)
0 °'7S = { (d, a, b, c), (a, b, c, d), (a, d, b, c), (a, b, d, c), (d, b, a, c),
...(b, a, c, d), (b, d, a, c), (b, a, d, c) }
O0-625 = { (a, d, b, c) }
The ultimately determined, group-preferred ordering is { (a, d, b, c) }, 
which carries with it an agreement value of 0.625 and only coincidentally 
matches the individual preferences of experts E4 and Eg.
This example not only demonstrates the Blin and Whinston (1973) and Blin
(1974) method mechanics but also the method’s characteristics that would most 
prominently affect its use in ACTD military utility assessment design. These are:
(1) Simplicity. Military operators would understand the method’s foundational 
mechanics and so be likely to accept them.
(2) Promotion of risk orderings independently identified by every evaluator. 
Though DoD-endorsed (DoD, 2003c) and long-popular decision making methods 
like the AHP and RAND Corporation’s Delphi (Ayyub, 2001) method allow groups’ 
levels of agreement to be visible to group members, and even though enhancements 
of Blin and Whinston’s own method (Spillman et al, 1979; Spillman et al, 1980)
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promote open consensus building, there may be little reason to believe that open 
approaches to small group decisions can produce sets of paired risk comparisons 
more valid (Bone, Hey, and Suckling, 1999) than can the Blin and Whinston 
approach. Moreover, the shared sense of mission that can be plausibly ascribed to 
military operators, here evaluators, might alone preclude any need to debate the 
relative strengths of collaborative and independent processes.
(3) De facto need to keep small the number of risks to be ranked. The number of 
pairwise comparisons required for a collection of n risks is (Vi)(n)(n - 1). For 
example, the 2 0  risks previously described as a hoped-for upper limit of the number 
identified through a RFRM Phase III process would incur 190 pairwise comparisons, 
a total possibly taxing to even the most dutiful of military evaluators. Incomplete or 
inconsistent pairings could also occur with so large a number of comparisons, and 
methods like those of Harker (1987a, 1987b) or Saaty (1980, 1987) might have to be 
invoked in response. While at least one algorithm has been demonstrated to require 
only n comparisons of n risks (Chen & Klein, 1997), its otherwise quite complex 
features might prove intolerable to military users.
Additionally, the number of possible preference orderings for n risks is n\, a 
dauntingly large number for even small values of n. Though computer-based sorting 
should render this factor of little computational concern, such large numbers of 
permutations might nevertheless concern MUA designers.
The Blin and Whinston method can serve as a straightforward, risk prioritization tool 
complementing the equally straightforward, risk identification capability afforded by 
RFRM Phases I-III. The collective expert ranking offered by the application of both
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methods may promote the development of measures of effectiveness and derivative 
assessment designs de facto already validated by the military user community that would 
employ them. As a whole, then, this risk- and fuzzy set-based methodology developed 
for ACTD MUA design merited the tests of application and review.
RESEARCH DESIGN
The research of this dissertation relied upon a simulated, Class III, system of 
systems ACTD of technology, organization, and military operations function components 
like those that MUAs are prescribed to address. The simulation was derived from an 
actual Class III demonstration in order to enhance research validity. A five-phase 
deployment scheme of key attributes depicted by Figure 5 afforded thorough exercise and 
review of the ACTD MUA design methodology developed for this research:
Phase 1. Joint warfare operations expert and researcher-assisted 
development of a military operations metasystem model suited to a 
joint service ACTD. This first phase of research involved the researcher 
as study leader and three joint warfare operations specialists purposively 
selected for their familiarity with organizations and operational functions 
relevant to the simulated ACTD; the group size of three and purposive 
selection for membership reflected findings of the literature review as well 
as ACTD norms. Participants over time collectively reviewed, refined, 
and confirmed the appropriateness of a joint military operations 
metasystem HHM initially prototyped by the researcher using sources like 
the Universal Joint Task List (DoD, 2002) used to identify critical 
operational issues for actual ACTDs (Singleton et al., 1998). The HHM
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
58
development observed practice long employed and endorsed by numerous 
researchers (Florentine et al., 2003; Haimes, 2004; Haimes et al., 2002; 
Horowitz & Haimes, 2003; Jones et al., 2003; Lambert et al., 2001; Lamm 
& Haimes, 2002; Leung et al., 2004; Pennock & Haimes, 2002).
Figure 5. Research Design
Develop Methodology
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S e l e c t  O p e r a t i o n s  M o d e l i n g  a n d  
R i s k  I D / R a n k i n g  S c h e m e s
Risk
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Phase 2. Collective, military operations expert assessment of risks 
identified with the ACTD-relevant, military operations metasystem
model. The same group of experts used to develop the simulated, 
ACTD-relevant HHM next collectively identified and analyzed the most 
significant risks represented by the model. This assessment utilized 
procedures conventional for the RFRM Phases II-III (Haimes, 2004; 
Haimes et al., 2002; Haimes et al., 2004; Horowitz & Haimes, 2003; Jones 
et al., 2003; Lambert et al., 2001; Leung et al., 2004; Pennock & Haimes, 
2 0 0 2 ) augmented by elements of expert perspective elicitation procedures 
proposed by Brandon (1998) and others.
Phase 3. Individual expert prioritizations of the group-identified risks 
of greatest significance. This process of independent rankings required 
final contributions from all joint military operations expert group members 
except the researcher, who supported individual ranking processes in 
face-to-face fashion for acceptable completeness and consistency.
Phase 4. Researcher aggregation of individual, risk rankings. The 
researcher exclusively executed this wholly mechanical process.
Phase 5. Individual expert reviews of methodology utility. This final 
phase of research synthesized judgments of a group of 2 0  purposively 
selected individuals collectively expert in ACTD management and MUA 
design. It employed a lone, single-stage, cross-sectional, primarily Likert 
scale-type survey instrument generally reflecting those demonstrated by 
Monroe (1997), Yeh (1998), Morgan (1999), and Chytka (2003) and
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topically related to survey structures used for related research in: (a) 
decision making (Yeh, 1998), (b) design performance evaluation (Sun,
2000); (c) risk and uncertainty assessment, including risk ranking (Chytka,
2003; Hampton, 2001; Monroe, 1997; Morgan, 1999; Wells, 1997); (d) 
technology adoption impact (Conway, 2003); and (e) evaluation of 
commercial product customer preferences (Liu, 1996).
Table 3 associates with these five phases this dissertation’s three research questions and 
data collection and analysis processes pursued under the study’s “dominant-less 
dominant” (Creswell, 1994, p. 177), research design.
Table 3. Data Collection and Analysis
Research Phase 1
Research Question: H o w  m i g h t  j o i n t  m i l i t a r y  o p e r a t i o n s  m e t a s y s t e m  m o d e l s  g u i d e  t h e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  
o f  A C T D  M U A  m e a s u r e s  o f  e f f e c t i v e n e s s ?
Collection Method Reference Analysis Method Reference Expected Products







■ Denzin & Lincoln 
(2005)
■ Haimes (2004)
■ Leedy &  Ormrod 
(2001)
■ Triangulation ■ Creswell (1994)
■ Tabulation ■ Haimes (2004)
■ Leedy &  Ormrod 
(2001)
■ A military operations 
metasystem model 
pertinent to the 
simulated ACTD.




Research Question: H o w  m i g h t  b e  d e v e l o p e d  a n d  e m p l o y e d  j o i n t  m i l i t a r y  o p e r a t i o n s  m e t a s y s t e m  
m o d e l s  w i t h  w h i c h  c a n  b e  i d e n t i f i e d  A C T D  M U A  m e a s u r e s  o f  e f f e c t i v e n e s s ?











■ Leedy & Ormrod 
(2001)
■ Triangulation • Blin (1974)
■ Tabulation ■ Blin & Whinston
■ Fuzzy preference (1973) 
relations ■ Creswell (1994)
■ Haimes (2004)
■ Leedy & Ormrod 
(2001)
■ Prioritized listing of 
greatest risks to 
ACTD.








Research Question: H o w  u s e f u l  m i g h t  A C T D  m a n a g e r s  a n d  a n a l y s t s  f i n d  t h e  A C T D  d e s i g n  
m e t h o d o l o g y  d e v e l o p e d  a n d  d e p l o y e d  w i t h  t h i s  r e s e a r c h ?
Collection Method Reference Analysis Method Reference Expected Products
■ Cross-sectional, ■ Ayyub (2001) 
individual surveys * Creswell (1994)
■ Leedy & Ormrod 
(2001)
■ Descriptive statistics 
• Inferential statistics
■ Creswell (1994)
■ Leedy & Ormrod 
(2001)




Creswell (1994) identifies a combined, quantitative- and qualitative-research
design that captures methodological aspects significant to this research effort:
In (the dominant-less dominant) design the researcher presents the study 
within a single, dominant paradigm with one small component o f the 
overall study drawn from the alternative paradigm. A classic example o f 
this approach is a quantitative study based on testing a theory in an 
experiment with a small qualitative interview component in the data 
collection phase. Alternately one might engage in qualitative observations 
with a limited number o f  informants, followed by a quantitative survey o f  a 
sample from a population. The advantage o f this approach is that it 
presents a consistent paradigm picture in the study and still gathers 
limited information to probe in detail one aspect o f the study (p. 177).
This dissertation’s research Phases 1 and 2 comprised primarily less-dominant,
qualitative pursuits supporting the dominant and distinctly quantitative Phases 3-5. Only
this sort of combined design could have adequately addressed the problem and answered
the questions that drove the research.
The Practical Impetus for Combined Designs
Though much popular literature portrays research as divided into two mutually 
exclusive camps of quantitative paradigm-adherent positivists and qualitative 
paradigm-adherent constructivists, that distinction has been often challenged by 
practitioners of both paradigms (Blaxter, Hughes, & Tight, 2001; Brandon, 1998;
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Brannen, 2004; Kemmis & McTaggart, 2005; Ladkin, 2004; Patten, 2004; Seale, Gobo, 
Gubrium, & Silverman, 2004). “Instead of forcibly applying abstract methodological 
rules (regarding the use of quantitative or qualitative paradigms),” suggest Seale et al. 
(2004, p. 7), researchers might instead fix their “research situation.. .in a place of 
dialogue with methodological rules.” If in particular, as others have posited, “the notion 
of different paradigms defies the way research is carried out in practice” (Brannen, 2004, 
p. 312), then researchers need not necessarily heed common exhortations (Creswell,
1994) to avoid combinations of quantitative and qualitative approaches to research. They 
should instead remain open to research opportunities to which both paradigms would 
bring value, and they should do so without fear of linkages that do not truly exist between 
research methodologies and the ontological and epistemological assumptions of 
research’s two traditional paradigms (Brannen, 2004).
The nature of the research reality and the relationships between researchers and 
the researched may be considered relevant to the selection of research methods, but strict 
adherence to positivist or constructivist stances can blind researchers to the answers they 
seek (Kemmis & McTaggart, 2005). Quantitative and qualitative data should be viewed 
as compatible and so should be together collected and analyzed if such collection and 
analysis serves research needs (Brannen, 2004; Zaras, 2003). Researchers should not feel 
constrained by either of the quantitative or qualitative paradigms and associated 
underpinnings of ontology and epistemology (Blaxter et al., 2001; Patten, 2004). Applied 
researchers, in particular, must view paradigmatic constraints as largely relaxed (if not 
altogether artificial or imagined) as they attend to practical aspects of problems of 
interest.
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Applied researchers normally do emphasize problems over paradigms in acting as
translators between theoretic disciplines and the world of action (Miller & Salkind,
2002). Those wishing to apply research findings directly to practical programs or
processes are commonly said to pursue evaluation research (Kelly, 2004; Patten, 2004),
of which the 40 years of public program evaluations prompted by and since President
Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society initiatives may be the examples (Orcher, 2005; Rossi &
Wright, 2002) best known in this country. Evaluation research routinely melds
quantitative and qualitative methods (Blaxter et al., 2001) and has been plainly described
in the following fashion (Patton, 1990, p. 11, as cited in Kelly, 2004, p. 523):
The term evaluation may be used quite broadly to include any effort to 
increase human effectiveness through systematic data-based inquiry.
Human beings are engaged in all kinds o f efforts to make the world a 
better place. These efforts include assessing needs, formulating policies, 
passing laws, delivering programs, managing people and resources, 
providing therapy, developing communities, changing organizational 
culture, educating students, intervening in conflicts, and solving problems.
In these and other efforts to make the world a better place, the question o f  
whether the people involved are accomplishing what they want to 
accomplish arises. When one examines and judges accomplishments and 
effectiveness, one is engaged in evaluation. When this examination o f 
effectiveness is conducted systematically and empirically through careful 
data collection and thoughtful analysis, one is engaged in evaluation 
research.
The discipline of evaluation research also serves as an umbrella for more refined 
categories such as action research (Kelly, 2004).
Characterizing Action Research
Since the approach’s beginnings credited to social psychologist, Kurt Lewin and 
the United Kingdom’s Tavistock Institute of Human Relations (Argyris, Putnam, & 
Smith, 1985; Kemmis & McTaggart, 2005), “the term ‘action research’ (has been) 
increasingly used to describe a [Figure 6 ] cycle of events that is intended to help the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
64
practitioner evaluate and modify practice. There are several models of action 
research.. .but, in essence, .. .the.. .process is problem-driven, in that a practice-based 
problem is identified... [and] the
practitioner and researcher design 
a research programme to 
investigate i t , . . .develop a 
package of change based on the 
[research] results, and then 
evaluate the impact of the change 
package” (Hicks, 2004, p. 8).
The defined cooperation between 
practitioner and researcher serves 
to “empower practitioners and to 
integrate research with practice, 
thereby overcoming the
Figure 6. The Action Research Spiral
(Atweh et al., 1998, p. 22, as cited in 
Blaxter et al., 2001, p. 70. Reprinted 
with permission.)
well-known (practice-research) divide” (p. 8).
Greenwood and Levin (1998, p. 21, as cited in Blaxter et al., 2001, p. 67)
elaborate upon Hicks’s description with:
(Action research) is a complex, dynamic activity involving the best efforts 
o f both members o f communities or organizations and professional 
researchers. It simultaneously involves co-generation o f new information 
and analysis together with actions aimed at transforming the situation in 
democratic ways. (Action research) is holistic and also context bound, 
producing practical solutions and new knowledge as part o f an integrated 
set o f activities... (it) is a way ofproducing tangible and desired results for  
the people involved, and it is a knowledge-generation process that 
produces insights both for researchers and the participants. It is a 
complex action-knowledge generation process... the immense importance
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o f insider knowledge and initiatives is evident, marking a clear distinction 
from orthodox research that systematically distrusts insider knowledge as 
co-opted.
These latter authors’ references repeat emphases applied earlier in this document to 
notions of holism, context, and complexity, all integral to a system of systems philosophy 
with which this dissertation’s research corresponds.
Utilizing Action Research
“The purpose of action research is, always and explicitly, to improve practice” 
(Griffiths, 1998, p. 21, as cited in Blaxter et al., 2001, p. 67). It has therefore become 
increasingly popular with small-scale researchers working in professional areas (Blaxter 
et al., 2 0 0 1 ).
“(Action research) is well suited to the needs of people conducting research in 
their workplaces, and who have a focus on improving aspects of their own and their 
colleagues’ practices. For example, the teacher who is concerned to improve 
performance in the classroom may find action research useful because it offers a 
systematic approach to the definition, solution, and evaluation of problems and concerns” 
(Blaxter et al., 2001, p. 67). Variations of action research have even been demonstrated 
with attempts to correct deficiencies in large-scale systems, notably health care and 
higher education delivery systems (Clarke, 1998; Greenwood & Levin, 2005; Linden & 
Wen, 1998; Meltzoff, 1998). That action researchers can realize process improvements 
by working together with those whose processes they seek to improve is reflected in 
seven characteristics that Hart and Bond (1995, p. 37-38, as cited in Blaxter et al., 2001) 
maintain distinguish it from alternate research methods:




(2 ) deals with individuals as members of social groups;
(3) is problem-focused, context-specific, and future-oriented;
(4) involves a change intervention;
(5) aims at improvement and involvement;
(6 ) involves a cyclic process in which research, action and evaluation are 
interlinked;
(7) is founded on a research relationship in which those involved are 
participants in the change process, (p. 69)
Hart’s and Bond’s characterization promotes action research as an appropriate vehicle for
deploying and testing the ACTD military utility assessment design methodology
proposed with this research.
STUDY LEADER SELECTION CRITERIA
As a combined effort of researcher and selected experts, the deployment of this
study’s ACTD MUA design methodology greatly depended on a study leader of
“managerial and technical responsibility for executing the (study), overseeing all
participants, and intellectually owning the results” (Ayyub, 2001, p. 235). The study
leader would perform the roles of technical integrator and facilitator described in
Appendix A; the leader would also possess characteristics aligned with general criteria
drawn from Ayyub (2001):
(1) Competence based on academic training and relevant experience;
(2) Strong communication skills, interpersonal skills, flexibility, impartiality, and ability 
to generalize and simplify;
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(3) A large contact base of (ACTD program) leaders, researchers.. .and decision makers; 
and
(4) Leadership qualities and the ability to build consensus, (p. 240)
Needed interactions with the operations expert group also required the study leader to 
meet the specific criteria prescribed in Appendix B for operations group participants.
This dissertation’s author met general and specific requirements for service as study 
leader and so performed that role.
EXPERT SELECTION CRITERIA
This study also greatly depended on characteristics of members selected for each 
of the required, joint military operations and ACTD expert groups. Though numerous 
studies point to difficulties associated with “expert” identification (Hutton & Klein, 1999; 
Shanteau, Weiss, Thomas, & Pounds, 2002; Vick, 2002), the following five general rules 
drove the participant selection criteria of both groups:
(1) Participants must be or represent ACTD program stakeholders (Brandon, 1998), 
with stakeholders defined as groups or individuals who can affect or be affected by 
some system of interest (Comelissen et al., 2002; Turnley, 2002) and “have 
demonstrated their need and willingness to be involved in seeking a solution” 
(Sproles, 2000, p. 53) to whatever problem the system is intended to address.
(2) Participants must possess strong relevant expertise in the study’s area of focus, 
gained through professional accomplishment and experience as well as academic 
training (Ayyub, 2001; Brandon, 1998);
(3) Participants must be willing to act as impartial evaluators (Ayyub, 2001);
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(4) Participants must be available and willing to commit the time and effort required by 
the study (Ayyub, 2001); and
(5) Participants must possess the same degree of communication and interpersonal 
skills, flexibility, impartiality, and abilities to generalize and simplify as that 
required of the study leader (Ayyub, 2001).
Appendices B and C respectively identify these and more precise criteria applied for the 
selection of individuals to populate the operations and ACTD expert groups. All general 
and specific, individual expert selection criteria were complemented by other 
requirements desired for the compositions of both groups ultimately determined to 
promote the study.
Operations Expert Group Characteristics
The joint military operations expert group employed for this research comprised 
three joint warfare operations specialists purposively selected in accordance with 
Appendix B. Group sizing reflected a preponderance of literature relevant to the 
research, and the purposive selection process could be plausibly argued as that which 
would normally be available to ACTD managers pursuing development of their 
demonstrations’ military utility assessments. The operations expert group displayed a 
degree of heterogeneity expected with military stakeholder experience, but -  as with the 
purposive selection process -  this degree of homogeneity was accepted by the researcher 
as closely aligned with realities of ACTD staffing.
ACTD Management and MUA Design Expert Group Characteristics 
The expert group of ACTD managers and MUA designers employed for this 
research comprised 2 0  purposively selected individuals meeting the selection criteria
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specified in Appendix C. This second group’s purpose of methodology review differed 
markedly from that of the operations group’s methodology deployment charge, and its 
characteristics reflected that distinction.
The group’s sizing represented a large portion of all individuals who have been or 
are involved with joint ACTD management or military utility assessment design. Its 
purposive origin, then, did not challenge routinely-voiced and accepted calls for random 
selection processes nearly as strongly as did the purposive origin of the operations expert 
group. The ACTD review group’s heterogeneity could also be shown to have been more 
prominent than that of the operations-oriented group.
METASYSTEM MODEL DEVELOPMENT
Brandon (1998) identifies three broad procedural rules for guiding interactions 
among study leaders and study experts, rules that transcend mere procedure by also 
contributing to study validity. The first of these three rules requires the “participation of 
stakeholder groups with the appropriate (study) expertise” (p. 328), and this research 
observed that first rule with the criteria established for participation in its operations and 
ACTD expert groups. The second rule stipulates “that stakeholders’ (study-related) 
expertise should be fully tapped by applying carefully developed, thorough methods for 
stakeholder participation” (p. 330), while the third holds that “the equitable participation 
of stakeholders.. .should be ensured” (p. 332). The second and third rules have been 
expanded by other researchers equally concerned with validity-related issues, and both 
were observed with processes executed during this dissertation’s research Phase 1 of 
metasystem model development.
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Ayyub (2001), Chicken and Hayns (1989), Comelissen et al. (2002), and Pennock 
and Haimes (2002) suggest complementary criteria also applied during this research to 
prepare for and execute the Phase 1 development of a joint military operations 
metasystem HHM. Those complementary criteria included:
■ Providing expert group members with statements of study objectives before the 
expert groups commenced their respective tasks;
■ Providing expert group members with explanations of appropriate, study-significant 
terms and processes prior to commencement of each group’s respective tasks;
■ Providing expert group members with clear and concise explanations of their 
respective tasks;
■ Providing expert group members with equitable, participation opportunities; and
■ Comprehensive documentation of each group’s proceedings in order to support 
acceptance of the results.
The operations expert group used supplied, preparatory information and brainstorming 
endorsed by Haimes (2004), Pennock and Haimes (2002), and others to develop the 
simulated ACTD-relevant, joint military operations metasystem HHM with which it was 
charged, a HHM of detail sufficient to capture substantive risks (Haimes, 2004; Saaty, 
1987) but not so complex as to threaten the availability of expert time or commitment 
(Haimes, 2004). Phase 1 proceedings may be considered to have been semi-structured, 
group interviews orchestrated and recorded by the researcher as study lead. 
METASYSTEM MODEL RISK ASSESSMENT AND PRIORITIZATION
Research Phases 2 and 3 each exhibited all appropriate, preparatory and execution 
process criteria observed during Phase 1. The second phase of research demonstrated a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
71
collaborative identification of risks made evident to the operations expert group by the 
joint operations metasystem model -  the HHM -  that the group developed during 
research Phase 1. A singular focus upon the independent, pairwise comparisons required 
by the Blin and Whinston (1973) method determined risk prioritizations of individual 
experts and marked Phase 3 as the operations expert group’s lone departure from 
collaboration. The Phase 4, study leader aggregation of Phase 3 prioritizations drew 
further upon the Blin and Whinston work by defining a single, operations expert group 
preference regarding prioritization of risks thought most significant. All Phase 1 through 
4 processes were next reviewed in Phase 5 by a group of experts distinct from the 
operations group and collectively versed in ACTD management and MUA design. 
ASSESSMENT OF METHODOLOGY UTILITY
A group of 20 individuals expert in either ACTD management, MUA design, or 
both, reviewed during research Phase 5 the ACTD MUA design methodology developed 
and deployed by the study leader and joint military operations expert group in preceding 
phases. Once accorded the same preparatory and procedural treatments provided the 
operations expert group, each ACTD or MUA design expert independently reviewed the 
methodology’s development, processes, and products with the aid of a lone, single-stage, 
cross-sectional survey instrument structurally like those of Monroe (1997), Yeh (1998), 
Morgan (1999), and Chytka (2003) and topically related to surveys used for related 
research in: (a) decision making (Yeh, 1998), (b) design performance evaluation (Sun,
2000); (c) risk and uncertainty assessment, including risk ranking (Chytka, 2003; 
Hampton, 2001; Monroe, 1997; Morgan, 1999; Wells, 1997); (d) technology adoption
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impact (Conway, 2003); and (e) evaluation of commercial product customer preferences 
(Liu, 1996).
APPROACH TO RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY
This study pursued a dominant-less dominant (Creswell, 1994), combined design
approach to reliability and validity. Research and instrument reliability and validity
issues were of particular concern during the less-dominant, action research-dependent
Phases 1 and 2 of military metasystem model development and risk identification.
Concerns reflected epistemological issues that Styhre et al. (2002, p. 98, as cited in
Ladkin, 2004, p. 539) reveal to have engendered criticism for “action researchers.. .not
taking a detached position vis-a-vis the research objects but rather actively becoming
involved” in ways possibly consequential to research findings.
The effort’s first two study phases pursued validity and reliability using an
epistemological tack respecting the Argyris et al. (1985) definition of action contexts of
high complexity wherein “unilateral control of variables is neither possible nor desirable”
(p. 239). To meet the phases’ contextual challenge, the research employed observations,
interviews, and recordings (Argyris et al., 1985; Gorman & Clayton, 2005) typical of
qualitative research together with a heavy emphasis on face, content, and construct
validity deemed appropriate for an HHM and as defined by Bernard (2002), Gliner and
Morgan (2000), and Orcher (2005) in Appendix A. Research Phases 1 and 2 also
observed the very clear counsel of Greenwood and Levin (2005, p. 54) regarding the
establishment of validity and reliability in action research studies:
Validity ...and reliability in action research are measured by the 
willingness o f ...stakeholders to act on the results o f the action research, 
thereby risking their welfare on the “validity ” o f  their ideas and the 
degree to which the outcomes meet their expectations. Thus, cogenerated
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contextual knowledge is deemed valid i f  it generates warrants for action.
The core validity claim centers on the workability o f the actual ...change 
engaged in, and the test is whether or not the actual solution to a problem 
arrived at solves the problem.
The dominant, third through fifth research phases of risk prioritization, risk 
aggregation, and methodology review employed non-experimental but still thoroughly 
quantitative analysis and survey methods. These phases observed measures of reliability 
and validity commonly associated with quantitative tests and survey instruments.
The combined design acknowledged plainly visible and necessary, qualitative and 
quantitative aspects of the MUA design process. It, too, was necessary and so necessarily 
judged in accordance with qualitative and quantitative norms of reliability and validity. 
SUMMARY
The ACTD MUA methodology developed for this dissertation was characterized 
as one displaying the attributes that some researchers have posited for system of systems 
engineering-based methodologies. That characterization supported researcher claims of 
an assessment design product applicable to numerous, complex systems other than the 
one simulated for this research.
The complex system simulated for this research was developed in accordance 
with criteria derived from the realities of the ACTD program, realities that include a 
prominent need for risk-based, expert judgments rendered either independently or 
collectively as group, or social, preferences. Elements of Haimes’ (2004) risk filtering, 
ranking, and management method and Blin and Whinston’s (1973) method for resolving 
small group preferences were identified as a pairing possibly able to address MUA design 
realities in a manner acceptable to program stakeholders. A five-phase research effort
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was planned to test the utility of a risk- and fuzzy set-based methodology for ACTD 
MUA design.
A mixed-method, action research plan was emplaced to govern less-dominant, 
qualitative proceedings of research Phases 1 and 2 as well as dominant, quantitative 
proceedings executed during Phases 3 through 5. The need for qualitative proceedings 
naturally derived from the expert perspective-based HHM development and risk 
identification that would occur during the first two research phases, while the need for 
quantitative measures derived equally naturally from the risk prioritizations and 
judgments regarding proposed methodology utility to define Phases 3 through 5. The 
research plan additionally incorporated distinct, selection criteria for the study lead and 
each of two expert groups respectively employed for the HHM development and risk 
prioritizations of research Phases 1 through 3 and the methodology utility assessment of 
research Phase 5. These selection criteria would buttress research validity and so 
complement other efforts regarding validity and reliability applied to qualitative and 
quantitative elements of the research.
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RESULTS
This research addressed its purpose, its objectives, and its three foundational 
questions within a single cycle of the Figure 6 action research spiral. Once developed, 
the risk- and fuzzy set-based MUA design methodology was deployed within the context 
of a simulated ACTD of technologies, organizations, processes, and other components of 
joint military operations metasystems that utility assessments should accommodate. The 
joint operations expert group executed its deployment charge by first identifying a model 
its members believed to portray the most relevant aspects of a joint military operations 
metasystem incorporated with the simulated demonstration. That same group then used 
the model to identify and classify in terms of high, moderate, and low the risks associated 
with adoption of the simulated ACTD within the superior metasystem. The classification 
was next refined with individual member prioritizations of those risks that the entire 
group had assessed as most serious. In a role of study leader granted under the action 
research format that governed the conduct of methodology deployment, the researcher 
concluded the exercise by determining a single, operations expert group prioritization of 
selected risk criticality, a prioritization the methodology holds to enable identification of 
measures of effectiveness fundamental to ACTD MUA design. All of these research 
processes were lastly reviewed by a distinct and consequentially-sized group of 
individuals prominent in the management or assessment of actual, joint operations 
demonstrations.
SIMULATED ACTD
The ACTD simulated for this research, the Operational Mine Detection ACTD, 
strongly reflected for validity purposes certain elements of an actual demonstration, the
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Class III, Joint Countermine (JCM) ACTD conducted 1994-2000 (Blumenthal, no date; 
Elliott, Madden, & Dean, 1996; Schaffer, Arnold, Smith, & Jackson, 1997; Schnoor, no 
date; U.S. Atlantic Command [USACOM], 1998). Aspects of the simulated, joint, 
amphibious, forcible entry operations-related, OMD ACTD included programmatic, 
technical, and operational traits that would be typically known to staffs early in a 
demonstration’s life cycle, when MUA design begins. Operations expert group 
members were given a statement of critical military need, a statement of OMD ACTD 
purpose, critical operational issues, and key technical and operational characteristics 
associated with the OMD system’s two principal and complementary components: the 
covert, national-level, Remote Littoral Sensing System (RLSS); and the Proximate 
Littoral Sensing System (PLSS) organic to the joint forces it would serve for joint, 
amphibious, forcible entry operations planning. The RLSS was characterized as using 
novel computational techniques to exploit capabilities of existing national-level 
reconnaissance assets and provide joint forces with cuing information required of the 
PLSS, an unmanned aerial vehicle, surveillance platform. Appendix D detail the OMD 
ACTD prototype and all other information provided the operations group in anticipation 
of research Phase 1.
METASYSTEM MODEL
Research Phase 1 saw the joint warfare operations expert group development of a 
joint military operations metasystem model suited to the OMD ACTD. That model was 
the fundamental element produced during the MUA design methodology deployment, 
and it was identified in accordance with Haimes’ (1998, 2004) notions of a HHM. The 
operations expert group crafted and achieved consensus on the HHM using a seed model
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provided by the study lead and that the balance of the group modified through 10 hours of 
deliberations over five meeting sessions. The final HHM comprised 13 perspectives -  
the principal, military operations metasystem components or, equivalently, those 
highest-level systems constituting the military operations metasystem with which the 
OMD ACTD was to be incorporated -  derived from a seed model total of 7. The 13 
perspectives together encompassed 93 domains and 95 subdomains, and they were 
derived through major, model configurations that included the seed’s 7 perspectives and 
an intermediate model’s 11. Table 4 describes the final HHM perspective evolution and 
Appendix E identifies the entire final model of perspectives, domains, and subdomains.
Table 4. OMD ACTD HHM Perspective Development
Seed Model Configuration
• Friendly Military and " OMD System Users 
Non-Military ■ OMD System 
Organizations Functions
■ OMD ACTD Critical ■ OMD System 
Operational Issues Operations
■ OMD System Missions
■ Adversary Threats to 
OMD Operations
Intermediate Model Configuration
■ Classes of Threat ■ OMD System Missions 
Mines ■ Friendly Military and
■ Potential Global Areas Non-Military 
o f Interest Organizations
■ OMD ACTD Critical ■ Adversary Military and 
Operational Issues Non-Military
Organizations
■ Neutral Military and 
Non-Military 
Organizations
■ RLSS Functions, 
Command and Control, 
Users, and Operations
■ PLSS Functions, 
Command and Control, 
Users, and Operations
■ Adversary Threats to 
OMD Operations
Final Model Configuration
■ Engineering Aspects o f * OMD System Missions ■ Neutral Forces and ■ PLSS Technical ■ Temporal Aspects of
Threat Mine ■ Friendly Forces and 
Employment Other Support
■ Environmental Aspects Capabilities
o f OMD Operating ■ Adversary Forces and 
Areas Other Support




■ RLSS Technical 
Attributes
■ RLSS Operational 
Attributes
Attributes
■ PLSS Operational 
Attributes
■ Adversary Threats to 
OMD Operations
OMD ACTD.
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METASYSTEM MODEL RISK ASSESSMENT
Research Phase 2 constituted an operations expert group assessment of risks 
represented to it by the HHM. Supported by the researcher as a study leader otherwise 
extracted from the assessment process, and mindful of Slovic et al. (2004) admonitions to 
regard “risk as feelings....[together with] risk as analysis” (p. 311), the three operations 
experts initially identified a collection of 104 risks they perceived associated with the 
adoption of the OMD ACTD by a superior, joint military operations metasystem. That 
number was refined through 25 hours of deliberation to the 86 identified in Appendix F, 
and the experts used an enhanced version of the RFRM Phase III and DoD-conventional 
risk matrix to classify each element of the resolved set as high, moderate, or low. This 
classification was achieved by associating with each risk one of the ordered pairs of 
consequence and likelihood, (consequence, likelihood), depicted in Figure 7.
Figure 7. Enhanced RFRM Phase III and DoD-Conventional Risk Matrix
LIKELIHOOD
CONSEQUENCE Remote Unlikely Likely HighlyLikely Frequent
Unacceptable M o d e r a t e  
( 5 ,  1 )
H i g h
( 5 , 2 )
H i g h  
( 5 ,  3 )
H i g h
( 5 , 4 )
H i g h  
( 5 ,  5 )
Minimally Acceptable L o w  
( 4 ,  1 )
M o d e r a t e
( 4 , 2 )
M o d e r a t e  
( 4 ,  3 )
H i g h
( 4 , 4 )
H i g h  
( 4 ,  5 )
Acceptable with L o w L o w M o d e r a t e M o d e r a t e H i g h
Significant Utility Loss ( 3 ,  1 ) ( 3 , 2 ) ( 3 , 3 ) ( 3 , 4 ) ( 3 , 5 )
Acceptable with Slight L o w L o w L o w M o d e r a t e M o d e r a t e
Utility Loss ( 2 , 1 ) ( 2 , 2 ) ( 2 , 3 ) ( 2 , 4 ) ( 2 ,  5 )
L o w L o w L o w L o w M o d e r a t eLittle or None
0 , 1 ) ( 1 , 2 ) ( 1 , 3 ) ( 1 , 4 ) 0 , 5 )
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Operations expert group members initially assigned (consequence, likelihood) 
pairings to risks on an independent basis. Once each of the three experts had completed 
their individual assessments, those risks that had been identified as high by any expert 
were again evaluated by the entire group, with the aim to resolve high risks to precise, 
(consequence, likelihood) assessments. This precise resolution facilitated two purposes. 
First, it offered opportunities to settle upon or at least understand group members’ 
possibly distinct definitions of “acceptable with significant utility loss,” “unacceptable,” 
“highly likely,” and other risk matrix terms; common understandings so achieved 
accommodated fuzzy terminology and issues beyond the scope of the research. Second, 
precise (consequence, likelihood) evaluations of risks considered to be high promoted the 
prioritization mechanics pursued in research Phases 3 and 4. Only high risks were 
resolved to consensus because: to identically resolve moderate or low risks would have 
added nothing to the deployment demonstration of the MUA design methodology; and 
because constraints of resources of other factors might force actual ACTD managers and 
analysts to design utility assessments based on effectiveness measures derived only from 
the most serious of methodology-identified risks.
Group consensus held eight risks as high once each had been associated with a 
particular ordered pair of (consequence, likelihood). Those eight high risks and their 
ordered pair assignments were:
■ (5, 3). OMD system yields false positive indications of mines or minefields.
■ (5, 3). OMD system yields false negative indications of mines or minefields.
■ (5, 3). Mines are concealed or camouflaged by natural or manmade objects
expected to be seen within surf and beach zones.
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■ (5, 4). Adversaries use various means to counter OMD system detection
capabilities.
■ (4, 4). RLSS algorithms are not sufficiently robust to provide useful information
regarding areas of operational interest.
■ (4, 4). PLSS UAV airframe is vulnerable to adversary anti-aircraft weapons and
tactics, including small arms fire.
■ (5, 4). PLSS deployment concept of one system per host vessel insufficiently
supports operational needs.
■ (5, 3). Adversary electronic attacks impair PLSS navigation or surveillance
functions.
Figure 8 is a pictorial representation of the distribution of high risks that operations
experts unanimously perceived linked to the OMD ACTD and its relevant metasystem.
Figure 8. High Risk Distribution Derived from the OMD ACTD HHM
LIKELIHOOD
CONSEQUENCE Remote Unlikely Likely HighlyLikely Frequent
Unacceptable
4  H i g h  R i s k s  
( 5 , 3 )
2  H i g h  R i s k s  
( 5 , 4 )
Minimally Acceptable
2  H i g h  R i s k s  
( 4 , 4 )
Acceptable with 
Significant Utility Loss
Acceptable with Slight 
Utility Loss
Little or None
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METASYSTEM MODEL RISK PRIORITIZATION
Research Phase 3 directed individual expert prioritizations of the eight high risks 
determined in Phase 2, and those prioritizations might have been executed in two primary 
ways. The experts might have ignored their earlier (consequence, likelihood) evaluations 
and treated the eight risks as elements of a single set to be ranked first through eighth in 
terms of seriousness. Alternately, they might have first prioritized in terms of seriousness 
the (consequence, likelihood) pairings assigned each of the high risks and then prioritized 
the risks assigned identical pairings. With neither suggestions from the study leader nor 
external guidance available to them from risk literature sources like Haimes (2004), the 
remaining three operations expert group members unanimously endorsed the alternative 
scheme of prioritization.
The operations expert group felt quite strongly that the two risks assigned a (5, 4) 
(consequence, likelihood) pairing should be, in some order, the most and second-most 
serious risks of the eight high risks identified. They felt equally strongly that risks 
categorized as (5, 3) should constitute those third- through sixth-most serious of the eight 
and that the (4, 4)-assigned risks should be considered seventh- and eighth-most serious. 
The group’s intent dictated the format of the individual, pairwise comparisons that would 
immediately follow.
The three operations expert group members participating in research Phase 3 were 
asked to use pairwise comparisons to prioritize elements of three risk sets, or categories. 
Those three categories comprised the two risks assigned (5, 4) pairings of consequence 
and likelihood:
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(A) PLSS deployment concept of one system per host vessel insufficiently supports 
operational needs and
(B) Adversaries use various means to counter OMD system detection capabilities; 
the four risks of
(C) Adversary electronic attacks impair PLSS navigation or surveillance functions,
(D) OMD system yields false negative indications of mines or minefields,
(E) Mines are concealed or camouflaged by natural or manmade objects expected to be 
seen within surf and beach zones, and
(F) OMD system yields false positive indications of mines or minefields, 
that were assigned (5, 3) pairings; and the two risks of
(G) RLSS algorithms are not sufficiently robust to provide useful information regarding 
areas of operational interest.
(H) PLSS UAV airframe is vulnerable to adversary anti-aircraft weapons and tactics, 
including small arms fire,
both assigned the pairings of (4, 4). Given these three categories of seriousness and the 
(V2){n)(n -1) number of pairwise comparisons needed to prioritize all elements of each of 
the two-, four-, and two-risk element sets respectively representing those categories, the 
researcher as study leader constructed a questionnaire of
1 + 6 + 1 = 8
pairwise comparisons randomly ordered in a fashion unlike any to which the operations 
expert group had been previously exposed. The members then independently used the 
questionnaire, presented in Appendix G, to identify three distinct prioritizations that can 
be portrayed using the preceding, (A) - (H) lettering scheme:
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Operations Expert Group Participant A: (B ,A , D, F, E, C, H, G)
Operations Expert Group Participant B: (A ,B ,D , F, E, C, G, H)
Operations Expert Group Participant C: (A, B, D, E, F, C, G, H)
These disparate prioritizations concluded research Phase 3. They also provided 
all the elements necessary for the researcher, as study leader, to execute research Phase 4 
in accordance with the Blin and Whinston (1973) and Blin (1974) method for identifying 
a group preference regarding, in this case, the most serious risks to the joint military 
operations metasystem with which the OMD ACTD system might be incorporated. In 
fact, the operations expert group’s use of three seriousness categories drove three distinct 
applications of the fuzzy group preference approach executed during Phase 4.
A first application of the fuzzy group preference method to (5, 4)-assessed risks A  
and B  determined a fuzzy, group preference relation, .Si, described by the reciprocal
The cut-sets of this fuzzy relation that correspond with its matrix values are, almost





.Si* = { (A, B) }
S t* = { (A ,B ) , (B ,A ) } .
where
Oi = Trivial solution (both orderings are compatible with .S/ = 0 ) and
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O ,* = { (A, B)  }
identified the (A, B)  ordering as the one preferred by the operations expert group at an 
agreement level of %.
A second application of the fuzzy group preference method to (5, 3)-assessed 
risks C through F  yielded a fuzzy, group preference relation, S 2 of
C D E F
c 0 0 0 0
D 1 0 1 1
E 1 0 0 lA
F 1 0 % 0
This fuzzy relation matrix determines cut-sets of 
S 2 1 = {(Df Q , ( D , E ) , (D , F) , (E ,C ) , (F ,C ) }
S / 3 = { (D, C), (D, E), (D, F), (E, C), (.F, C), (F, E) }
S2'A = { (A Q,  (A E), (D, F), (E, Q , (E, C), (F, E), (E, F) }.
Table 5 portrays the set of 4! = 24 possible crisp orderings with which S 2 cut-sets were 
compared to determine the one that constituted the group prioritization of risks C-F.
Table5. Crisp Orderings of Risks C-F
(C, D, E, F) 0c, E, F, D) (E, c, D, F) (A E, c, F) (E, F, c, D) (E, A  F, O
(C, D, F, E) (C, F, E, D) (F, c, D,E) (A F, c, E) (F, E, c, D) (F, A  E, Q
(C, E, D, F) (D, c, E, F) (E, C, F,D) (E, D, c, F) (A E, F, Q (E, F,D, Q
(C, F, O, E) (D, c, F, E) (F, C, E ,D ) (F, D, c, E) (A F, E, Q (F, E ,D , Q
A review of these possible orderings in the descending, a-cut value sequence of 
O2 1 = { ( D , E , F , Q , ( D , F , E , Q }
0 /  = { (D, F , E , Q }
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identified the ordering (D, F, E, C) as that preferred by the operations expert group at an 
agreement level of % identical to that achieved for the (A, B ) ordering of the two most 
serious risks.
A third and final application of the Blin and Whinston (1973) and Blin (1974) 
method to (4, 4)-assessed risks G and H  determined a fuzzy, group preference relation, 




g  r~ 0 % I
H l_ 1/3 0 _T
The cut-sets of this fuzzy relation that correspond with its matrix values are
S31 = 0
S i A = { (G , H ) }
S 3 A = { (G,H), (H, G) }.
Similar to the case of the two most serious risks, A  and B,  the only possible crisp
orderings of the least serious of operations expert group-identified, high risks are (G, H)
and (G, H), where
O3 1 = Trivial solution and
0 /  =  { ( G , H ) }
identified the (G, H)  pair to represent the operations expert group prioritization at an 
agreement level of %. Merging these (4 4)-risk category results with those of the (5,4)- 
and (5, 3)-assessed categories -  all three attained with agreement levels of 2/3 -  yielded a 
comprehensive prioritization of
(A, B , D , F ,  E, C, G, H)
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carrying a comprehensive agreement level of % and that only coincidentally matched the 
individual prioritization of expert group Participant B.
All operations expert group participants expressed satisfaction with this final 
accord elaborated with Table 6. They also believed their prioritization would facilitate
Table 6. Final Operations Expert Group Ranking of OMD ACTD High Risks
(1 ) PLSS deployment concept o f  one system per host vessel insufficiently supports operational needs.
(2 ) Adversaries use various means to counter OMD system detection capabilities.
(3 ) OMD system yields false negative indications o f  mines or minefields.
(4) OMD system yields false positive indications o f  mines or minefields.
(5 ) Mines are concealed or camouflaged by natural or manmade objects expected to be seen within surf and 
beach zones.
(6 ) Adversary electronic attacks impair PLSS navigation or surveillance functions.
(7 ) RLSS algorithms are not sufficiently robust to provide useful information regarding areas o f  operations 
interest.
(8 ) PLSS UA V airframe is vulnerable to adversary anti-aircraft weapons and tactics, including small arms 
fire.
the identification of measures of effectiveness -  such as those inviting counts of 
operational deficiencies imposed by a PLSS deployment concept of one surveillance 
vehicle per host vessel -  by affording the pertinence, completeness, and accuracy 
required of a MUA design process.
RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY
The satisfaction that operations expert group members expressed regarding their 
efforts and results hints at reliability- and validity-related aspects of research Phases 1 
through 4. A more complete review of reliability and validity associated with this study 
can be generated.
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The first two phases of this research observed identical, qualitative approaches to 
reliability and validity. Reliability -  or an equivalent term of dependability preferred by 
some adherents of the qualitative paradigm of research (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005) -  can 
be argued to have been introduced primarily with the operations expert selection criteria 
promoted by numerous sources (Ayyub, 2001; Brandon, 1998; Comelissen et al., 2002; 
Tumley, 2002; Sproles, 2000), together with the holistic perspective integral to Haimes’ 
(2004) RFRM and with which this study’s operations experts, given their selection, can 
be said to have been facile. Arguments addressing research Phases 1-2 validity rest 
primarily upon action research tenets as well as the same expert selection criteria and 
Haimes’ holism that supported reliability.
The instrumental case study-like (Stake, 2005) effort of research Phases 1-2 
depended for its reliability upon a qualitative scheme by Gorman and Clayton (2005) 
supposing persistent recording as “perhaps the main key to reliability” (p. 56); such 
recording was a hallmark of researcher activity during Phases 1-2 development of the 
OMD ACTD HHM and following identification of associated risks. The action research 
formula that placed the researcher as the operations expert group leader represented a 
second reliability technique endorsed by Gorman and Clayton, that of researcher 
immersion in the problem context; this circumstance was reinforced by the participation 
criteria established prior to methodology deployment for the study leader and all 
members of the operations expert group. Expert selection criteria demanding a high 
degree of pertinent operations and operational testing experience also represented a third 
Gorman and Clayton technique of drawing upon “other research...for assistance” (p. 57).
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This third technique was itself buttressed by a prominent history of RFRM applications 
available to the operations group through the literature.
The measurement validity of this work’s Phase 1-2 effort should also be gauged 
from the perspective of qualitative or, more precisely, action research. That may be done 
using five criteria suggested by Reason and Bradbury (2001, p. 5, as cited in Ladkin, 
2004):
■ The extent to which the research demonstrates emergence and enduring 
consequences;
■ The extent to which the research deals with pragmatic issues of practice and 
practising;
■ The extent to which the inquiry demonstrates good qualities of relational practice, 
such as democracy and collaboration;
■ The extent to which the research deals with questions of significance; and
■ The extent to which the research takes into account a number of different ways of 
knowing, (p. 539)
These criteria can be shown to encompass measurement validation concepts more 
traditionally termed (Gliner & Morgan, 2000; Gorman & Clayton, 2005; Leedy & 
Ormrod, 2001) face, content, and construct validity. Satisfying the criteria represented 
the culmination of efforts to establish the face, content, and construct validity of the 
operations expert group-derived HHM and set of 86 risks.
The Phase 1 development of the OMD ACTD HHM and the Phase 2 
identification of 104 model-derived risks later resolved to 86 each plainly evinced an 
emergence of expert understanding and concerns stimulated by the collaborative
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environment emplaced for those two research phases. The very nature of the complex, 
joint military operations metasystem to be modeled drove “a number of different ways of 
knowing” (p. 539) that were manifested in the use of Haimes’ (1998, 2004) RFRM and, 
particularly, HHM development processes. The significance of the pragmatic issue 
simulated -  OMD ACTD MUA design -  provided the impetus for all research and 
supported a supposition of “enduring consequence” plausible for one last and notable 
characteristic of action research: that the validity of such research is “measured by the 
willingness of.. .stakeholders to act on the results of (their work), thereby risking their 
welfare on the ‘validity’ of their idea and the degree to which the outcomes meet their 
expectations” (Greenwood & Levin, 2005, p. 54). Given that operations expert group 
selection criteria stipulated members to be either stakeholders or representatives of 
stakeholders, and given that each of those members expressed comfort with the final 
HHM and associated set of risks, the “enduring consequence” criterion may be portrayed 
as satisfied.
Research Phase 3-4 reliability and measurement validity concerns reflected 
attributes of quantitative research practice. Phase 3 reliability concerns rested strictly 
with the instrument reliability of an eight-question survey that invited only pairwise 
comparisons of risks earlier collectively identified and defined by the operations expert 
group, and it is easy to argue that multiple applications of the instrument would have 
yielded precisely the same number of identical results. The practically deterministic, Blin 
and Whinston (1973) and Blin (1974) fuzzy group preference method applied in research 
Phase 4 to Phase 3 results effectively dismisses concerns regarding Phase 4 reliability.
The issue of Phase 3 measurement validity may be characterized as trivial in that a survey
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eliciting only eight pairwise comparisons must surely have accurately indicated the 
individual preferences of operations expert group members. The measurement validity of 
research Phase 4 seems only slightly more difficult to judge with its exceedingly 
straightforward derivation of a group prioritization of risks and its identification of a level 
of group agreement invoking an arithmetic mean easily accepted as accurate.
The measures of internal and external validity -  respectively, the evaluation of 
extraneous variable control and generalizability -  that may be assigned this research 
proved high, largely for a design that accommodated the Argyris et al. (1984) definition 
of action research problem contexts as highly complex and wherein “unilateral control of 
variables is neither possible nor desirable” (p. 239). The RFRM and fuzzy group 
preference methods of this research were employed precisely for their suitability to 
processes demanding holistic perspectives and the necessarily dense array of variables 
associated with those perspectives. It was the collective reasoning process utilized by the 
operations expert group during research Phases 1-2 that established order over numerous 
and legitimate, group concerns and that therefore afforded the variable control expected 
for internal validity.
The study’s external validity, or “the extent to which its results [could] apply to 
situations beyond the study itself’ (Leedy & Ormrod, 2001, p. 105), was likewise 
promoted by the research design. The OMD ACTD simulation did, indeed, simulate 
essential elements of problem contexts evident with actual demonstrations like that from 
which it was derived. The operations expert selection criteria established for the 
deployment stage of this research ensured that individuals chosen to execute the 
research-proposed, MUA design methodology truly represented those available to and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
91
desired by assessment designers and managers preparing to conduct actual 
demonstrations. These research design factors reflected strategies commonly pursued to 
“enhance the external validity of research” (Leedy & Ormrod, 2001) projects. They also 
promoted an assertion that the study’s methodology could be applied to: all ACTDs; to 
ACTD program-derivative, joint capability technology demonstrations; and quite 
possibly to assessment settings beyond those two programs and that equally depend on 
the holistic perspectives of small groups of experts upon which this study so greatly 
depended.
ASSESSMENT OF METHODOLOGY UTILITY
The methodological and practical aspects of a research effort emphasizing joint 
service ACTD assessment designs prompted review by: persons who have managed the 
joint service-oriented ACTD programs of major organizations; persons who have served 
individual demonstrations as the operational managers and deputy managers most 
responsible for the implementation and conduct of joint service-oriented ACTD MUA; 
and persons who have designed and conducted military utility assessments of joint 
service-oriented ACTDs for those demonstrations’ operational managers. While not 
required for research validation purposes, the researcher adjudged the solicitation of these 
persons’ perspectives as an indispensable appendage of the methodology development 
and its deployment executed during research Phases 1 through 4. Research Phase 5 
therefore pursued ACTD expert opinion regarding the MUA design methodology, its 
derivation, and its testing.
In Phase 5 a group of 20 ACTD experts reviewed the methodology and research 
Phases 1-4 application by the operations expert group, with no members of the ACTD
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expert group having served as a member of the latter body. The ACTD experts included: 
four individuals primarily experienced in large-organization management of joint service 
ACTDs; eight individuals primarily experienced as operational or deputy operational 
managers of one or more, joint service demonstrations, with operational management 
arguably the most central of all, ACTD managerial tasks and operational managers those 
persons most responsible for military utility assessments; and eight individuals primarily 
experienced in the design and conduct of military utility assessments applied to the joint 
service demonstrations guided by operational managers. The group represented a large 
portion of individuals known by the researcher to have participated in demonstrations 
emphasizing joint service needs that the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), 
perhaps most among major U.S. military commands and organizations, is directed to 
support (USJFCOM, no date). The command has served a major sponsorship role for 33 
(G. A. Koumbis, personal communication, January 9, 2007) of nearly 150 demonstrations 
executed since ACTD program initiation (DoD, 2006), and it was sponsoring 12 of the 74 
demonstrations active at the time of this research (G. A. Koumbis, personal 
communication, January 9, 2007). Three of the four ACTD program managers served the 
USJFCOM, all of the operational managers and deputy operational managers had pursued 
their positions in the service of USJFCOM ACTD efforts, and all individuals of MUA 
design and conduct experience had gained their experience by supporting 
USJFCOM-sponsored demonstrations. Length of ACTD expert group participant 
experience varied from between one and two years to periods of continuing involvement 
that began with ACTD program inception in 1994.
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Over a series of seven lecture sessions directed toward mixed groups of between 
one and five ACTD program managers, operational or deputy operational managers, or 
MUA designers, the researcher reviewed the risk- and fuzzy set-based, MUA design 
methodology development and deployment, including the final application results 
achieved during research Phase 4. Following their respective sessions, the ACTD experts 
were asked to complete a 49-question survey that offered each participant an opportunity 
for 47 Likert scale- and 2 free form-type responses. Nineteen ACTD experts responded 
to the researcher’s request to complete the questionnaire of Appendix H, three of the four 
ACTD program managers and all remaining of the group of 20. Responses identified in 
Appendix I proved instructive:
■ Sixteen respondents agreed or “strongly” agreed that user assessments of military 
utility constituted the most important aspect of ACTDs;
■ All respondents agreed or “strongly” agreed that ACTD program intent established 
military utility assessments as the chief mechanism by which should be gauged 
ACTDs’ potential value to military users;
■ Seventeen respondents agreed or “strongly” agreed that ACTD program intent 
assigned MOEs to be the chief mechanism for determining if prototype system 
demonstrations address critical operational issues identified by potential, system 
users. All 19 agreed or “strongly” agreed that MOEs are indispensable to MUA 
design;
■ Fifteen ACTD experts agreed that the Department of Defense (DoD) has suggested 
no rigorous methodology for MUA design, two claimed they did “not know,” and
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two considered local processes to represent DoD-level suggestions they otherwise 
conceded had not been promulgated;
■ Eighteen of the 19 respondents agreed or “strongly” agreed upon a need for more 
rigor in ACTD MUA design. One “strongly” disagreed;
■ Seventeen respondents agreed or “strongly” agreed that the design methodology 
proposed with this research promoted a degree of MUA rigor appropriate for 
ACTDs;
■ Eighteen respondents agreed or “strongly” agreed that the design methodology 
proposed with this research represented a treatment of joint military operations 
metasystems appropriate for ACTDs. Eighteen also rendered an identical judgment 
regarding the methodology’s treatment of risk, with 16 likewise endorsing the 
methodology’s treatment of the ambiguities of human judgment. The balance of 
respondents in each of these three cases considered themselves unable to render the 
requested judgments;
■ Questionnaire responses and complementary inquiries of the researcher 
demonstrated that none of the 19 ACTD experts had been previously exposed to a 
MUA design methodology comprising the treatments of complex systems, risk, and 
fuzzy set theory essential to the methodology proposed with this research. In 
particular, no respondents had before been exposed to a methodology based on the 
work of Haimes (1998, 2004), Blin and Whinston (1973), and Blin (1974).
■ Fourteen respondents agreed or “strongly” agreed that the methodology proposed 
with this research “(filled) a gap in the ACTD MUA design process,” and 15 
believed that the methodology would promote the identification of MOE needed of
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assessment design processes. The balance of respondents conceded they did “not 
know” and so could render no judgments regarding those elements of the survey; 
and, lastly,
■ Seventeen respondents agreed or “strongly” agreed that the MUA design
methodology proposed with this research could be applied by analysts immediately 
assigned MUA design tasks as well as managed by demonstrations’ operational 
managers ultimately responsible for assessment design and execution.
SUMMARY
The deployment stage of this study was executed using a demonstrably reliable 
and valid, action research process the researcher considered most appropriate for the 
research context and aims. A group of three volunteers expert in joint, amphibious 
forcible entry operations coupled foundational information supplied by the researcher 
with elements of Haimes’ (1998, 2004) Risk Filtering, Ranking, and Management 
method to develop a hierarchical holographic model they believed represented the 
simulated, Operational Mine Detection ACTD incorporated with what would be its 
superior, joint military operations metasystem. That same group of three next drew from 
the HHM the most serious risks posed by the ACTD and its metasystem to joint military 
utility. The three group members then individually prioritized eight risks that the group 
had categorized as high, and the researcher followed with an application of the Blin and 
Whinston (1973) and Blin (1974) fuzzy method for resolving preferences of small groups 
and identifying associated levels of agreement. All results as well as the rationale and 
processes leading to those results were finally reviewed by a total of 20 ACTD
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management and MUA experts, 19 of whom used the information to judge the worth to 
practice of the MUA design methodology proposed with the study.
The OMD ACTD metasystem model developed by the operations expert group 
required approximately 10 hours of collaborative work and comprised 13 perspectives, 93 
perspective-subordinate domains, and 95 subdomains identified in accordance with 
Haimes’ (1998, 2004) notions of an HHM. From that HHM the operations experts drew 
a total of 104 risks to joint operations utility that the model represented to them, over 
time refining the 104 to a number of 86. Of the 86 risks, the operations group noted 8 to 
be distinctly more serious than the others and classified them as high risks.
The three operations expert group members then departed from their previously 
strictly collective processes to individually prioritize the group-identified high risks using 
a survey that offered a series of pairwise comparisons in accordance with the fuzzy group 
preference method of Blin and Whinston (1973) and Blin (1974). The researcher, too, 
employed the fuzzy preference method to transform the three individual prioritizations 
into a single, group-preferred prioritization from which could be derived measures of 
effectiveness required for an OMD ACTD MUA. The researcher additionally used the 
fuzzy preference method to assess and associate with the group preference a % level of 
agreement useful to any following process of MOE development.
Prominent methodological and practical aspects of the MUA design methodology 
development and deployment prompted a corollary review of its worth to practice by 20 
volunteers expert in the management, design, and conduct of ACTD military utility 
assessments. The review indicated a potential user community that recognized the value
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of a MUA design standard not presently available and which the proposed methodology 
would provide with a complement of attributes the ACTD experts considered necessary.
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CONCLUSIONS
This research pursued the development and deployment of a risk- and fuzzy 
set-based methodology for advanced concept technology demonstration military utility 
assessment design. The research was prompted by the lack of a standard for rigorously 
identifying the assessment criteria that individual demonstration MUA designs should 
emplace. It was guided by two principal propositions that MUA design standards should:
■ holistically account for risks precipitated when ACTD systems and processes are 
considered for incorporation within the complex metasystems of joint military 
operations; and
■ respect ACTD end-user perspectives necessary for MUA designs by employing 
analytical schemes suited to the ambiguities and other of what have been termed 
“fuzzy” (Zadeh, 1965, p. 338) manifestations of human cognition and language.
It was also guided by a set of three research questions.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
A purpose to develop and deploy an ACTD MUA design methodology prompted 
three research questions:
(1) How might joint military operations metasystem models guide the identification of 
ACTD MUA measures of effectiveness?
(2) How might be developed and employed joint military operations metasystem models 
with which can be identified ACTD MUA measures of effectiveness?
(3) How useful might ACTD managers and analysts find the MUA design methodology 
developed and deployed with this research?
Each of these was answered during the course of the study.
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The research demonstrated that an ACTD-tailored, joint military operations 
metasystem model developed by appropriate experts could promote the identification of 
risks evident in the model and that those risks could, in turn, promote the identification of 
effectiveness measures by which ACTD utility could be gauged. Table 8 confirms this 
assertion with samples of MOEs derivable from the Table 7 risks identified during this 
research.
The research also demonstrated how an ACTD-tailored, joint military operations 
metasystem model could be developed and employed for the purpose of MUA MOE 
identification, and it did so by observing its own risk- and fuzzy set-related propositions 
regarding MUA design standards. A holistic approach afforded model developers a 
construct able to promote the identification of an equally holistic set of risks from which 
could be derived needed effectiveness measures. Certain risk filtering elements of 
Haimes’ (1998, 2004) eight-phase, Risk Filtering, Ranking, and Management method 
were first used to develop a hierarchical holographic model of a joint military operations 
metasystem appropriate for a simulated ACTD. Other filtering elements were next 
employed to determine and categorize as high, moderate, or low a set of risks that the 
model represented to its developers. A fuzzy group preference method of Blin and 
Whinston (1973) and Blin (1974) was then used to transform independently-formulated 
prioritizations of identified high risks into a single, group preference with associated 
agreement level and from which could be derived MOEs like those displayed in Table 7. 
As a guide to ACTD practitioners, Appendix J provides a review of proceedings that met 
expected reliability and validity criteria while satisfying the second of the three research 
questions.
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Table 7. HHM-Identified Risks and Sample Derivative Measures of Effectiveness
HHM-Identified Risks
P L S S  d e p l o y m e n t  c o n c e p t  o f  o n e  s y s t e m  p e r  h o s t  
v e s s e l  i n s u f f i c i e n t l y  s u p p o r t s  o p e r a t i o n a l  n e e d s .
Sample Derivative MOE
■  P e r c e n t a g e  o f  o p e r a t i o n s  i m p e d e d  b y  P L S S  
d e p l o y m e n t  c o n c e p t  o f  o n e  s u r v e i l l a n c e  v e h i c l e  p e r  
h o s t  v e s s e l .
■  T y p e s  o f  o p e r a t i o n s  i m p e d e d  b y  P L S S  d e p l o y m e n t  
c o n c e p t  o f  o n e  s u r v e i l l a n c e  v e h i c l e  p e r  h o s t  v e s s e l .
A d v e r s a r i e s  u s e  v a r i o u s  m e a n s  t o  c o u n t e r  O M D ■  F a l s e  n e g a t i v e  r a t e  o f  s u r v e i l l a n c e  d e t e r m i n e d  b y
s y s t e m  d e t e c t i o n  c a p a b i l i t i e s . a d v e r s a r y  c o u n t e r m e a s u r e s .
■  F a l s e  p o s i t i v e  r a t e  o f  s u r v e i l l a n c e  d e t e r m i n e d  b y  
a d v e r s a r y  c o u n t e r m e a s u r e s .
O M D  s y s t e m  y i e l d s  f a l s e  n e g a t i v e  i n d i c a t i o n s  o f  
m i n e s  o r  m i n e f i e l d s .
■  F a l s e  n e g a t i v e  r a t e  o f  s u r v e i l l a n c e .
O M D  s y s t e m  y i e l d s  f a l s e  p o s i t i v e  i n d i c a t i o n s  o f  
m i n e s  o r  m i n e f i e l d s .
■  F a l s e  p o s i t i v e  r a t e  o f  s u r v e i l l a n c e .
M i n e s  a r e  c o n c e a l e d  o r  c a m o u f l a g e d  b y  n a t u r a l  o r  ■  F a l s e  n e g a t i v e  r a t e  o f  s u r v e i l l a n c e  d e t e r m i n e d  b y  
m a n m a d e  o b j e c t s  e x p e c t e d  t o  b e  s e e n  w i t h i n  s u r f  n a t u r a l  o b j e c t s ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h o s e  p o s i t i o n e d  a s  
a n d  b e a c h  z o n e s .  a d v e r s a r y  c o u n t e r m e a s u r e s .
■  F a l s e  n e g a t i v e  r a t e  o f  s u r v e i l l a n c e  d e t e r m i n e d  b y  
m a n m a d e  o b j e c t s ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h o s e  p o s i t i o n e d  a s  
a d v e r s a r y  c o u n t e r m e a s u r e s .
A d v e r s a r y  e l e c t r o n i c  a t t a c k s  i m p a i r  P L S S  ■  P e r c e n t a g e  o f  m i s s i o n s  i m p a i r e d  d u e  t o  a d v e r s a r y
n a v i g a t i o n  o r  s u r v e i l l a n c e  f u n c t i o n s .  e l e c t r o n i c  a t t a c k s  u p o n  P L S S  n a v i g a t i o n  s y s t e m .
■  P e r c e n t a g e  o f  m i s s i o n s  i m p a i r e d  d u e  t o  a d v e r s a r y  
e l e c t r o n i c  a t t a c k s  u p o n  P L S S  s u r v e i l l a n c e  s y s t e m .
R L S S  a l g o r i t h m s  a r e  n o t  s u f f i c i e n t l y  r o b u s t  t o  ■  P e r c e n t a g e  o f  g e o g r a p h i c a l l y  a n d  o p e r a t i o n a l l y
p r o v i d e  u s e f u l  i n f o r m a t i o n  r e g a r d i n g  a r e a s  o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  m i s s i o n s  f o r  w h i c h  R L S S  f a i l e d  t o
o p e r a t i o n s  i n t e r e s t .  p r o v i d e  a d e q u a t e ,  P L S S  c u i n g .
P L S S  U A V  a i r f r a m e  i s  v u l n e r a b l e  t o  a d v e r s a r y  ■  E s t i m a t e d  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  m i s s i o n s  i n  w h i c h  t h e  
a n t i - a i r c r a f t  w e a p o n s  a n d  t a c t i c s ,  i n c l u d i n g  s m a l l  P L S S  p l a t f o r m  p r o v e d  v u l n e r a b l e  t o  a d v e r s a r y
a r m s  f i r e .  a n t i - a i r c r a f t  w e a p o n s  a n d  t a c t i c s .
■  E s t i m a t e d  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  f l i g h t  p r o f i l e s  
f o r  w h i c h  t h e  P L S S  p l a t f o r m  p r o v e d  v u l n e r a b l e  t o  
a d v e r s a r y  a n t i - a i r c r a f t  w e a p o n s  a n d  t a c t i c s . .
■  T y p e s  o f  f l i g h t  p r o f i l e s  f o r  w h i c h  t h e  P L S S  
p l a t f o r m  d i s p l a y e d  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  t o  a d v e r s a r y  
a n t i - a i r c r a f t  w e a p o n s  a n d  t a c t i c s .
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The third of three research questions addressed the utility that might be assigned 
by expert, ACTD managers and analysts to the MUA design methodology proposed with 
this research. A survey of 20 such experts indicated an almost complete endorsement of 
the methodology and its value to practice.
SUITABILITY AS A METHODOLOGY
The risk- and fuzzy set-based approach to ACTD MUA design taken with this 
research proved to be, as originally claimed by the researcher, one properly characterized 
as a methodological level of study applicable to complex systems. Accordingly, it 
displayed all nine attributes that Keating et al. (2004) assign to system of systems-, or 
complex system-oriented methodologies: the emphasis upon assessment design rather 
than conduct, in particular, gave the approach a transportability feature suiting it to 
application to ACTDs, to demonstrations of the joint capability technology demonstration 
program recently initiated by the Department of Defense, to rapid acquisition test and 
evaluation design, to operational tests like those developed for DoD acquisition 
programs, and to similar assessment design needs that could or even must be met using 
the perspectives of small groups of appropriate experts; key artifacts of the Haimes 
(1998, 2004), Blin and Whinston (1973) and Blin (1974) methods pointed directly to the 
approach’s grounding in theory and philosophy associated with risk assessment, fuzzy 
sets, and complex systems; the holistic perspective required by complex systems theory 
and afforded by Haimes’ RFRM and Blin and Whinston’s method for resolving group 
preferences marks the approach as a “guide to action... [of] significance, consistency, 
adaptability, neutrality, and multiple utility” (Keating et al., 2004, p. 6); and numerous 
aspects of the Haimes and Blin and Whinston methods provide the approach a degree of
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“rigor” (p. 6) needed for justifiable employment and that does not exist among ad hoc 
MUA design schemes presently used. The Appendix J practitioner’s guide embodies and 
directly or indirectly requires the observance of each of these attributes.
RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS
This research contributed to the theory, methodology, and practice associated with 
joint military operations metasystem transformations driven by new technology and 
process insertion. It did that by suggesting theoretical, methodological, and practical 
considerations applicable to similar transformations of other types of metasystems.
The study revealed undeniable and significant links among domains of risk, fuzzy 
set theory, and complex systems theory; and it forced consideration of synergies to be 
gained by exploiting those links. It recognized the advantage of using fuzzy set theory to 
accommodate the epistemic uncertainties and describe the associated risks so prominent 
in complex system settings, with that emphasis upon risk, in particular, prompting 
additional considerations regarding analyses of complex system failure modes.
The work demonstrated a valid, risk- and fuzzy set-based methodology for ACTD 
military assessment design, and in doing so provided a flexible yet common scheme for 
assessments quite unlike the ad hoc approaches previously used. The methodology itself 
promoted a merger of risk assessment and fuzzy set theory that reflected theoretical 
findings regarding the inextricability of fuzzy approaches to particular risk settings, and 
the methodology’s deployment under an action research format endorsed the efficacy of 
that qualitative scheme for assessment design efforts.
The research lastly and perhaps most significantly contributed to practice. The 
MUA design methodology produced offers ACTD program executives, managers, and
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analysts a standard they concede as lacking and necessary. A practitioner’s guide also 
produced can rigorously enable the identification and emplacement of measures of 
effectiveness fundamental to ACTD MUA designs or designs needed for assessments of 
ACTD-like enterprises. Indeed, the methodology and its derivative techniques suggest 
means with which complex system transformations of many kinds can be anticipated, 
whether those transformations will be evaluated using the relatively informal assessment 
formats of ACTDs, the more particular evaluation designs typically associated with 
formalized operational testing, or other assessment conventions.
FUTURE RESEARCH
Future research could explore and possibly advance several of this study’s 
assumptions and findings. That research would address methodology elements such as 
model development, expert identification, the significance of fuzzy set theory and 
derivative applications, and methodology application.
The identification of HHM perspectives appeals for possible enhancement. In this 
and apparently other research, the highest-level HHM components were derived from the 
collective and holistic wisdom of a group of experts, with that derivation a process as 
much art as science. A more rigorous, if not more complete or accurate, approach might 
apply grounded theory to the effort of identifying the most prominent parts of a complex 
system characterized in terms of system context. Crownover’s (2005) recent proposals 
regarding construction of complex system contextual frameworks could provide one path 
toward more rigorously defined, HHM constructs.
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Additional research might also enhance this study’s expert identification methods. 
Much work has been done and continues to be done in the field of expert identification, 
and reason points toward some merger of that work with the work of this study.
This research demonstrated the pertinence of fuzzy set theory to assessment 
design through the need to resolve independent, expert prioritizations to a single, group 
prioritization preferred by all group members. That demonstration ignored other aspects 
of the chosen problem that equally called for applications of fuzzy mathematics, such as 
the definition of risk assessment-related and patently fuzzy descriptors like “military 
utility,” “unacceptable” consequence, “frequent” likelihood, and “high risk.” A more 
encompassing application of fuzzy set theory to risk-based assessment design seems in 
order.
A final suggestion for future research must address the breadth of problems to 
which this study’s methodology should be applied. A superficial case can and has been 
made for the methodology’s applicability to ACTD assessment design, JCTD assessment 
design, rapid acquisition test and evaluation, operational test planning, and other 
semiformal or formal assessment design needs. However, the methodology was tested 
upon only a simulated ACTD and only within a single cycle of the action research spiral 
(Figure 6); although it does seem to exhibit tenets prescribed for transportability and 
other methodological attributes, the true bounds of its applicability remain undetermined. 
SUMMARY
This research pursued the development and deployment of a risk- and fuzzy 
set-based methodology for advanced concept technology demonstration military utility 
assessment design. It was prompted by the lack of a standard for rigorously identifying
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the assessment criteria that individual demonstration MUA designs should emplace, and 
it was guided by propositions regarding the pertinence of holistic risk assessments and 
fuzzy set theory. The research pursued and answered three questions in demonstrating a 
rigorous approach -  well received by potential users -  to determining measures of 
effectiveness by which ACTD military utility must be gauged. It also showed a 
methodology observant of standards established for research and measurement reliability 
and validity, with study limitations and delimitations addressed by calls for future 
research.
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Command and Control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly 
designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the 
mission (DoD, 2005).
Complex System. A bounded set of richly interrelated elements of collective structural 
and behavioral patterns together producing a system performance that emerges over time 
through interactions among system elements and elements of the environment in which 
the complex system operates (Keating et al., 2004).
Complex System Context. The set of factors that influence a complex system or 
metasystem (Keating et al., 2004; Keating et al., 2005).
Construct Validity. A characteristic of measurement instruments like surveys or 
structured interviews that can be judged by researchers or stakeholder participants as 
producing measurements and even supporting predictions regarding complex traits of the 
objects of measurement, such as risks associated with ACTDs (Bernard, 2002; Gliner & 
Morgan, 2000; Orcher, 2005).
Content Validity. A characteristic of measurement instruments like surveys or 
structured interviews that can be judged by researchers or stakeholder participants to 
possess contents representative of the concepts, such as risk, instruments are intended to 
measure (Bernard, 2002; Gliner & Morgan, 2000; Orcher, 2005).
Critical Operational Issues. In terms of ACTDs, incontrovertible, military operator 
identified requirements for mission success; essentials of capability without which an 
ACTD would be adjudged unacceptable on functional grounds (DoD, no date-a; Sproles 
2001, 2002).
Face Validity. A characteristic of measurement instruments like surveys or structured 
interviews that can be judged by, or appear to, researchers or stakeholder participants as 
appropriate for the instruments’ purposes (Bernard, 2002; Gliner & Morgan, 2000; 
Orcher, 2005).
Joint, Amphibious, Forcible Entry Operations. The use of a joint military force and 
ship-to-shore maneuver to seize and hold a shore-area, military lodgment in the face of 
armed opposition (DoD, 2005).
Joint Military Operations. Single-command operations of forces composed of 
significant elements assigned from two or more of the United States Army, Navy, Air 
Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard (DoD, 2001, 2005).
Measures of Effectiveness. In terms of ACTDs, high-level indicators of military 
effectiveness and suitability; standards directly derived by military operators from critical 
operational issues, independent of particular demonstrations or demonstrations’ 
performance, and against which should be assessed the performance of ACTDs (DoD, no 
date-a; Sproles, 2000, 2001, 2002).
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Measures of Performance. In terms of ACTDs, technical characteristics that determine 
a particular aspect of a system’s effectiveness or suitability, evaluations of 
system-internal functions, and the system performance values that can be judged against 
MOEs to assess demonstration effectiveness and suitability (DoD, no date-a; Sproles, 
2000, 2001, 2002).
Metasystem. Synonymous with the term, system o f systems, a system of functionally 
integrated and complex subsystems necessarily complex in its own right (Keating et al., 
2003; Keating et al., 2004; Keating et al., 2005).
Military Effectiveness. In terms of ACTDs, the ability of a demonstration system to 
provide its postulated capabilities within a military environment (DoD, no date-a).
Military Suitability. In terms of ACTDs, a function of the operational facility, 
sustainability, reliability, and like characteristics associated with a demonstrated system’s 
use in a military environment (DoD, no date-a).
Military Utility. In terms of ACTDs, a function of a demonstration system’s military 
effectiveness, military suitability, and contribution to military operations (DoD, no 
date-a).
Risk. A function of some risk event’s likelihood and consequence (Bedford & Cooke, 
2001; DoD, 2003c; Haimes, 2004; Kaplan & Garrick, 1981; Kaplan et al., 2001; 
Kosmowski, 2000; Kujawski, 2002; Thompson & Montagne, 1998), characterized by one 
or both of aleatory and epistemic uncertainty (Bae et al., 2004; Bedford & Cooke, 2001; 
Quelch & Cameron, 1994; Williams, 1995). In terms of ACTDs, a demonstration’s 
potential inability to perform well against military utility assessment measures of 
effectiveness (DoD, 2003c).
Risk Assessment. In terms of ACTDs, the process of identifying events (Tchankova, 
2002) possibly limiting demonstrations’ ability to enhance the utility of joint military 
operations metasystems with which the demonstrations could be incorporated (DoD, 
2003c). The process is intended to answer the three questions of: (1) What can go 
wrong?; (2) What is the likelihood that it will?; and (3) What would be the consequences 
if it does? (Haimes, 1991, 2004; Kaplan & Garrick, 1981).
Risk Event. In terms of ACTDs, an event or circumstance potentially constraining a 
demonstration’s effectiveness and which therefore merits assessment in terms of 
likelihood and consequence (DoD, 2003c).
Stakeholder. An individual or group of individuals who can affect or be affected by 
some system of interest and has demonstrated a desire and need to engage in that 
system’s development or analysis (Comelissen, 2002; Sproles 2000; Tumley, 2002).
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System of Systems. Synonymous with the term, metasystem, a complex system of 
functionally integrated, complex subsystems that can be diverse in technology, context, 
operation, geography, and conceptual perspectives of persons associated with the system 
of systems or its components (Keating et al., 2004; Keating et al., 2005).
Technical Facilitator. An individual responsible for structuring and facilitating the 
interactions of experts employed for expert-elicitation processes (Ayyub, 2001).
Technical Integrator. An individual responsible for developing the composite 
representation of expert judgments (Ayyub, 2001).
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This research imposed general and specific requirements for the selection of
operations expert group participants. General requirements were that:
(1) Participants be or represent ACTD program stakeholders (Brandon, 1998), with 
stakeholders defined as in Appendix A.
(2) Participants possess expertise strongly relevant to the simulated ACTD of the study 
and gained through professional accomplishment, experience, and academic training 
(Ayyub, 2001; Brandon, 1998);
(3) Participants be willing to act as impartial evaluators (Ayyub, 2001);
(4) Participants be available and willing to commit the time and effort required by the 
study (Ayyub, 2001); and that
(5) Participants possess strong communication and interpersonal skills, flexibility, 
impartiality, and an ability to appropriately generalize and simplify (Ayyub, 2001).
Specific requirements were that:
(6) Participants had attained an active duty rank of: major in the U.S. Army, Air Force, 
or Marine Corps; or lieutenant commander in the U.S Navy; and
(7) Participants could demonstrate experience with or formal training in joint operations 
of attributes similar to those of the ACTD simulated for this research; and
(8) Participants could demonstrate experience with or formal training in the operational 
test and evaluation of military systems or prototypes; and that
(9) Participants had been awarded graduate degrees in a physical science, mathematical 
sciences, or a field of engineering.
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This research imposed general and specific requirements for the selection of
ACTD management- and MUA design-experienced participants, collectively termed the
ACTD expert group. General requirements were that:
(1) Participants be ACTD program stakeholders (Brandon, 1998), with stakeholders 
defined as in Appendix A.
(2) Participants possess expertise strongly relevant to ACTD management, MUA 
design, or both, and gained through professional accomplishment, experience, and 
academic training (Ayyub, 2001; Brandon, 1998);
(3) Participants be willing to act as impartial evaluators (Ayyub, 2001);
(4) Participants be available and willing to commit the time and effort required by the 
study (Ayyub, 2001); and that
(5) Participants possess strong communication and interpersonal skills, flexibility, 
impartiality, and abilities to generalize and simplify (Ayyub, 2001).
Specific requirements were that:
(6) Participants had been assigned as ACTD operational managers or deputy operational 
managers for periods of at least one year; or
(7) Participants had been assigned ACTD military utility assessment or supporting 
analysis tasks for periods of at least one year; or
(8) Participants had been assigned general or specific, ACTD program management or 
training responsibilities at U.S. Department of Defense or major military command 
levels for periods of at least one year; and that
(9) Participants had been awarded baccalaureate degrees.
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The ACTD simulated for this research, the Operational Mine Detection ACTD, 
strongly reflected for validity purposes certain elements of an actual demonstration, the 
Joint Countermine (JCM) ACTD conducted 1994-2000 (Blumenthal, no date; Elliott et 
al., 1996; Schaffer et al., 1997; Schnoor, no date; USACOM, 1998). Aspects of the 
simulated, joint forcible entry operations planning-related ACTD generated for this 
research included technological and operational traits typical of those available to ACTD 
staffs early in a demonstration’s life cycle, when MUA design begins. These and other 
appropriate planning details were provided to the joint military operations expert group 
under the following format:
The Operational Mine Detection (OMD) ACTD has been selected for an 
immediate start. Key demonstration initiatives, issues, and attributes include:
Statement of Critical Military Need. Near- and on-shore mining by threat forces can 
impede or deny amphibious forcible entry operations. With no significant improvements 
having been made to amphibious forcible entry operations capabilities since the 1991 
Operation Desert Storm, U.S. joint military forces now face a critical deficiency in a key 
mission area.
Statement of ACTD Purpose. The OMD ACTD is intended to offer a near- and 
on-shore mine surveillance capability suited to present-day, U.S. joint, amphibious 
forcible entry operations needs.
Critical Operational Issues (COI) and Component Issues. Military sponsors of the 
OMD ACTD have stipulated three top-level, critical operational issues, or questions, they 
wish the demonstration to address. Sponsors have additionally identified limited sets of
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components associated with each top-level COI, and they reserve the right to alter those 
sets during the course of the demonstration’s MUA. Current issues and component issues 
are:
Critical Operational Issue 1. Functionality. Do OMD systems and processes 
represent a credible, near- and on-shore mine detection capability suited to present-day, 
joint amphibious forcible entry operations?
Component Issue l.a. Are OMD capabilities equally available under all 
(nonthreat-induced) operational conditions typically encountered by joint, amphibious 
forces?
Component Issue l.b. Can OMD capabilities be routinely realized given 
their dependence upon systems and processes controlled by other than the joint forces 
seeking to employ those capabilities?
Critical Operational Issue 2. Impact. Given that desired, OMD functionality is 
observed, does it significantly enhance the totality o f  operations that might be executed 
by U.S. joint military forces?
Component Issue 2.a. Are OMD capabilities equally available under all 
threat-induced operational conditions expected to be encountered by joint, amphibious 
forces?
Component Issue 2.b. Do systems or processes providing the OMD 
capability in any way degrade or interfere with other joint force capabilities?
Critical Operational Issue 3. Suitability. Can OMD capabilities be integrated 
with current systems and processes without undue logistical burdens?
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Component Issue 3.a. Would the integration o f OMD capabilities with 
extant systems and processes adversely affect personnel staffing or training processes?
Component Issue 3.b. Would adoption o f OMD capabilities pose 
untenable problems regarding system-level integration?
ACTD Technical and Operational Characteristics. The Operational Mine Detection 
ACTD comprises covert and overt elements. Those complementary elements are 
intended to yield a prototype, amphibious forcible entry capability significantly better 
than any presently available and suited to today’s threats.
One of the OMD prototype’s two principal components is the covert, Remote 
Littoral Sensing System, or RLSS, that uses novel computational techniques to exploit 
capabilities of existing national-level reconnaissance assets and provide joint forces with 
cuing information required of the OMD prototype’s second major element, the 
Proximate Littoral Sensing System, or PLSS. The PLSS is an operational-level, overt 
asset organic to the joint forces it serves.
The RLSS may be characterized by its unique set of technical and operational 
attributes. Most significant of the technical attributes are:
■ An infrared and visible spectrum imaging capability;
■ A capability to detect the presence of minefields in surf zones and very shallow 
water, as well as on beaches;
■ A capability to provide atmospheric and bathymetric data in the vicinity of beaches 
of interest;
■ A very limited capability to detect individual mines or to determine geospatial 
parameters of minefields;
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■ A capability to detect mine laying activities; and
■ No practical capability to detect the presence of mines in land or ocean settings 
unlike those already described. The system is optimized for clear-day, very-near 
shore environments.
Most significant of RLSS operational attributes are:
■ Strategic national-level control of those reconnaissance assets from which the RLSS 
draws its data;
■ Strategic theater-level (typically a joint force higher headquarters) control of RLSS 
data requests, processing, and dissemination;
■ Data collection, processing, and dissemination times markedly dependent on factors 
such as atmospheric and oceanographic conditions in the vicinity of beaches of 
interest, availability of transmission media for processed information, and competing 
demands for the use of national-level reconnaissance systems.
The PLSS may be characterized by its own unique set of attributes. Most
significant of its technical attributes are:
■ A medium-sized, single propeller-driven unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) platform 
hosting an infrared sensor dedicated to preprogrammed, self-navigation and two 
multi-spectral optical sensors constituting the system’s primary, surveillance 
elements;
■ A UAV platform designed to be catapult-launched from and net-recovered to U.S. 
Navy amphibious class, aviation and aviation-capable ships. Such ships normally 
carry a single, PLSS system;
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A UAV platform possessing a programmable, self-navigation capability. Once 
launched by a catapult, the UAV executes a mission program and returns to its 
launching platform in accordance with that program. The system can remain 
airborne for up to four hours but possesses no in-flight, reprogramming capability.
The system can only be net-recovered;
A UAV platform of 60 knots maximum airspeed and 20 knot stall speed; 
Tandem-mounted and gimballed, infrared- and visible spectrum-sensitive sensors 
operating redundantly for sensor data fusion purposes. Independent operations are 
not possible, though single-imager operations remain available when an imager’s 
optical system fails but the tandem gimballing mechanism does not;
Algorithms within the PLSS onboard, intelligent target recognition (ITR) software 
package manipulate sensor data to determine whether the presence of individual 
mines represents the presence of whole minefields. One of three determinations is 
possible: minefields are present; minefields are not present; or no determination.
The ITR processing outcomes are transmitted to launch vessels via encrypted, radio 
frequency communications;
The equivalent of two hours of digitized optical data can be retained onboard the 
UAV and retrieved with recovered vehicles for post-mission processing. Optical 
data cannot be transmitted from the PLSS UAV to launching vessels;
Launching vessels house personnel and facilities able to independently analyze data 
employed during missions by the ITR system and recovered with the PLSS UAV;
A capability to detect individual mines or obstacles presenting to PLSS sensors 
cross-sectional areas no less than the equivalent of 12 inch diameter, circular mines;
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■ A capability to detect individual mines or obstacles positioned on or very near the 
surface of dry beach areas as well as beach areas washed by breaking waves;
■ A capability to detect individual, submerged mines or obstacles positioned on or 
very near the sea floor surface to depths of 10 feet;
■ Given ideal atmospheric and oceanographic conditions, a capability to detect 
individual mines or obstacles from altitudes as high as 1000 feet above beach areas. 
And
■ A limited capability, constrained by sensor and algorithmic limitations, to 
distinguish between mines and natural or man-made obstacles.
The most significant of PLSS operational attributes are:
■ Surveillance and related parameters optimized for RLSS cuing. System operations 
independent of RLSS cuing are generally difficult and time-consuming;
■ With RLSS cuing and ideal atmospheric and oceanographic conditions, PLSS 
systems may survey beach areas of up to 10,000 square meters within three hours. 
Identically-sized submerged areas may be surveyed within six hours. Survey times 
are highly dependent upon constraints built into the ITR system with intelligent 
software agents;
■ Semi-autonomous operations of the UAV platform may only be interrupted by PLSS 
personnel positioned aboard launching vessels. These personnel may terminate 
PLSS missions and direct platforms to return to their launch sites but cannot 
reprogram UAV flight profiles or control surveillance sensor fields of view during 
vehicle operations;
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■ The specially trained, PLSS personnel stationed aboard system launch vessels 
execute a primary role of post-mission analysis. These same personnel also execute 
a very limited, flight operations and data transmission monitoring function;
■ Launch vessel personnel are able to destroy PLSS UAV platforms in flight;
■ System personnel positioned aboard PLSS UAV launch vessels may monitor 
real-time transmissions of ITR products.
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The following Operational Mine Detection Advanced Concept Technology 
Demonstration hierarchical holographic -  ACTD metasystem -  model (HHM) was the 
fundamental element of the deployment phase of research regarding a risk- and fuzzy 
set-based methodology for ACTD MUA design. The model was developed in 
accordance with the general work of Haimes (1998, 2004) and was the particular result of 
a simulated, action research process pursued by the researcher as study lead and three 
volunteer participants expert in what the U.S. Department of Defense terms amphibious, 
joint forcible entry operations (DoD, 2002,2005). The operations expert group crafted 
and achieved consensus on this HHM using a seed model provided by the study lead that 
the balance of the group modified through a total of 10 hours of deliberations over five 
meeting sessions:
Perspective 1. Science and Engineering Aspects of Threat Mines and Employment 
Domain l.A. Mine Physical Characteristics 
Subdomain l.A.a. Distinctiveness 
Subdomain l.A.b. Size 
Subdomain l.A.c. Shape
Subdomain l.A.d. Visible and Infrared Spectral Reflectivity 
Domain l.B. Mine Emplacement
Subdomain l.B.a. Presented Area
Subdomain l.B.b. Visible and Infrared Spectral Contrasts with 
Surroundings
Subdomain l.B.c. Concealment
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Subdomain l.B.d. Camouflage
Subdomain l.B.e. Emplacement Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
Domain l.C. Recognizable Features of Mine Type
Perspective 2. Environmental Aspects of OMD System Operating Areas
Domain 2.A. Seasonal Factors
Domain 2.B. Atmospheric Factors
Subdomain 2.B.a. Temperature and Humidity
Subdomain 2.B.C. Cloudiness and Other Spectral Attenuation
Subdomain 2.B.C. Wind and Turbulence
Subdomain 2.B.d. Ambient Light





Perspective 3. OMD ACTD Critical Operational Issues
Domain 3.A. Functionality. Do OMD systems and processes represent a 
credible, near- and on-shore mine detection capability suited to present-day, joint 
amphibious forcible entry operations?
Subdomain 3.A.a. Are OMD capabilities equally available under all 
(nonthreat-induced) operational conditions typically encountered by joint, 
amphibious forces?
Subdomain 3.A.b. Can OMD capabilities be routinely realized given 
their dependence upon systems and processes controlled by other than the 
joint forces seeking to employ those capabilities?
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Domain 3.B. Impact. Given that desired, OMD functionality is observed, does it 
significantly enhance the totality of operations that might be executed by U.S. 
joint military forces?
Subdomain 3.B.a. Are OMD capabilities equally available under all 
threat-induced operational conditions expected to be encountered by joint, 
amphibious forces?
Subdomain 3.B.b. Do systems or processes providing the OMD 
capability in any way degrade or interfere with other joint force 
capabilities?
Domain 3.C. Suitability. Can OMD capabilities be integrated with current 
systems and processes without undue logistical burdens?
Subdomain 3.C.a. Would the integration of OMD capabilities with 
extant systems and processes adversely affect personnel staffing or 
training processes?
Subdomain 3.C.b. Would adoption of OMD capabilities pose untenable 
problems regarding system-level integration?
Perspective 4. OMD System Missions
Domain 4.A. Near-shore Mine Surveillance
Subdomain 4.A.a. Forcible Entry Operations Near-Shore Route Planning
Subdomain 4.A.b. Special Operations Near-Shore Route Planning
Domain 4.B. On-Shore Mine Surveillance
Subdomain 4.B.a. Forcible Entry Operations On-Shore Route Planning
Subdomain 4.B.b. Special Operations On-Shore Route Planning
Perspective 5. Friendly Forces and Other Support Capabilities
Domain 5.A. Senior Military Forces
Subdomain 5. A. a. Allied Forces
Subdomain 5.A.b. U.S. Regional Combatant Commands
Subdomain 5.A.C. U.S. Joint Task Forces
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Subdomain 5.A.d. U.S. Joint Component Commands
Subdomain 5.A.e. U.S. Amphibious Forces
Domain 5.B. Subordinate Military Forces
Subdomain 5.B.a. Allied Forces
Subdomain 5.B.b. U.S. Amphibious Forces
Domain 5.C. Coordinating U.S. Military Forces and Defense Organizations
Subdomain 5.C.a. U.S. Strategic Command
Subdomain 5.C.b. U.S. Special Operations Command
Subdomain 5.C.C. U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency
Subdomain 5.C.d. U.S. National Reconnaissance Office
Subdomain 5.C.e. U.S. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
Subdomain 5.C.f. U.S. Military Service Intelligence Organizations
Subdomain 5.C.g. U.S. Air Force Space Command
Subdomain 5.C.h. U.S. Naval Network Warfare Command
Subdomain 5.C.i. U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
Subdomain 5.C.j. U.S. Military Service Systems Commands
Domain 5.D. Coordinating Allied Military Forces and Defense Organizations
Domain 5.E. Other Support Capabilities
Subdomain 5.E.a. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
Subdomain 5.E.b. U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration
Subdomain 5.E.C. Governmental Space Agencies
Subdomain 5.E.d. Commercial Space-Bome Imagery Organizations
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Perspective 6. Adversary Forces and Other Support Capabilities 
Domain 6.A. Military Forces
Subdomain 6.A.a. Defensive (Geographic) Area 
Subdomain 6.A.b. Defensive Forces 
Subdomain 6.A.C. Mining Forces 
Domain 6.B. Defense Organizations
Domain 6.C. Adversary-Allied Military Forces and Defense Organizations 
Domain 6.D. Other Support Capabilities
Subdomain 6.D.a. Governmental Space Agencies 
Subdomain 6.D.b. Commercial Space-Bome Imagery Organizations 
Subdomain 6.D.C. Non-Military Population 
Perspective 7. Neutral Forces and Other Support Capabilities 
Domain 7. A. Military Forces 
Domain 7.B. Defense Organizations 
Domain 7.C. Other Support Capabilities
Subdomain 7.C.a. Governmental Space Agencies 
Subdomain 7.C.b. Commercial Space-Bome Imagery Organizations 
Perspective 8. RLSS Technical Attributes
Domain 8.A. Ground-Based Computational Venues
Domain 8.B. Raw Data Receipt
Domain 8.C. Novel Computational Techniques
Domain 8.D. Optimized for Clear-Day, Near-Shore Environmental Data 
Domain 8.E. Visible Spectrum Image Processing
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Domain 8.F. Infrared Spectrum Image Processing
Domain 8.G. Surf and Beach Zone Minefield Detection Capability
Domain 8.H. Limited Minefield Parameter Detection Capability
Domain 8.1. Limited Individual Mine Detection Capability
Domain 8. J. Beach and Surf Zone Area Atmospheric Data Processing Capability
Domain 8.K. Beach and Surf Zone Area Bathymetric Data Processing Capability
Domain 8.L. Capability to Detect Mine Laying Activities in Surf and Beach 
Zone Areas of Interest
Domain 8.M. No Practical Capability to Process Other Than Beach and Surf 
Zone Surveillance Data
Domain 8.N. Processed Data Dissemination
Perspective 9. RLSS Operational Attributes
Domain 9.A. Data Collection Greatly Dependent On Atmospheric and 
Oceanographic Conditions in Areas of Interest
Domain 9.B. Operators
Subdomain 9.B.a. Requesting Joint Task Forces
Subdomain 9.B.b. Requesting Joint Task Force Theater-Level 
Headquarters
Subdomain 9.B.C. National Reconnaissance Asset Control Authorities 
Domain 9.C. Concept of Operations
Subdomain 9.C.a. Completeness
Subdomain 9.C.b. Doctrinal, Organizational, Training, Material, 
Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications
Subdomain 9.C.c. Operator Employment
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Domain 9.D. Command and Control
Subdomain 9.D.a. Joint Forces Issue Requests for RLSS Data to 
Theater-Level Headquarters
Subdomain 9.D.b. Theater-Level Control of RLSS Data Requests, Data 
Processing, and Processed Data Dissemination
Subdomain 9.D.C. National-Level Control of Reconnaissance Assets
Subdomain 9.D.d. Data Collection Greatly Dependent On Competing 
Demands for National-Level Reconnaissance Systems
Subdomain 9.D.e. Processed Data Dissemination Greatly Dependent On 
Availability of Transmission Media
Domain 9.E. System Usability
Domain 9.F. Operator Staffing and Proficiency
Domain 9.G. System Availability, Reliability, and Maintainability
Domain 9.H. Maintenance Personnel Staffing and Proficiency
Perspective 10. PLSS Technical Attributes
Domain 10.A. Medium-Sized, Single Propeller-Driven Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle (UAV) Platform
Domain 10.B. U.S. Navy Aviation or Aviation-Capable Amphibious Ship-Based
Domain 10.C. Semi-Autonomous Flight Operations Using Programmable 
Navigation Augmented by Onboard, Infrared Navigation Sensor
Domain 10.D. No Inflight Navigation Programming Capability
Domain 10.E. Catapult-Launched
Domain 10.F. Net-Recovered
Domain 10.G. Maximum Flight Endurance of Four Hours
Domain 10.H. Maximum Airspeed of 60 Knots and Stall Speed of 20 Knots
Domain 10.1. UAV Platform Equipped with Two Multi-Spectral Optical 
Surveillance Sensors
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Domain 10.J. One Visible-Spectrum and One Infrared-Spectrum Surveillance 
Sensor Tandem-Mounted and Gimballed for Redundant Surveillance
Domain 10.K. No Capability for Independent Operations of Visible-Spectrum 
and Infrared-Spectrum Sensors
Domain 10.L. Onboard Intelligent Target Recognition (ITR) System Processes 
Sensor Data for Outcome of Minefields Present, Minefields Not Present, or No 
Determination
Domain 10.M. ITR Processing Outcomes Transmitted to the PLSS Host via 
Encrypted Radio Frequency (RF) Transmissions
Domain 10.N. ITR System Can Store and Process Up to Two Hours of Optical 
Data
Domain 10.0. ITR-Stored Optical data Cannot be Transmitted to the PLS Host
Domain 10.P. ITR-Stored Data May be Recovered with the PLSS UAV for 
Analysis by PLSS Support Personnel Aboard the Host Vessel
Domain 10.Q. Capability to Detect Individual Mines Presenting to Sensors 
Equivalent of 12-Inch Diameter, Circular Mines
Domain 10.R. Capability to Detect Individual Mines On or Very Near Surface of 
Dry or Wave-Washed Beach Areas
Domain 10.S. Capability to Detect Individual Submerged Mines On or Very 
Near the Surf Zone Surface to Depths of 10 Feet
Domain 10.T. Under Ideal Atmospheric and Oceanographic Conditions, a 
Capability to Detect Individual Mines from Altitudes As High As 1000 Feet 
Above Beach Zones
Domain 10.U. Onboard PLSS Sensor Characteristics and Processing Algorithms 
Limit ITR System Capability to Distinguish Between Mines and Natural or 
Manmade Obstacles
Perspective 11. PLSS Operational Attributes
Domain 11. A. Normal Deployment Complement of One System Per Host Vessel
Domain ll.B . Surveillance Capability Strongly Dependent On RLSS Cuing, 
with Non-Cued Operations Very Difficult and Time-Consuming
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Domain ll.C . With RLSS Cuing and Ideal Atmospheric and Oceanographic 
Conditions, PLSS Systems Require Three Hours to Survey 10,000 Square Meters 
of Dry or Wave-Swept Beach Areas
Domain ll.D . With RLSS Cuing and Ideal Atmospheric and Oceanographic 
Conditions, PLSS Systems Require Six Hours to Survey 10,000 Square Meters of 
Submerged Surf Zone Areas
Domain ll .E . PLSS Personnel Aboard Host Execute Primary Role of 
Post-Mission Analysis
Domain ll.F . PLSS Personnel Aboard Host Vessel Execute Secondary Role of 
Real-Time Flight Operations and ITR-Processed Data Transmission Monitoring
Domain 11.G. Semi-Autonomous Flight Operations May Be Terminated by 
Retum-to-Vessel (RF) Signal from Host Vessel
Domain ll.H . Semi-Autonomous Flight Operations May Be Terminated by 
Destruct (RF) Signal from Host Vessel
Domain 11.1. Operators
Subdomain 11.La. PLSS Support Personnel
Subdomain 11.1.b. Host Vessels
Subdomain 11.I.e. Joint Task Forces
Subdomain ll.I.d . Joint Task Force Theater-Level Headquarters
Domain 11.J. Concept of Operations
Subdomain ll.J .a . Completeness with Integration of Host Vessel and 
Other Operator Processes
Subdomain ll.J .b . Implications for Doctrine, Organization, Training, 
Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities
Subdomain ll.J .c. Operator Employment
Domain U.K. Command and Control
Subdomain ll.K .a. Joint Force Initiates Forcible Entry Operations 
Planning
Subdomain ll.K .b. UAV Platform Navigation Programmed
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Subdomain 11.K.C. Joint Force Coordinates PLSS Operations Among 
Force Elements
Subdomain ll.K .d. Joint Force Governs PLSS Flight Operations from 
Launch Through Recovery
Subdomain ll.K .e. Joint Force Governs Post-Mission Analysis and 
Processed Data Dissemination
Domain ll.L . Weather and Environmental Influences
Domain ll.M . System Usability
Domain ll.N . Operator Staffing and Proficiency
Domain 11.0. System Availability, Reliability, and Maintainability
Domain 11.P. Maintenance Personnel Staffing and Proficiency
Perspective 12. Adversary Threats to OMD Operations
Domain 12.A. Anti-Aircraft Weapons
Domain 12.B. Small Arms Fire
Domain 12.C. Anti-Ship Kinetic Weapons
Subdomain 12.C.a. Surface Kinetic Weapons
Subdomain 12.C.b. Subsurface Kinetic Weapons
Domain 12.D. Anti-Satellite Weapons
Subdomain 12.D.a. Kinetic Weapons
Subdomain 12.D.b. Non-Kinetic Weapons
Domain 12.E. Electronic Warfare
Subdomain 12.E.a. Onboard PLSS Communication System Disruption
Subdomain 12.E.b. Offboard PLSS Communication System Disruption
Subdomain 12.E.C. PLSS Surveillance System Disruption
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Subdomain 12.E.d. PLSS Navigation System Disruption 
Subdomain 12.E.e. Onboard RLSS Communication System Disruption 
Subdomain 12.E.f. Offboard RLSS Communication System Disruption 
Subdomain 12.E.g. RLSS Surveillance System Disruption 
Subdomain 12.E.h. RLSS Navigation System Disruption 
Domain 12.F. Passive Mine Protection Tactics 
Subdomain 12.F.a. Camouflage 
Subdomain 12.F.b. Concealment 
Subdomain 12.F.C. Deception 
Subdomain 12.F.d. Stealth 
Perspective 13. Temporal Aspects of OMD ACTD
Domain 13.A. Demonstration Preparation Phase 
Domain 13.B. Demonstration Phase 
Domain 13.C. Residual Phase 
Domain 13.D. Acquisition Phase 
Domain 13.E. Deployment Phase
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The Operational Mine Detection ACTD hierarchical holographic, or 
metasystem, model identified in research Phase 1 was the fundamental element of the 
deployment phase of this research. The model stimulated the research Phase 2 
identification of risks - shown following -  that it represented to the operations expert 
group. As with Phase 1, Phase 2 processes utilized portions of the RFRM convention 
practiced extensively by Haimes (1998, 2004) and others (Haimes et al., 2002; Haimes 
et al., 2004; Horowitz & Haimes, 2003; Jones et al., 2003; Lambert et al., 2001; Leung 
et al., 2004; Pennock & Haimes, 2002).
(1) OMD system yields false positive indications of mines or minefields.
(2) OMD system yields false negative indications of mines or minefields.
(3) Mines are buried too deeply beneath (dry or submerged) surfaces to detect.
'y
(4) Mines present visible areas of less than 113 inches to PLSS system optics.
(5) Mine coatings lessen visible signature available to OMD system optics.
(6) Mine coatings lessen infrared signature available to OMD system optics.
(7) Glare or other natural mechanisms of visible spectrum saturation impair OMD 
system optical sensors.
(8) Noise equivalent temperature differences (NETD) between mines and mine 
surroundings are less than the thermal resolution capabilities of OMD system 
infrared sensors.
(9) Mine thermal characteristics and spacing impose minimum resolvable temperature 
(MRT) differences confounding OMD system infrared sensors.
(10) Mine designs incorporating acoustic fusing or floating contact fuses would present 
little to no visible area to OMD system sensors.
(11) Mines are concealed or camouflaged by natural or manmade objects expected to be 
seen within surf and beach zones.
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(12) Near-shore currents cause mines to migrate along the beach, confounding OMD 
system sensors and algorithms
(13) Precipitation confounds OMD system sensors.
(14) Beach or surf zone ice confounds OMD system sensors.
(15) Air temperature and humidity adversely affects PLSS UAV endurance.
(16) Clouds or other spectral attenuation mechanisms degrade OMD sensor capability.
(17) Excessive low-level winds or turbulence adversely affect or altogether preclude 
PLSS UAV launch, recovery, or flight stability necessary for sensor operations.
(18) Water clarity or turbidity adversely affects OMD system sensor capability.
(19) Water temperature may adversely affect OMD system sensor capability.
(20) Fall and winter season restrictions of available daylight impair OMD system utility.
(21) When fielded, the OMD system will no longer resolve the critical (mine 
surveillance) problem it is intended to resolve.
(22) PLSS UAV operations interfere with other operations preliminary to forcible entry 
operations.
(23) Neither joint task forces nor their higher headquarters control the national-level 
systems providing data to the RLSS.
(24) Operators do not sufficiently trust the OMD system and will therefore not take 
optimal advantage of its capabilities.
(25) PLSS employment impairs other joint task force operations, such as frequency 
spectrum usage or flight operations other than those of the PLSS UAV.
(26) Times required for OMD system and, particularly, PLSS employment, prove too 
lengthy for unplanned missions of immediate precedence.
(27) Tidal or current conditions demand search patterns of course or duration infeasible 
under operational constraints
(28) OMD system employment precipitates system-level issues of interoperability 
among joint task forces and senior, subordinate, or coordinating military forces or 
organizations.
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(29) RLSS and PLSS operations in widely separated time zones precipitate operational 
coordination problems.
(30) RLSS communications impair other joint task force operations, such as frequency 
spectrum usage.
(31) Coordinating OMD system operations with allied forces poses operational security 
risks.
(32) Competing priorities of higher headquarters or other responsible organizations slow 
delivery of RLSS products requested by joint task forces.
(33) Inadequate operations personnel staffing of higher headquarters or other responsible 
organizations slows delivery of RLSS products requested by joint task forces.
(34) Inadequate training of higher headquarters or other responsible organization 
operations staffs slows delivery of RLSS products requested by joint task forces.
(35) Rules of engagement impede or preclude PLSS employment in certain geographical 
areas.
(36) Inadequate intelligence regarding adversary mining capabilities or techniques 
impairs OMD system utility.
(37) Neutral force or population use of OMD system frequencies in joint task force 
operating areas impairs OMD system capabilities.
(38) Adversaries use various means to counter OMD system detection capabilities.
(39) Adversary or neutral concerns make political or diplomatic case that RLSS 
represents militarization of space, forcing cessation of RLSS operations.
(40) Deliberate or accidental PLSS operations in neutral territory proximate to joint task 
force operations areas precipitate political or diplomatic pressure halting PLSS 
operations. ’
(41) OMD system optimization for clear-day surveillance limits system utility for 
nighttime operations.
(42) RLSS data feed system is degraded or inoperative.
(43) RLSS computing system is degraded or inoperative.
(44) RLSS processed data transmission system is degraded or lost.
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(45) RLSS algorithms are not sufficiently robust to provide useful information regarding 
areas of operational interest.
(46) An insufficiently developed concept of operations (CONOPS) impairs RLSS utility.
(47) RAM (reliability, availability, and maintainability) issues impair RLSS utility.
(48) Inadequate maintenance personnel staffing of higher headquarters or other 
responsible organizations slows delivery of RLSS products requested by joint task 
forces.
(49) Inadequate training of higher headquarters or other responsible organization 
maintenance personnel slows delivery of RLSS products requested by joint task 
forces.
(50) PLSS UAV size and operating airspeed and altitude render it susceptible to 
adversary targeting.
(51) PLSS UAV airframe is vulnerable to adversary anti-aircraft weapons and tactics, 
including small arms fire.
(52) PLSS UAV launch and recovery parameters of wind speed and direction are 
difficult to attain or maintain under routine, host vessel operating conditions.
(53) Preprogrammed navigation restriction impairs PLSS utility.
(54) Four-hour PLSS UAV endurance insufficiently supports numerous combinations of 
missions and operating environments.
(55) PLSS deployment concept of one system per host vessel insufficiently supports 
operational needs.
(56) The PLSS ITR two-hour optical data storage capacity is insufficient for numerous 
combinations of missions and operating environments.
(57) Dependence on RLSS cuing jeopardizes PLSS utility.
(58) Competing priorities of host vessel slow transmission of joint task force requests for 
RLSS products.
(59) Inadequate operations personnel staffing of host vessels slows transmission of joint 
task force requests for RLSS products.
(60) Inadequate training of host vessel operations staffs slows transmission of joint task 
requests for RLSS products.
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(61) Inadequate PLSS operations personnel staffing slows PLSS operations.
(62) Inadequate training of PLSS operations personnel slows PLSS operations.
(63) Inadequate operations personnel staffing of host vessels slow PLSS operations.
(64) Inadequate training of host vessel operations staffs slows PLSS operations.
(65) ITR-processed data link from PLSS UAV to host vessel is degraded or inoperative.
(66) PLSS host vessel post-mission processing capability is degraded or lost.
(67) Degraded or inoperative communication links render host vessel unable to transmit 
PLSS-processed data to joint task force planners.
(68) ITR algorithms are not sufficiently robust to provide useful information regarding 
areas of operational interest.
(69) An insufficiently developed concept of operations (CONOPS) impairs PLSS utility.
(70) RAM (reliability, availability, and maintainability) issues impair PLSS utility.
(71) Inadequate PLSS maintenance personnel staffing slows PLSS operations.
(72) Inadequate training of PLSS maintenance personnel slows PLSS operations.
(73) Inadequate host vessel maintenance personnel staffing slows PLSS operations.
(74) Inadequate training of host vessel maintenance personnel slows PLSS operations.
(75) PLSS UAV does not properly respond to retum-to-host vessel command, impeding 
joint task force operations.
(76) PLSS UAV self-destruct does not occur when commanded and errant vehicle flies 
into enemy or neutral force airspace.
(77) PLSS UAV executes uncommanded self-destruct.
(78) Doctrine, operations, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, or 
facilities (DOTMLPF) change process will not accommodate OMD system fielding 
requirements.
(79) PLSS UAV platform is damaged during launch or recovery.
(80) Host vessel offensive or defensive posture impedes OMD-, and particularly 
PLSS-related operations.
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(81) Adversary anti-satellite tactics disrupt RLSS operations.
(82) Adversary electronic attacks impair communications between PLSS UAVs and host 
vessels.
(83) Adversary electronic attacks impair PLSS navigation or surveillance functions.
(84) Friendly force electronic emissions impair PLSS UAV navigational or other 
flight-related functions.
(85) Friendly force electronic emissions impair PLSS optical sensing, optical data 
processing, processed data transmission, or other surveillance-related functions.
(86) When fielded, the mining threat for which the OMD system would be produced will 
no longer be of concern to joint military forces.
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APPENDIX G 
HIGH RISK PRIORITIZATION QUESTIONNAIRE
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Operational Mine Detection 
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration
High Risk Prioritization Questionnaire
Participant Identifier: A D  B O  C I I
Date: December , 2006
Your operations expert group has determined eight high risks evident in the 
hierarchical holographic model earlier developed to characterize the Operational Mine 
Detection Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration system deployed within a joint 
military operations metasystem of relevance. Moreover, your group used a 
DoD-Conventional Matrix of Risk Consequence and Likelihood to describe each of those
DoD-Conventional Matrix of Risk Consequence and Likelihood
LIKELIHOOD
CONSEQUENCE Remote Unlikely Likely HighlyLikely Frequent
Unacceptable M o d e r a t e
( 5 , 1 )
H i g h
( 5 , 2 )
H i g h  
( 5 ,  3 )
H i g h
( 5 , 4 )
H i g h  
( 5 ,  5 )
Minimally Acceptable L o w
( 4 , 1 )
M o d e r a t e
( 4 , 2 )
M o d e r a t e  
( 4 ,  3 )
H i g h
( 4 , 4 )
H i g h  
( 4 ,  5 )
Acceptable with L o w L o w M o d e r a t e M o d e r a t e H i g h
Significant Utility Loss ( 3 ,  1 ) ( 3 , 2 ) ( 3 , 3 ) ( 3 , 4 ) ( 3 , 5 )
Acceptable with Slight L o w L o w L o w M o d e r a t e M o d e r a t e
Utility Loss ( 2 , 1 ) ( 2 , 2 ) ( 2 ,  3 ) ( 2 , 4 ) ( 2 ,  5 )
Little or None L o w
( 1 , 1 )
L o w
( 1 , 2 )
L o w
( 1 , 3 )
L o w
0 , 4 )
M o d e r a t e
( 1 , 5 )
eight high risks in terms of consequence and likelihood. The group assessed the 
(consequence, likelihood) components of two risks as (5, 4) and agreed that these two 
constituted the most serious of the eight:
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Risk: PLSS deployment concept o f one system per host vessel insufficiently supports
operational needs.
Risk: Adversaries use various means to counter OMD system detection capabilities.
The group assessed the (consequence, likelihood) components of four risks as (5, 3) and 
agreed that these constituted a high-risk grouping of intermediate significance, third 
through sixth most serious of the eight:
Risk: Adversary electronic attacks impair PLSS navigation or surveillance functions.
Risk: OMD system yields false negative indications o f mines or minefields.
Risk: Mines are concealed or camouflaged by natural or manmade objects expected
to be seen within surf and beach zones.
Risk: OMD system yields false positive indications o f mines or minefields.
The group assessed the (consequence, likelihood) components of two other risks as (4, 4), 
agreeing these to be the least serious the eight high-risk scenarios identified:
Risk: PLSS UA V airframe is vulnerable to adversary anti-aircraft weapons and
tactics, including small arms fire.
Risk: RLSS algorithms are not sufficiently robust to provide useful information
regarding areas o f operational interest.
A group preference regarding overall prioritization of the eight risks may now be 
achieved by soliciting individual (operations expert group member) prioritizations of 
risks associated with each of the (5, 4), (5, 3), and (4, 4) component categories of relative 
seriousness already determined.
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Given each of the following eight pairings of risks, please check the block beside 
the risk you consider the more serious. You should check only one block per pairing and 
identify your preference for every pairing; no “ties” are allowed. Please also attempt to 
maintain ranking consistency; that is, if you identify risk ̂ 4 as more serious than risk B  
and risk B  as more serious than risk C, please attempt to ensure you have also identified 
risk .4 as more serious than risk C.
Please check the block beside the risk you consider the more serious of the two:
I I PLSS UA V airframe is vulnerable to adversary anti-aircraft weapons and tactics,
including small arms fire.
I I RLSS algorithms are not sufficiently robust to provide useful information
regarding areas o f  operational interest.
Please check the block beside the risk you consider the more serious of the two:
I I PLSS deployment concept o f one system per host vessel insufficiently supports
operational needs.
I I Adversaries use various means to counter OMD system detection capabilities.
Please check the block beside the risk you consider the more serious of the two:
□  Adversary electronic attacks impair PLSS navigation or surveillance functions. 
I I OMD system yields false negative indications o f mines or minefields.
Please check the block beside the risk you consider the more serious of the two:
I I Adversary electronic attacks impair PLSS navigation or surveillance functions.
I I Mines are concealed or camouflaged by natural or manmade objects expected to
be seen within surf and beach zones.
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Please check the block beside the risk you consider the more serious of the two:
□  Adversary electronic attacks impair PLSS navigation or surveillance functions.
□  OMD system yields false positive indications o f mines or minefields.
Please check the block beside the risk you consider the more serious of the two:
I I OMD system yields false negative indications o f mines or minefields.
I I Mines are concealed or camouflaged by natural or manmade objects expected to
be seen within surf and beach zones.
Please check the block beside the risk you consider the more serious of the two:
I I OMD system yields false negative indications o f  mines or minefields.
□  OMD system yields false positive indications o f mines or minefields.
Please check the block beside the risk you consider the more serious of the two:
□  Mines are concealed or camouflaged by natural or manmade objects expected to 
be seen within surf and beach zones.
□  OMD system yields false positive indications o f mines or minefields.
THANK YOU
For Participating as a Volunteer Member of the 
Operations Expert Group
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The final phase of five phases of research synthesized judgments of a group of 20 
purposively selected volunteers collectively expert in ACTD management and MUA 
design. Research Phase 5 employed a single, single-stage, cross-sectional, primarily 
Likert scale survey instrument structurally similar to those used by Monroe (1997), Yeh 
(1998), Morgan (1999), and Chytka (2003) and topically related to survey structures used 
for related research in: (a) decision making (Yeh, 1998), (b) design performance 
evaluation (Sun, 2000); (c) risk and uncertainty assessment, including risk ranking 
(Chytka, 2003; Hampton, 2001; Monroe, 1997; Morgan, 1999; Wells, 1997); (d) 
technology adoption impact (Conway, 2003); and (e) evaluation of commercial product 
customer preferences (Liu, 1996). The instrument used to survey the ACTD expert group 
of 20 follows:
You are one of a group of advanced concept technology demonstration (ACTD) experts who 
have volunteered to judge the researcher’s proposed methodology for ACTD military utility 
assessment (MUA) design. Your participation owes to your education as well as your experience 
with ACTD program management, ACTD management, or MUA design and conduct.
Please answer all questions of all sections as accurately and completely as possible. Unless 
otherwise indicated, please select only one response for questions prompting checkbox-type 
responses. For questions prompting free form responses, please answer using the (unlimited length) 
fields provided. The questionnaire should take no more than one hour to complete.
RESPONSES WILL REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL TO ALL BUT THE RESEARCHER.
SECTION 1. PROFESSIONAL AND EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE
(1) Select the description or descriptions (select all applicable) best characterizing your experience 
with advanced concept technology demonstrations:
A C T D  P r o g r a m  M a n a g e m e n t  Id A C T D  M a n a g e m e n t  Id M U A  D e s i g n  o r  C o n d u c t  I I
N o t e  t h a t :  p r o g r a m  m a n a g e m e n t  i n d i c a t e s  n o  l e s s  t h a n  o n e  y e a r  o f  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  m a j o r  
m i l i t a r y  c o m m a n d s ’ o r  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  D e f e n s e  ( D o D )  a g e n c i e s ’  A C T D  p o l i c i e s  p o s s i b l y  g o v e r n i n g  
m u l t i p l e  A C T D s ;  A C T D  m a n a g e m e n t  i n d i c a t e s  n o  l e s s  t h a n  o n e  y e a r  o f  e x p e r i e n c e  a s  a n  A C T D  
o p e r a t i o n a l  o r  d e p u t y  o p e r a t i o n a l  m a n a g e r ,  a n d  M U A  d e s i g n  o r  c o n d u c t  i n d i c a t e s  n o  l e s s  t h a n  o n e  y e a r  o f  
e x p e r i e n c e  a s  a n  a n a l y s t  d e s i g n i n g  o r  c o n d u c t i n g  A C T D  m i l i t a r y  u t i l i t y  a s s e s s m e n t s .
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(2) Identify your combined years of experience as an ACTD program manager, an ACTD 
operational manager or deputy operational manager, or an analyst pursuing ACTD MUA design or 
conduct.
1 - 2  Y e a r s  Q  2 - 5  Y e a r s  Q  M o r e  T h a n  5  Y e a r s  Q
(3) Identify your highest level of education as:
B a c h e l o r ’ s  D e g r e e  C H  M a s t e r ’ s  D e g r e e  d  P h . D .  o r  O t h e r  T e r m i n a l  D e g r e e  I I
SECTION 2. ACTD GENERAL GUIDANCE
(1) ACTDs are intended as precursors to formal acquisition processes.
□  □  □  □ □
S t r o n g l y  A g r e eS t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w  A g r e e
(2) ACTDs offer military users opportunities to “try before buy.”
□ □ □ □ □ 
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w  A g r e e  S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
(3) Concept o f operations (CONOPS) development is an indispensable component of ACTDs.
□
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e
□
D i s a g r e e
□
D o  N o t  K n o w
□
A g r e e
(4) The most important aspect of ACTDs is user assessment of military utility.
□ □ □ □
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w  A g r e e
(5) The most important aspect of ACTDs is transition to acquisition or fielding.
□  □  □  □
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w  A g r e e
□
S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
□
S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
□
S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
(6) User assessment of military utility is more important to the ACTD process than transition to 
acquisition or fielding.
□
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e
□
D i s a g r e e
□
D o  N o t  K n o w
□
A g r e e
□
S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
(7) If you believe there to be some aspect (or aspects) o f the ACTD process more important than 
either of (a) utility assessment; or (b) transition to acquisition or fielding, please identify and describe 
it (or them):
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SECTION 3. ACTD MUA GUIDANCE
(1) Military utility assessments are intended as the principal mechanism by which ACTDs’ potential 
value to military users may be gauged.
□ □ □ □ □
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w  A g r e e  S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
(2) Military utility assessments are intended to be highly dependent on user judgment.
□  □  □  □  □
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w  A g r e e  S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
(3) The ACTD MUA design process begins with the identification of critical operational issues (COI) 
the demonstration is intended to address.
□ □ □ □ □
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w  A g r e e  S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
(4) Appropriate, military users hold ultimate responsibility for approving COI.
□  □  □  □  □
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w  A g r e e  S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
(5) COI are “show stoppers” that must be addressed to users’ satisfaction if ACTDs are to move to 
acquisition or fielding.
□  □  □  □
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w  A g r e e
(6) COI are indispensable to MUA design.
□  □  □  □
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w  A g r e e
(7) Measures of effectiveness (MOE) are derived from critical operational issues.
□ □ □ □ □
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w  A g r e e  S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
(8) MOE selection is a responsibility shared by appropriate military users and analysts charged with 
MUA design and conduct.
□ □ □ □ □
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w  A g r e e  S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
(9) ACTD program guidance intends MOE as primary indicators of whether or not ACTDs have 
satisfactorily addressed COI established for demonstrations.
□ □ □ □ □
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w  A g r e e  S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
□
S t r o n g l y  A g r e e  
□
S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
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(10) MOE are indispensable to MUA design.
□ □ □ □ □
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w  A g r e e  S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
SECTION 4. ACTD MUA DESIGN PRACTICE
(1) COI should be employed for all ACTD MU As.
□ □ □ □
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w  A g r e e
(2) MOE should be employed for every COI used for ACTD MU As.
□ □ □ □
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w  A g r e e
(3) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have employed COI as part of the MUA.
□ □ □ □
N e v e r  O c c a s i o n a l l y  O f t e n  A l w a y s
(4) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have employed MOE as part of the MUA.
□ □ □ □
N e v e r  O c c a s i o n a l l y  O f t e n  A l w a y s
(5) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have employed COI approved by military users.
□ □ □ □
N e v e r  O c c a s i o n a l l y  O f t e n  A l w a y s
(6) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have employed MOE developed with cooperation of 
military users.
□ □ □ □
N e v e r  O c c a s i o n a l l y  O f t e n  A l w a y s
(7) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have employed MOE developed with cooperation of 
analysts charged with MUA design and conduct.
□ □ □ □
N e v e r  O c c a s i o n a l l y  O f t e n  A l w a y s
(8) ACTD MU As about which I have knowledge have greatly depended on user judgment.
□ □ □ □
N e v e r  O c c a s i o n a l l y  O f t e n  A l w a y s
□
S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
□
S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
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(9) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have applied risk assessment methods to MUA design.
□ □ □ □
N e v e r  O c c a s i o n a l l y  O f t e n  A l w a y s
(10) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have applied fuzzy set theory to MUA design.
□ □ □ □
N e v e r  O c c a s i o n a l l y  O f t e n  A l w a y s
(11) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have applied Phases I-III of Haimes’ Risk Filtering, 
Ranking and Management (RFRM) convention to MUA design.
□
N e v e r
□
O c c a s i o n a l l y
□
O f t e n
□
A l w a y s
(12) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have applied the fuzzy prioritization method of Blin and 
Whinston to MUA design.
□
N e v e r
□
O c c a s i o n a l l y
□
O f t e n
□
A l w a y s
SECTION 5. METHODOLOGY REVIEW
(1) There exists no rigorous methodology for ACTD MUA design.
□ □ □ □
A g r e e
□
S t r o n g l y  A g r e eS t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w
(2) The Department of Defense has suggested no rigorous methodology for ACTD MUA design.
□
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e
□
D i s a g r e e
□
D o  N o t  K n o w
(3) There is a need for more rigor in ACTD MUA design.
□  □  □  
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w
□
A g r e e
□
A g r e e
□
S t r o n g l y  A g r e e  
□
S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
(4) ACTD guidance endorsing demonstrations of minimum technical risk should be extended to 
include operational or other risks associated with demonstrations’ intended uses.
□
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e
□
D i s a g r e e
□
D o  N o t  K n o w
(5) MU As should emphasize user judgment.
□ □ □ 
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w
□
A g r e e
□
A g r e e
□
S t r o n g l y  A g r e e  
□
S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
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(6) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have determined MOE by prioritizing user-perceived risks 
associated with fielding demonstrations or their derivatives.
□
N e v e r
□
O c c a s i o n a l l y
□
O f t e n
□
A l w a y s
(7) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have determined MOE by developing metasystem models 
like that proposed with this methodology.
□
N e v e r
□
O c c a s i o n a l l y
□
O f t e n
□
A l w a y s
(8) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have determined MOE using metasystem models to 
identify and assess risks in a manner like that proposed with this methodology.
□
N e v e r
□
O c c a s i o n a l l y
□
O f t e n
□
A l w a y s
(9) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have determined MOE using risk prioritization schemes 
like that proposed with this methodology.
□
N e v e r
□
O c c a s i o n a l l y
□
O f t e n
(10) This methodology promotes a degree of MUA rigor appropriate for ACTDs.
□ □ □ □
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w  A g r e e
(11) This methodology respects user judgment to a degree appropriate for MU As.
□ □ □ □
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w  A g r e e
□
A l w a y s
□
S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
□
S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
(12) This methodology’s treatment of joint military operations metasystems is appropriate for 
ACTDs
□
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e
□
D i s a g r e e
□
D o  N o t  K n o w
□
A g r e e
(13) This methodology’s treatment of risk is appropriate for ACTDs
□ □ □ □
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e D i s a g r e e D o  N o t  K n o w A g r e e
□
S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
□
S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
(14) This methodology’s treatment of the ambiguities associated with human judgment is 
appropriate for ACTDs.
□
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e
□
D i s a g r e e
□
D o  N o t  K n o w
□
A g r e e
□
S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
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(15) This methodology could be applied by persons assigned to ACTD MUA design.
□ □ □ □ □
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w  A g r e e  S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
(16) The application of this methodology could be managed by ACTD operational managers or their 
deputies.
□ □ □ □ □
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w  A g r e e  S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
(17) This methodology could promote the identification of MOE used for ACTD MU As.
□ □ □ □ □
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w  A g r e e  S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
(18) This methodology fills a gap in the ACTD MUA design process.
□ □ □ □ □
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w  A g r e e  S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
(19) Please conclude this questionnaire by submitting any additional thoughts you wish regarding the 
proposed methodology or its value to ACTD MUA design.
THANK YOU FOR COMPLETING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE
and for
Your Participation as a Volunteer Member of the 
ACTD Expert Group.
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APPENDIX I 
ACTD EXPERT REVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES
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Nineteen of twenty ACTD experts who reviewed the methodology development 
and deployment responded to the questionnaire offered to capture their views of those 
proceedings and associated topics such as ACTD program intent and deficiencies. 
Responses are summarized below.
You are one of a group of advanced concept technology demonstration (ACTD) experts who 
have volunteered to judge the researcher’s proposed methodology for ACTD military utility 
assessment (MUA) design. Your participation owes to your education as well as your experience 
with ACTD program management, ACTD management, or MUA design and conduct.
Please answer all questions of all sections as accurately and completely as possible. Unless 
otherwise indicated, please select only one response for questions prompting checkbox-type 
responses. For questions prompting free form responses, please answer using the (unlimited length) 
fields provided. The questionnaire should take no more than one hour to complete.
RESPONSES WILL REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL TO ALL BUT THE RESEARCHER.
SECTION 1. PROFESSIONAL AND EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE
(1) Select the description or descriptions (select all applicable) best characterizing your experience 
with advanced concept technology demonstrations:
A C T D  P r o g r a m  M a n a g e m e n t  3  A C T D  M a n a g e m e n t  8  M U A  D e s i g n  o r  C o n d u c t  8
N o t e  t h a t :  p r o g r a m  m a n a g e m e n t  i n d i c a t e s  n o  l e s s  t h a n  o n e  y e a r  o f  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  m a j o r  
m i l i t a r y  c o m m a n d s ’ o r  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  D e f e n s e  ( D o D )  a g e n c i e s ’  A C T D  p o l i c i e s  p o s s i b l y  g o v e r n i n g  
m u l t i p l e  A C T D s ;  A C T D  m a n a g e m e n t  i n d i c a t e s  n o  l e s s  t h a n  o n e  y e a r  o f  e x p e r i e n c e  a s  a n  A C T D  
o p e r a t i o n a l  o r  d e p u t y  o p e r a t i o n a l  m a n a g e r ,  a n d  M U A  d e s i g n  o r  c o n d u c t  i n d i c a t e s  n o  l e s s  t h a n  o n e  y e a r  o f  
e x p e r i e n c e  a s  a n  a n a l y s t  d e s i g n i n g  o r  c o n d u c t i n g  A C T D  m i l i t a r y  u t i l i t y  a s s e s s m e n t s .
(2) Identify your combined years of experience as an ACTD program manager, an ACTD 
operational manager or deputy operational manager, or an analyst pursuing ACTD MUA design or 
conduct.
1 - 2  Y e a r s  3  2 - 5  Y e a r s  9  M o r e  T h a n  5  Y e a r s  7
( 3 )  Identify your highest level of education as:
B a c h e l o r ’ s  D e g r e e  4  M a s t e r ’ s  D e g r e e  1 5  P h . D .  o r  O t h e r  T e r m i n a l  D e g r e e
SECTION 2. ACTD GENERAL GUIDANCE
(1) ACTDs are intended as precursors to formal acquisition processes.
1
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e D o  N o t  K n o w
11
A g r e e
7
S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
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(2) ACTDs offer military users opportunities to “try before buy.”
9 10
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w  A g r e e  S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
(3) Concept of operations (CONOPS) development is an indispensable component of ACTDs.
7 12
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w  A g r e e  S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
(4) The most important aspect of ACTDs is user assessment of military utility.
3 2 14
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w  A g r e e  S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
(5) The most important aspect of ACTDs is transition to acquisition or fielding.
7 10 2
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w  A g r e e  S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
(6) User assessment o f military utility is more important to the ACTD process than transition to 
acquisition or fielding.
3 11 5
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w  A g r e e  S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
(7) If you believe there to be some aspect (or aspects) of the ACTD process more important than 
either of (a) utility assessment; or (b) transition to acquisition or fielding, please identify and describe 
it (or them):
R e s p o n s e  s u m m a r i e s  i n c l u d e :
( A )  I t  w o u l d  b e  n o n s e n s i c a l  t o  t r a n s i t i o n i n g  A C T D s  w i t h o u t  a d e q u a t e  a s s e s s m e n t  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  a n d  r e s u l t s .
( B )  T r a n s i t i o n  a s s u m e s  t h a t  m i l i t a r y  u t i l i t y  h a s  b e e n  d e t e r m i n e d .
( C )  T h e y  a r e  b o t h  i m p o r t a n t  b u t  m i l i t a r y  u t i l i t y  i s  p a r a m o u n t .
SECTION 3. ACTD MUA GUIDANCE
(1) Military utility assessments are intended as the principal mechanism by which ACTDs’ potential 
value to military users may be gauged.
8 11
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w  A g r e e  S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
(2) Military utility assessments are intended to be highly dependent on user judgment.
6 1 8  4
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w  A g r e e  S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
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(3) The ACTD MUA design process begins with the identification of critical operational issues (COI) 
the demonstration is intended to address.
10 9
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w  A g r e e  S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
(4) Appropriate, military users hold ultimate responsibility for approving COI.
2 11 6
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w  A g r e e  S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
(5) COI are “show stoppers” that must be addressed to users’ satisfaction if  ACTDs are to move to 
acquisition or fielding.
3 12 4
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w  A g r e e  S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
(6) COI are indispensable to MUA design.
7 12
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w  A g r e e  S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
(7) Measures of effectiveness (MOE) are derived from critical operational issues.
12 7
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w  A g r e e  S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
(8) MOE selection is a responsibility shared by appropriate military users and analysts charged with 
MUA design and conduct.
1 13 5
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w  A g r e e  S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
(9) ACTD program guidance intends MOE as primary indicators of whether or not ACTDs have 
satisfactorily addressed COI established for demonstrations.
2 14 3
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w  A g r e e  S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
(10) MOE are indispensable to MUA design.
12 7
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w  A g r e e  S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
SECTION 4. ACTD MUA DESIGN PRACTICE
(1) COI should be employed for all ACTD MU As.
6 13
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w  A g r e e  S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
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(2) MOE should be employed for every COI used for ACTD MU As.
3 1 9  6
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w  A g r e e  S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
(3) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have employed COI as part of the MUA.
4 15
N e v e r  O c c a s i o n a l l y  O f t e n  A l w a y s
(4) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have employed MOE as part of the MUA.
6 13
N e v e r  O c c a s i o n a l l y  O f t e n  A l w a y s
(5) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have employed COI approved by military users.
2 8 9
N e v e r  O c c a s i o n a l l y  O f t e n  A l w a y s
(6) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have employed MOE developed with cooperation of 
military users.
1 4  9 5
N e v e r  O c c a s i o n a l l y  O f t e n  A l w a y s
(7) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have employed MOE developed with cooperation of 
analysts charged with MUA design and conduct.
9 10
N e v e r  O c c a s i o n a l l y  O f t e n  A l w a y s
(8) ACTD MU As about which I have knowledge have greatly depended on user judgment.
2 12 5
N e v e r  O c c a s i o n a l l y  O f t e n  A l w a y s
(9) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have applied risk assessment methods to MUA design.
1 11 5 2
N e v e r  O c c a s i o n a l l y  O f t e n  A l w a y s
(10) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have applied fuzzy set theory to MUA design.
14 5
N e v e r  O c c a s i o n a l l y  O f t e n  A l w a y s
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(11) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have applied Phases I-III o f Haimes’ Risk Filtering, 
Ranking and Management (RFRM) convention to MUA design.
15 3 1
N e v e r  O c c a s i o n a l l y  O f t e n  A l w a y s
(12) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have applied the fuzzy prioritization method of Biin and 
Whinston to MUA design.
15 4
N e v e r  O c c a s i o n a l l y  O f t e n  A l w a y s
SECTION 5. METHODOLOGY REVIEW
(1) There exists no rigorous methodology for ACTD MUA design.
2 5 1 11
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w  A g r e e  S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
(2) The Department of Defense has suggested no rigorous methodology for ACTD MUA design.
2 2
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w
(3) There is a need for more rigor in ACTD MUA design.
1
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e D i s a g r e e D o  N o t  K n o w
15
A g r e e
14
A g r e e
S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
(4) ACTD guidance endorsing demonstrations of minimum technical risk should be extended to 
include operational or other risks associated with demonstrations’ intended uses.
1 4
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w
(5) MUAs should emphasize user judgment.
1
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e
3
D i s a g r e e
1
D o  N o t  K n o w
14
A g r e e
11
A g r e e
S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
(6) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have determined MOE by prioritizing user-perceived risks 
associated with fielding demonstrations or their derivatives.
2
N e v e r
10
O c c a s i o n a l l y
6
O f t e n A l w a y s
(7) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have determined MOE by developing metasystem models 
like that proposed with this methodology.
11
N e v e r
8
O c c a s i o n a l l y O f t e n A l w a y s
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(8) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have determined MOE using metasystem models to 
identify and assess risks in a manner like that proposed with this methodology.
12
N e v e r O c c a s i o n a l l y
1
O f t e n A l w a y s
(9) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have determined MOE using risk prioritization schemes 
like that proposed with this methodology.
12
N e v e r
2
O f t e nO c c a s i o n a l l y
(10) This methodology promotes a degree of MUA rigor appropriate for ACTDs.
A l w a y s
1 1 12
A g r e eS t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w
(11) This methodology respects user judgment to a degree appropriate for MU As.
S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e D i s a g r e e
1
D o  N o t  K n o w
12
A g r e e S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
(12) This methodology’s treatment of joint military operations metasystems is appropriate for 
ACTDs
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w
(13) This methodology’s treatment of risk is appropriate for ACTDs
14
A g r e e S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e D i s a g r e e
1
D o  N o t  K n o w
13
A g r e e S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
(14) This methodology’s treatment of the ambiguities associated with human judgment is 
appropriate for ACTDs.
3 13 3
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D o  N o t  K n o w  A g r e e  S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
(15) This methodology could be applied by persons assigned to ACTD MUA design.
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e D i s a g r e e D o  N o t  K n o w
11
A g r e e S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
(16) The application of this methodology could be managed by ACTD operational managers or their 
deputies.
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e D i s a g r e e
1
D o  N o t  K n o w
13
A g r e e S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
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(17) This methodology could promote the identification o f MOE used for ACTD MU As.
3
D o  N o t  K n o w
10 5
S t r o n g l y  A g r e eS t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e A g r e e
(18) This methodology fills a gap in the ACTD MUA design process.
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e
5
D o  N o t  K n o w
8
A g r e e
6
S t r o n g l y  A g r e e
(19) Please conclude this questionnaire by submitting any additional thoughts you wish regarding the 
proposed methodology or its value to ACTD MUA design.
R e s p o n s e  s u m m a r i e s  i n c l u d e :
( A )  W o u l d  l i k e  t o  s e e  t h e  p r o c e s s  a p p l i e d  t o  a n  a c t u a l  A C T D .
( B )  T h i s  i s  a  r e a s o n a b l e  a p p r o a c h  t h a t  a d d r e s s e s  a  g a p  i n  t h e  c u r r e n t  M U A  p r o c e s s .
( C )  T h i s  m e t h o d o l o g y  h a s  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  t o  i n s t i l l  r i g o r  i n  r i s k  a s s e s s m e n t  p r o c e s s e s  t h a t  c o u l d  i n f l u e n c e  
M U  A s .
( D )  T h e  m e t h o d o l o g y  h o l d s  p o t e n t i a l  v a l u e  f o r  M U A  d e s i g n .
( E )  T h i s  m e t h o d o l o g y  c o u l d  m a k e  m o r e  r o b u s t  a n d  o t h e r w i s e  g r e a t l y  b e n e f i t  t h e  M U A  d e s i g n  p r a c t i c e s  o f  
A C T D  s p o n s o r s .
( F )  T h i s  m e t h o d o l o g y  s h o u l d  b e  v a l i d a t e d  w i t h  a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  a c t u a l  A C T D s .
( G )  T h e r e  i s  v e r y  l i t t l e  s c i e n c e  b e h i n d  t h e  M O E  d e v e l o p m e n t  p r o c e s s e s  u s e d  b y  A C T D  a n d  s i m i l a r  
p r o g r a m  a g e n t s .  T h i s  m e t h o d o l o g y  c o u l d  p r o v i d e  t h a t  s c i e n c e .
( H )  M O E  d e v e l o p m e n t  s h o u l d  b e  s t a n d a r d i z e d  i n  a  f a s h i o n  s u p p o r t e d  b y  t h i s  m e t h o d o l o g y .
( I )  T h i s  m e t h o d o l o g y  c a n  p r o v i d e  a  r i g o r o u s  a p p r o a c h  t o  t h e  m a n y  A C T D  M U A  d e s i g n s  t h a t  l a c k  r i g o r .  I t  
o f f e r s  r e s u l t s  w i t h  c r e d i b i l i t y .
THANK YOU FOR COMPLETING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE
and for
Your Participation as a Volunteer Member of the 
ACTD Expert Group.
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Advanced concept technology and joint capability technology demonstration 
operational managers should understand the primary importance assigned military utility 
assessments under ACTD and JCTD program guidance, and those managers should 
pursue their demonstration’s assessment designs in concert with supporting analysts and 
the supported community of potential users. Operational managers should ensure their 
assessment designs account for:
■ risks derived from incorporating ACTD systems within larger systems of military 
systems and operational processes; and
■ the ambiguities of human cognition and language used to identify risks associated 
with complex, military systems.
The following practitioner’s guide should promote such accounting. It is intended to be a 
brief, non-prescriptive, and largely iterative guide for operational managers, assessment 
designers supporting operational managers, and others supporting MUA design. It 
should be used precisely as intended -  as a guide to meeting the critical military needs 
that demonstrations can represent.
(1) Operational managers must identify to MUA designers the critical operational need 
their demonstration is expected to satisfy.
(2) Operational managers must identify to MUA designers their demonstration’s 
purpose or, equivalently, the capabilities it is expected to provide in satisfying some 
critical need.
(3) Operational managers must elicit from their demonstration’s potential user 
community and provide to MUA designers the critical operational issues the user 
community wishes addressed with a military utility assessment.
(4) Operational managers must develop or elicit from their demonstration’s potential 
user community an initial concept of operations for governing the demonstration’s
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deployment as part of relevant, existing military and possibly non-military systems 
and procedures. They must provide that concept of operations to MUA designers.
(5) Operational managers must elicit from their demonstration’s system developers and 
provide to MUA designers an initial understanding of the demonstration’s primary, 
technical elements.
(6) Operational managers must elicit from their demonstration’s system developers and 
provide to MUA designers an initial understanding of the demonstration’s primary, 
operational elements.
(7) Assessment designers must consider initial information provided them by the 
operational manager and draw from that information a recommendation regarding 
composition of an operations expert group of purpose like that pursued by the 
operations group of this research. Assessment designers should advance their 
recommendation to the operational manager, soliciting that individual’s support in 
forming an operations expert group.
(8) Assessment designers must identify an analyst of their own group to serve as study 
leader of the operations expert group. The study leader should meet selection 
requirements criteria developed a priori by the assessment designers and comprising 
criteria regarding analytical skill and appropriate, operational experience.
(9) The operations experts should use Phases I-II of Haimes’ (1998, 2004) Risk 
Filtering, Ranking, and Management method to develop a hierarchical holographic 
model of their demonstration of interest, together with relevant aspects of other 
systems and processes with which the demonstration systems and processes are to be 
incorporated. The HHM must include user-provided, critical operational issues 
together with system developer-provided information regarding a demonstration 
system’s technical and operational attributes.
(10) In developing a HHM, the operations experts may wish to first identify its major 
category, perspectives and follow that by identifying perspective-subordinate 
domains and subdomains to whatever level of hierarchy the group believes needed.
(11) The HHM development process should conclude when operations expert group 
members agree upon a final model.
(12) The operations expert group should use Phase III of Haimes’ (1998, 2004) Risk 
Filtering, Ranking, and Management method to identify the risks to military 
operations utility that the HHM represents to it. Risks should be understood as 
functions of consequence and likelihood.
(13) The group may find that they are able to transcribe directly as risks any subdomain 
or lower-level HHM constructs earlier identified.
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(14) The risk identification process should conclude when operations expert group 
members agree upon a final set of risks.
(15) The experts should next again use RFRM Phase III procedures to categorize 
elements of their final risk set in terms of high, moderate, or low. Experts may 
identify high-moderate-low graduations based on analytical considerations of 
consequence and likelihood, but they should not be bound by a false sense of rigor 
assigned such a “risk as analysis” (Slovic et al., 2004, p. 311) approach. Experts 
may, instead, address “risk as feelings” (p. 311) by depending on their “experiential 
system” to guide them toward plausible, risk assessments.
(16) The experts should refine their high-moderate-low categorizations by associating 
with each risk an ordered pairing of consequence and likelihood, (consequence, 
likelihood), like that demonstrated with this research. These associations may be 
made in concert with or in lieu of the high-moderate-low categorizations described 
in (14). As with any broader categorizations pursued under the guidance of (15), 
operations experts should concede the equivalent credence of “risk as feelings” and 
“risk as analysis” (Slovic et al., 2004).
(17) Based on an assessment of resources available to pursue a demonstration, 
operational managers may request the operational expert group to assess in terms of 
(consequence, likelihood) only those risks identified by the group as high. Those 
most serious risks would then be the only ones subjected to an ensuing prioritization 
based on the fuzzy group preference method of Blin and Whinston (1973) and Blin 
(1974) and so the only ones from which would be derived the measures of 
effectiveness upon which a military utility assessment would be founded. Such a 
process could ensure that an assessment executed under conditions of limited 
resources would address user-prescribed COIs as optimally as possible.
(18) Operational managers may instead request that all identified risks (or, at least a set 
of risks larger than that comprising only of those considered as high) be associated 
with ordered pairings of consequence and likelihood. In that case the following 
prioritization process would remain the same as for the more restrictive case 
described in (17).
(19) Once the domain of prioritization is determined by the operational manager, the 
operations expert group must decide to pursue one of two prioritization schemes:
(a) one that treats as equivalent all elements of sets of risks assigned to the three 
categories of high, moderate, or low; or (b) one that first prioritizes within each risk 
category the distinct groupings of (consequence, likelihood) and then prioritizes the 
risks within each grouping. The latter scheme will normally be easier to execute in 
terms of operations group deliberations needed and the fuzzy mathematics 
computations to follow those deliberations.
(20) Once a particular prioritization scheme is determined, the leader of the operations 
expert group leader must develop a questionnaire to portray to group members the
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pairwise comparisons of risks of interest required for the Blin and Whinston (1973) 
and Blin (1974) method.
(21) Operations expert group members must individually complete the questionnaire 
developed by their study leader. The study leader may participate in the survey but 
must most importantly ensure the completeness and accuracy of all questionnaire 
responses. Completeness and accuracy may be ensured by measures addressed in 
this research
(22) Observing the prioritization scheme selected from the two options of (19), the study 
leader must apply the Blin and Whinston (1973) and Blin (1974) fuzzy group 
preference method to determine from independent, operations group member 
responses: (a) a single group preference of prioritized risks; and (b) the level of 
agreement associated with that single preference.
(23) The group leader must then apprise the operational manager of the operations expert 
group preference regarding identified risks. The group leader must also apprise the 
operational manager of the level of agreement associated with that preference.
(24) The operational manager and operations group leader should together analyze the 
implications of the group preference and level of agreement determined. Given the 
analysis, they may determine that the preference and agreement level support the 
immediate development of MOEs from identified risks. They might alternately 
determine that the operations expert group should reconsider certain elements of 
their proceedings before a transition from identified risks to MOEs is made.
(25) Whatever the implications of the group preference and agreement level to the 
operational manager and operations expert group study leader, neither should 
consider MUA design complete until the demonstration’s end. The entire or 
elements of the process described by (1) through (24) can and should be repeated 
whenever during the course of a demonstration such repetition seems of value to the 
MUA.
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